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ABSTRACT

Many Forms of Black Death: Coal extraction, Transnational Activism and the Value of Life
in Colombia
by
OSCAR PEDRAZA

Advisor: Marc Edelman
After the murder of the president and vice president of the coal union by paramilitaries in
the department of Cesár, Colombia, the union is left adrift. Its fragility is only heightened when
the person who decides to take over, is killed six months later. The union has been vocal on
their critique of environmental destruction produced by coal and argues that their criticism is
part of the reasons why they were targeted. Not far from there, in the department of Guajira,
the conglomerate in charge of Cerrejón, the largest open-pit coal mine of South America, wants
to divert a creek to expand their operations. Indigenous communities, lawyers and
environmental activists struggle to impede the diversion, claiming that the plan to divert the
creek is a direct threat to human and non-human life in the region.
Both cases – the Bruno Creek diversion in the department of Guajira and the murder
Valdemoré Lorcano and Víctor Orcasita- are used in Colombia and European countries to
intervene in conversations about energy transitions, political violence, environmental
degradation, war, impunity and the responsibility of transnational corporations. However, the
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cases are not always considered important, and they are often presented in diverse ways,
depending on the specific objectives of scholars, activists, NGOs or grassroots organizations.
In this study I analyze what makes certain deaths more relevant than others, what makes
some forms of dying more important than others, and what makes the claim of the universal
value of life the condition of possibility for the marginalization of certain forms of death over
others. By conducting a transnational analysis of the circulation of these cases, from Colombia
to countries like Germany and the United kingdom, I maintain that there are some basic
elements that organize the relevance of death: first, the anthropocentric hierarchy that
subordinates nature to the human, and makes the former relevant only as long as it can be
connected to the latter. Second, the idea that beyond the extended moral claim of a universal
recognition of human life, the death of certain humans is considered more relevant than others.
Third, the social and material relations through which violence is defined.
The historical making of the dichotomy between nature and society not only reproduces
the idea of the environment as an economic resource that is supposed to serve humanity, but it
creates a hierarchical valuation of life. Violence is not an ahistorical concept, but it depends
on specific and geo-historical material relations that help to define what is considered violence
and, in that connection, what forms of death are considered relevant. In the context of a
longstanding war and a transitional justice scenario such as those in Colombia, the
epistemological articulation of violence has been concentrated by a notion of violence related
to the legal frameworks and discourses, institutions and practices of human rights and armed
conflict. In this study I show that the prevalence of these notions of violence reproduces
dichotomies of nature and society, and often understands nature as a theater of operations of
war or as war booty. Furthermore, I show how in the transnational circulation of the cases
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contested definitions of war, violence, and environment are produced, depending on the actors,
the institutions, the political objectives and the discourses at each location where the cases are
discussed.
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Introduction
I did not know what to do with that pain. With the anger. With the frustration that the
disappearance of my father did to the people that reached out to me at meetings, gatherings,
conferences and parties. I did not know, mostly because they did not know either. They stopped
me when I was walking to the bathroom, when I was hanging out with my friends, when the
meeting ended. Their faces and their tears in their eyes. Their "I know who you are and I am going
to stay here, staring at you, scrutinizing your face in my search for the signs of your father." Their
hugs, their care. Their hands holding my arm, taking me to their group for a “I want you to
introduce you to this guy. He is the son of…”. The "I have that photo of you and your father on
my desk" and the look in their eyes, full of sadness and hope, vibrating with emotions that none of
us are able to understand.
I was conducting fieldwork in Germany for this project when I met a group of women
working on extractivism in Berlin. Colombian exiles have created a vast network of support in
Europe, focusing on many issues related to the histories of political violence. But it is not common
to see a collective dedicated explicitly to extractivism. I finished the interview and told them that
I was doing this because I wanted to make sense of death in a different way. I told them that even
though I valued the work of solidarity groups in relation to political violence, I have always sensed
that something was missing. That in the midst of death, the event of violence mattered more than
the struggles that led people to become targets. Suddenly, one of them seemed paralyzed and asked
for my name, realizing my family ́s history. But she did not talk about my father. She talked about
my mother. About the moment when my mom was fired from the NGO she worked for because
she was a security risk, right after my father was disappeared by the Colombian army. She told me
that she learnt what dignity meant that day. That woman invited me to her apartment, introduced
1

me to her family, repeating the story of my mom while her German husband and their kid stared
at me as if I were a ghost from the past.
What is the difference? Why was my father's death more important than the life of a woman
who fought to make my life possible?
----While working for a project for Colombia´s recently appointed truth commission, I was
told about a report that I knew to be in my house. Specifically, my father ́s library. I started to read,
looking for sources, evidence, narrations that could help me to develop the project. Out of nowhere
a memory came and crushed me like a hammer. I used to do something similar when I was a kid.
I would arrive from school and start to read reports, magazines and notes that contained events of
violence in Colombia. I wanted to understand why my father was not with me, why I could not
play soccer again with him, why I was in such a horrible emotional disarray, unable to say that my
father was actually dead. I went through those reports looking for stories that could help me to
understand what could have happened to him, where could he be, what kinds of torture he might
be going through.
But I could not.

All I found was the uncertainty of violence beating me up, the many layers of terror that
made me stop in the middle of a soccer field to cry. The paralysis that took over my life and forced
me to hide myself for hours crying at the school. But my father is not the only disappeared in
Colombia. During my undergraduate years I met dozens of people like me. Kids with relatives
killed, tortured, disappeared. Kids looking for answers who had experienced the imposed silence
of being unable to tell their stories. At the very least, we listened to each other. At that moment for
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us, our stories could not be mapped in political hierarchy, but this was not the case for everyone.
For political parties, aid agencies, NGOs, journalists, scholars, social movements and government
institutions, some stories were more relevant while others were not, and a few were stories to hide.
The valuation of death seems an obvious process at first: people move on and forget, the world
changes and with that, the relevance of death. However, in the discourses, practices and institutions
of human rights a different moral claim is made, one that argues that every life has the same value.
The universalist discourse of human rights argues for the recognition of the equal value of all
human life, regardless of what that human is or was. This claim, as important as it is, seemed to
me at odds with the practices, interests and relations I have personally experienced. While human
rights activists, institutions and discourses make the claim of a universal equality of life, I kept
confronting the fact that not all lives were deemed equal, that certain experiences were sidelined
or disregarded in favor of others. Nevertheless, every once in a while a forgotten story would be
picked up by someone else, a modality of dying that lost relevance and faded from the public eye
10 years ago would suddenly acquire importance, bringing the cases back to life, shining a light
into the abyss of oblivion.
My mother once said to me something I cannot forget. After a friend of hers died from a
heart attack while teaching, with tears in her eyes she said: "I look at the past and I only see a pile
of bones,” an image that came back to me while watching Marina Abramovic’s “Balkan Baroque.”
There she was, surrounded by a pile of bones, cleaning them while singing. An anonymous pile of
bones that is the ground where we stand today, where the history of the persons is displaced by the
presence of the bones, by the impacting image of death as massive and indistinguishable.
It is this idea of a diffused past — where every bone becomes the anonymous representation of
an idea of death without history — that I found to be the most violent. There is a tension between
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the claim that every life has the same value and the material histories, political interests and affects
in which events of death occur. By disconnecting the histories of conflict that produce death in the
cases of human rights violations, certain institutions and actors in the networks of human rights
focus on the sacred respect of bare life (Agamben 1998), diminishing the importance of the larger
political and historical conditions that create forms of violence that result in death. In my own
history, that meant that my father ́s life seemed less important than his disappearance. Somehow,
this fading away of history and conflict, made to privilege the event of violence, becomes
instrumental for the reproduction of those conditions of violence.
In this study I analyze what makes certain deaths more relevant than others, what makes some
forms of dying more important than others, and what makes the claim of the universal value of life
the condition of possibility for the marginalization of certain forms of death over others. I do this
by studying the process for the making of two cases of human rights violations in relation to coal
extraction in the Caribbean region of Colombia, specifically in the departments of Cesár and
Guajira. These cases are:
1) The diversion of the Arroyo Bruno in Lowland Guajira. This case deals specially with
environmental violence and the conflict between Cerrejón, the largest open-pit coal mine
in South America, owned by a transnational consortium between BHP-Billiton, Glencore
and Anglo American.
2) The murder in 2001 of Valdemoré Lorcano and Víctor Orcasita, president and vicepresident of the Union SINTRAMINERGETICA and workers of a mine owned by
Drummond in the region of Cesár. The murder was conducted by paramilitary forces, and
human rights activists claim that Drummond was directly involved in it.
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For a period of 18 months, I followed lawyers, human rights and environmental activists,
scholars, bureaucrats, NGOs representatives and grassroots leaders from the sites where the events
occurred to the sites in which these cases were put together, debated, countered and used to further
different political objectives. This led me to follow the cases through the transnational networks
of human rights and environmental institutions and practices, from Colombia to Germany, the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In the process I conducted participant observation and
interviews in the departments of Magdalena, Cesár and Guajira in the Caribbean of Colombia,
where the mines and ports are located.
I followed activists, scholars and lawyers in Bogotá, at conferences, meetings, social
movement gatherings, rallies, offices of NGOs and government institutions to understand how a
particular conflict or event of violence was presented as a case of human rights violation. I also
followed these events as they were being presented and discussed in Germany and the U.K, where
I interviewed members of NGOs and scholars interested in the discussions of coal in Colombia
and its relations to human rights violations. I conducted 60 interviews with activists, experts on
human rights and energy discussions at all of these locations. Finally, I conducted documentary
research in which I followed not only the processes of gathering evidence, but the making of
reports, brochures, objects for the dissemination of the case and the ways in which the documents
were arranged to become legal and political cases of human rights violations.
This study interrogates the assumption that events of violence automatically become relevant
to human rights actors, discourses and institutions by virtue of the idea that life — and death —
has a universal equal value. I argue instead that it is in their circulation and interaction with
multiple actors in transnational discourses, institutions and practices that the value of certain lives
and deaths is created. Hence, this research is organized around three main premises: first, that the
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universalist assumption —deeply ingrained at the core of human rights moral dispositions— of
the equal value of human life is confronted with the interests, objectives and geo-historical
conditions that create hierarchies of the value of life and death. Second, that events of violence do
not inherently become cases of human rights, despite the claim that any threat to life is a threat to
the rights of the human. Finally, that in spite of the many developments to bridge and bring together
the realms of human and environment, they are still seen as substantially differentiated realms,
and thus institutions, activists, experts and grassroots movements are constantly negotiating the
value of the cases, defining the limits of environmental violence and human rights, and struggle to
situate them in one realm or the other.
One of the most common claims made in contexts of violence like that of Colombia is that
every life -and therefore every death- is equally important. In Colombia, after fifty years of war,
more than 200,000 people have died and more than 150,000 have disappeared. In such a context,
the claim that Colombians need to consider life as sacred and basic moral code to stop massive
and continuous death, has become a powerful argument in the public sphere, with politicians and
activists presenting it as a central element of their political projects. In 2005, the government of
Alvaro Uribe Vélez initiated a highly questioned peace process with paramilitary groups united
under the name of Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), which opened the discussion on
transitional justice scenarios, victimhood, reparations and non-repetition. Later, in 2012, President
Juan Manuel Santos started peace negotiations with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia (FARC), the oldest guerrilla movement of the continent.
During this period most South American countries relied on extractivist economic practices as
their main source of revenue. As a specific economic formation, neo-extractivism could be defined
as the large-scale exploitation of natural resources for export. It follows the idea that natural
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resources (or nature as a resource) are commodities with few costs and large revenues, creating a
competitive advantage that can be invested in development projects and the diversification of
national economies (Burchardt and Dietz 2014; Gudynas 2009; Svampa and Viale 2014). Hence,
neo-extractivism becomes the center of the economic project of the country, and often leads to a
heightened dependence on a small number of primary product exports, rather than to a diversified
economy as was promised (Gudynas 2010; North and Grispun 2016; Martínez Alier 2015).
The emergence of new governments at the beginning of this century led to a sense of hope and
oceans of ink discussing their meaning in the global political scheme. Post-neoliberal, pink wave,
left-turn and other terms tried to capture these novel times. Countries like Bolivia and Ecuador
moved fast into the critique of transnational corporations´ use of natural resources, and at first
offered changes in that regard, with new constitutions that reflected the protection of nature and
the recognition of indigenous epistemologies. However, as the global prices of commodities rose,
these countries (and others) saw an opportunity to boost their development-oriented projects, and
quickly started to re-articulate their economies around natural resource extraction.
Indigenous and peasant movements, environmental activists and political organizations began
to question the reliance of these governments on natural resource extraction, the destruction of the
environment and the betrayal of the accords around its protection.1 Garcia Linera, former vice
President of Bolivia under Evo Morales, famously joined the debate, arguing the importance of
the sovereign use of nature to propel progressive agendas, while questioning academics and
activists for providing a simplistic portrayal of indigenous groups and peasant movements, who
according to him not only needed development projects, but were in favor of them (Linera 2012).
Authors like Gudynas (2012) Zibechi (2015), Garcia- Torres (2017) and Sousa Santos (2014)

1

I will expand on this subject below in the Introduction.
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intensified their criticism of the policies of these governments, as they considered that political
projects that could further alternatives to neoliberal capitalism were instead retracting their course
and locking these countries at the bottom of the capital chain of production.
Furthermore, Svampa (2012a, 2012b) explicitly questioned the economic risk of over relying
on the inherent instability of the commodity markets, the fact that extractivism turned these
countries into mere providers of raw materials at a global scale, and the ways in which these
governments persecuted critical organizations. To summarize, the debate was much more than a
disengaged analysis of the development of state projects through the use of nature, but a lively and
sometimes painful political confrontation, in which scholars with an important public presence and
longstanding political involvement, sometimes -former- defenders of these governments,
addressed these concerns as they saw that the process of materializing alternatives were at risk of
crumble down.
Although Colombia participated of this extended continental economic decision, it did not
intensified it as other countries of the hemisphere, although not for lack of trying. When the
Colombian government decided to act at a large scale, Colombian social movements had taken
notice of the many disputes already happening in Ecuador, Argentina and Bolivia (Bebbington and
Bury 2013; Villalba Eguiluz and Etxano 2017; Chiasson-Lebel 2016; Webber 2014). Before the
commodity bubble burst in 2014, President Santos spoke of the mining locomotive as a massive
project of intensification of mining extractivism throughout the country, which would partially be
able to finance the peace accords, as well as the promise of development. Grassroots movements
throughout the country were able to stop or stall many of these projects, putting in question the
effectiveness of the locomotive as a developmental project (Gobel and Ulloa 2014; Ulloa and
Coronado 2016).
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In this context, victims of the violence of war, as well as NGOs, scholars, and peasant and
indigenous organizations, emerged as significant actors that demanded justice for the crimes
committed by the different actors of the Colombian war: paramilitaries, the state and guerrillas.2
After the signing of the peace accords and in accordance with international tradition, the
Colombian government established a Transitional Justice System, known as Sistema Integral de
Verdad, Justicia y Reparación y no Repeticiòn (SIVJRR) with three main institutions: a Truth
Commission, an Alternative Justice System (JEP) based on restorative justice and a Search Unit
of Disappeared People. The cases analyzed in this dissertation are caught in between these different
political and economic processes: they are environmental conflicts that have different degrees of
participation of armed actors in the context of war.

The Case
As I will show in the pages below, the idea of violence linked to the war concentrated for
a long period the relevance of death -stressing the centrality of human death-, and thus
marginalized other forms of death and other beings that die, because they could not be concretely
situated as resulting from war. In this study I maintain that there are some basic elements that
organize the relevance of death: First, the anthropocentric hierarchy that subordinates nature to the
human, and makes the former relevant only as long as it can be connected to the latter. Second,
the idea that beyond the extended moral claim of a universal recognition of human life, the death
of certain humans is considered to be more relevant than others. Third, the social and material
relations through which violence is defined. 3 The cases in my study highlight the struggle of

2
3

Some organizations claim that there no difference should be made between the state and paramilitary forces.
I will expand on these later in this introduction.
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activists, scholars, victims and institutions to position specific events as relevant cases, all in the
midst of the development of the promise of transitional politics.
When I first started this project, a lawyer asked me what I meant by the term case. She told
me that in her organization, they understood a case as having three characteristics: first, that it can
be won, meaning that it makes sense to spend time and effort in its litigation; second -and a direct
result of the first point-, that there is enough evidence to make it relevant, which as a corollary,
also means that evidence could be gathered to further strengthen the case; finally, that it has the
potential to highlight similar cases. This, according to her, was a highly pragmatic definition of a
case, but it worked in the context of a human right´s NGO that required to maximize their resources
and show to the public and their allies concrete successes. Her explanation is an straightforward
description of what is often known as strategic litigation or high impact litigation, the tactical
decision to mobilize cases with the objective of pushing for the transformation of specific social
conflicts in the public sphere ( Díaz et al. 2010; Rodríguez et al. 2011; Solvang 2008).
This definition is closely tied to a consideration about the status of law and legality as a
privileged site of action. In Colombia, where most of my fieldwork took place, the history of
human rights activism is inextricably tied to escalation of war and violence, at least since the 1970s.
Several scholars have pointed out that human rights discourses, institutions and practices have
been relevant for Colombian political and social movements, both as a form of protection from
state-sponsored violence and a form to achieve specific objectives (Tate 2007). For some of these
authors, the escalation of violence steered a transition from the use of human rights as a political
tactic to its definition as the main political objective (Gill 2016; González Jácome 2019, Van
Ischoot 2015). In their analysis, other forms of political action that were considered relevant
political tactics in the 1970´s and 1980´s in the country -such as strikes, land invasions, agitprop,

10

physical confrontations with the police or the military and clandestine activities- were gradually
displaced by the use of human rights as a claim of protection of human beings and in the context
of a country that experienced a massive scalation of violence against leftists organizations.
By the mid-nineties unions, peasant and indigenous movements and leftists political parties
were often stigmatized as being the facades of guerrillas, and thus their murders or disappearances
were explained away (if not directly justified) as the result of their alleged relation and support of
the terrorism embodied by guerrillas. Increasingly, grassroots movements started to move away
from more radical forms of action and embraced the discourses, practices and institutions of human
rights as sites of possibility. As a result, the realm of law, the knowledge of legislation, the use of
human rights litigation and of the intricacies of legal bureaucracies acquired an unprecedented
relevance that led to a common understanding of law as the privileged site for political activity.
Thus, the predominance of human rights, discourses and institutions ties the case to its
potential legal impact. Achieving a favorable resolution through legal means became relevant, for
it created a sense of validation of what the case contend. This is heightened by two elements: first
the staggering levels of impunity in the country -which means that for lawyers, NGOs and activists
if a case achieve a positive legal resolution it can help to turn the wave of impunity around- ;
second, the introduction in the twenty-first century of transitional justice processes -which have as
one of their central concepts the promise of an institutionally validated truth as a form of
transparency that leads to public condemnation and, in the long term, the guarantee that certain
things will not repeat again-. The combination of these two elements led to the idea that a legal
resolution equates to transparency, justice and a sense of truth that can effectively transform the
conditions that originally created violence.
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Nevertheless, my fieldwork shows a more nuanced picture, partially because of the nature
of the cases and the actors involved in them -which have a critical stance on the importance given
to law in spite of the fact that their work often upholds it relevance-. For reasons that I will explain
in more detail later in this introduction -and in the chapters-, the cases I followed do not fall in neat
categories of legal or political corpuses , and their circumstances, actors and expectations struggled
with the importance given to law as a the ultimate site of politics. I am not suggesting that law is
a congealed field while everything else is in flux. On the contrary, law -its making, writing and
institutional-political legitimacy- is also a field of struggle, constantly changing and historically
situated. The cases of this research put in question the normative configurations that define certain
arrangements of law in Colombia, their naturalization and the ways in which the actors involved
make sense of them, particularly those concerned with environmental violence and violence in the
context of war.
The actors in this research gravitate between two paths: on the hand, the critique of the
weight that legality has in the practices of activism; on the other, the fact that they need to organize
their actions and strategies in ways that reproduce the status of the legal as a privileged site of
conflict resolution. The question of how to articulate a case so it could be effective, is for them a
question of what legal fields and epistemologies it will interpolate, what kinds of debates it will
interact with and what kind of stories, experiences and conflicts will be sidelined in the process.
The actors I followed recognized these tensions as informing their activities and epistemic
articulations of violence related to coal extraction, and created strategies to intervene in and beyond
the formal legal realm. Without dismissing the relevance of law, in fact considering that extending
the sites of intervention could favor the possibilities of legal activities, they made documentaries,
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songs, reports, brochures and events like conferences, rallies and gatherings in which the cases
exist beyond the exclusive realm of legality and litigation.
Because of these plurality of sites, objects, narrations and actors, I study the case as an
artifact, an object that emerges through the organization and articulation of legal, affective,
political and evidentiary practices; the form that the case takes depends on the negotiations,
interests and conflicts of many different actors, discourses and institutions, as well as its circulation
beyond the realm of the legal through conflict. The case is the result of social practices and
struggles, rather than a simple compendium of data that presents an objective reality validated by
a legal truth. Although the case is indeed composed of evidence, testimonies, affective
dispositions, documents (such as video clips, brochures, documentaries, NGO reports, posters,
songs and YouTube clips) and legal documentation -and thus being a legal case is one of its
manifestations-, its organization is mediated by the practices and negotiations of those involved
and the sites in which it will be presented (Brey 2005; Latour 1992; Riles 2006; Suchman 2003)
It is far from new to state that the production of history is full of political decisions that
entail the silencing and amplification of the importance of specific events. As Trouillot explains,
silences are constitutive of the creation of historical facts, which means that the facts that create
history are inherently unequal (Trouillot 1995: 48). Trouillot reminds us of the power of archives,
as institutionalized sites in which their own arrangement of data constitutes the conditions of
possibility of the ways in which history is assembled. He argues that it is not necessarily that the
facts are not there, but that the archive is already organized through power struggles, it is formed
precisely through the political relevance that is given to what resides in it.
In his analysis of the Haitian revolution as a non-event, Troulliot says that the revolution
itself was unthinkable in Europe, for it defied the analytical frameworks available in the
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Enlightenment era. This was the case for the novel ideas of the universal recognition of the human
were incompatible with the colonial assumption of Europeans’ superior capacity to rule (Trouillot
1995: 82). This impossibility to make sense of an event is a challenge for any attempt at legibility,
for it shows the limits of categories, their inadequacy for description and, in many cases, the limits
of political imagination.
The cases of this research embody the conflicting forms in which the past and the present
are organized to intervene in political debates about violence, war, death and environmental
degradation. The public presentation of the murder of union leaders or the diversion of a creek
depend on the ways in which the elements that constitute the artifact are arranged and presented at
courtrooms, conferences, meetings, rallies and offices of NGOs and aid agencies. But the
documents, testimonies and objects of evidence, are also historically constituted, already charged
with their own silences and tensions, containing the traces of many forms of layered conflicts and
contradictions (Stoler 2010).
Similarly, political objectives, geo-historical locations, audiences and negotiations, all
become part of the ways in which the case emerges to be presented. This is the fundamental reason
why I refrained from deciding which cases I would be analyzing prior to starting my fieldwork.
Choosing the cases was the first moment of my ethnographic work, as it was a decision based on
the actors ́ analysis of the political context and their projected work. My personal experience with
victimhood in Colombia taught me that the importance of a case depends on the convergence of
the actors, interactions, interests and sensibilities, both in Colombia and at a transnational level.
Therefore, among the thousands of cases and events of violence available, I decided to use cases
that the lawyers, activists and NGOs were currently working on, both as part of their political
strategies as well as in their legal and evidentiary sense.
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I consider useful to define the case as multiple, following Mol, for it is assembled according
to specific locations, audiences and interests, and responds to the contingencies of its emergence.
In her study of arteriosclerosis, historian of medicine Annemarie Mol argues that “far from
necessarily falling into fragments, multiple objects tend to hang together somehow” (Mol, 2002:
5). Moreover, the author asserts that “if not removed from the practices that sustain it, reality is
multiple [...] But attending to the multiplicity of reality is also an act” (Mol 2002: 6).
The disease, from this point of view, becomes a social relation rather than a set of fixed
data that defines its meaning. Mol engages with the ethnographic importance of analyzing the
practices that make a disease, importantly, the way in which these practices enact arteriosclerosis.
As I will show in the following chapters, attending to the practices of those involved in the making
of cases means that is not possible to consider the case as presenting itself homogenously across
geographies, institutions and actors, but as always depending on the interactions of those involved.
Therefore, the case of the murder of union leaders related to coal extraction in Colombia is very
different in Netherlands. The actors involved pursue a sense of clarity in the case that could
translate into legibility and, in that connection, a sense of transparency and justice on the matters
that the case deals with. However, the fact that the case appears simultaneously at different
locations defies the expectations of a linear narration and most of the times the very attempt for
clarity that it seeks to achieve. This is a problematic situation for those involved in the cases. The
actors I followed are not significantly interested in the speculative forms of history that could be
generated in the analysis of multiplicity of the case. On the contrary, they have concrete objectives
related to judicial responsibilities of corporations with regard the different forms of violence
produced by extractivist practices.
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For that reason, it is important for them the creation of a case that could depict a conflict
with clarity and transparency, namely, that could be stable to pursue a firm road of action.
Colombian activists expect that the ways in which the case exists in Europe can serve the purposes
of Colombian struggles. When this does not happen -which as I will show is more often than notit becomes a problem for the actors involved and creates conflicts along the transnational networks
involved. On the other hand, these situations generally show the limits of the practices, institutions
and epistemologies in which these cases operate, creating questions about the historical formations
of notions such as violence, environment, legality and transitional justice.
In Colombia union leaders are grappling with the new formations of political violence, the
arrangements of a plurality of practices of violence aimed to obliterate the union movement, and
therefore are struggling to redefine the role of physical armed violence in relation to legal,
affective, labor and environmental violence. Meanwhile, NGOs and activists in Europe are focused
on tying the case to the corporation’s responsibility for the murders, fixating the case to its relation
to physical violence in the armed conflict. Similarly, the debates on climate change and energy
transitions in Germany mediate an articulation of the Bruno conflict as revolving around those
very issues, giving it an unprecedented relevance. Meanwhile in Colombia, the Bruno case
struggles to gain traction, for it is not explicitly related to the violence of war. In that sense, the
case exists simultaneously at different sites in a multiplicity mediated. by the geo-historical
conditions in which it exist. As I will explain in detail below in this introduction, this is to an
important extent the result of the definitions of violence and, in particular, the process through
which the actors involved argued as to why the form of violence that was at the center of their case
was urgent, timely and more important than others. In the case of the union leaders’ murders, the
form of violence that is privileged in the case is that linked to a form of violence within the
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framework of armed conflict and paramilitarism. In the Bruno case, the central concern is
environmental violence and European responsibility. And while in both cases the actors try to
expand the definition of violence in order to address pressing issues that go beyond a narrow
understandings of violence, they keep being presented with obstacles to achieve that, whether it
be the result of the public debates in specific locations or because the constraints of the legal fields
impede its reconceptualization.
In Foucault’s discussion of the concept of genealogy, he argues for a project that rejects
the search for the origins and essences of the past, as well as teleologies that prescribe the future.
In this way, the past is not defined by the transparency of a process that leads from point A to point
B: “To follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper
dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations […] the errors, the false appraisals
and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for
us (Foucault 1978: 146). The actors of this dissertation are actively searching for that sense of
truth, for that essential secret that hides beneath the layers of impunity and that might be able to
bring justice. In that search, they make plans with the objective of unveiling something that could
be defined as a stable fact, a sense of truth for victims, institutions and the public. However, in my
research I analyze the case by paying attention to those errors, accidents and uncertainties that
make of the case, not a neatly defined narration, but a contested plurality of possibilities that are
never fully realized.
The problem posed by Foucault here is important for many reasons on this dissertation,
and I will come back to it at different moments. Human rights are often considered at the pinnacle
of modernity and Enlightment, a major victory of their values, morals and promises.4 The
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This is explained in a remarkable manner by Lynn Hunt (2007), when she traces what she calls the invention of
human rights through the emergent humanist ideals in the eighteenth century in Europe and North America.
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discourses and institutions of human rights have strongly embraced such standards,

5

and with

them an idea of time as progress that assimilates justice to a linear progression. Transitional justice
also makes that promise, stressing the notion of transition in which society moves from a state of
violence to one of stability, a promise of peace that begins in a moment of chaos and ends in one
of order: first a state of war, followed by the filters of transition (with its apparatuses, discourses
and practices) and ending in a system of liberal democracy, free markets and reconciliation
(Castillejo 2017; Rothberg 2012). Even if it is assumed that transitional processes are not smooth
and contain many pitfalls, this linear sequence is presented as the ideal of transitional politics, and
the success of transition is largely defined by the possibility of asserting the idea of an aftermath,
often defined in terms of the making of liberal citizenships, liberal democracies and unregulated
but stable markets (Bowsher 2018; Andrieu 2010; Ulfe 2016 ).
This equation is a progression in which the disorder associated with violence is rendered
legible through transitional procedures, allowing a sense of clarification, reconciliation and coming
to terms. Justice is thought to be achieved through the possibility of clarification as a processual
organization of facts.6 Thus, lawyers, scholars and activists have been trained for decades in
making cases in ways that can articulate facts in a linear sequence, with causes and contexts that
explain them. Hence, modalities of violence that escape established legal frameworks and
conceptualizations of violence, or that cannot be registered by linear frameworks of analysis,
disturb the standardized practices and discourses that are regularly used to manage these cases.
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I will discuss this in length in chapter 2.
The idea of justice in ordinary legal systems often differs from what transitional justice offers, and this is not
different in Colombia. In principle, transitional justice exists because it is supposed to provide a different form of
justice that is directed to reconciliation and acknowledgment rather than punishment. However, my interest here is
less on the alleged purposes of justice and more on the ways in which the case is required to be organized according
to normative definitions of historization and narration.
6
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Violence and death
The cases analyzed here are based on events of violence that occurred in relation to coal
extractivism. But violence is plural in its meaning, practices, directions and effects. It creates as
much as it destroys and cannot be reduced to its physical dimension on human bodies. The cases
that are part of this research are not considered by those involved as belonging to the same forms
of violence. But that does not necessarily mean that they do not have their own restrictive
interpretations of what violence is, nor what modes of violence are considered relevant.
Violence related to coal in Colombia is often seen as resulting from two different processes.
On the one hand, conflicts linked to the armed conflict, understood as explicitly political, in which
the environment is regularly seen as a resource and land is a factor of production. In this analysis,
land and coal are seen as part of an economic struggle for accumulation purposes, while nature is
passive and located in the realm of the economy. On the other, they are the practices of extraction
that do not attend to regulations and are oriented towards the intensification of extraction and
maximizing revenues. This is often defined as environmental violence and while it can relate to
the armed conflict and its political dimension, it is usually defined as a different form of violence
by lawyers, government institutions and aid agencies.
As a definition that will organize many of the struggles of the actors in this work, the
transitional justice system in Colombia ratified this distinction between forms of violence,
suggesting that there were forms of violence within the armed conflict -which are the focus of the
system-, and other forms of violence, in which environmental conflicts would be located. Thus,
unless environmental conflicts could be explicitly linked to the armed conflict, they would not be
considered part of the transnational processes. Despite the fact that these two realms of violence
are entangled in substantial ways, during my fieldwork I saw that the fracture between human and
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environment had an enormous resonance in the definition of violence related to coal extraction
and thus, the ways in which the cases are arranged.
I conducted an ethnographic analysis of the procedures and epistemological operations that
contribute to arrange definitions of violence, and what these definitions do. My focus on studying
violence is on how the actors negotiate the demarcations of notions of violence and create
definitions of what violence is, as well as the hierarchies, exclusions and inclusions that these
definitions make possible.
There are political, legal and economic forces in the decisions and experiences of actors
that contribute to draw the lines that define modes of violence. These are important because they
help to create the institutional, legal and political routes of the case. They situate the cases in
relation to specific conflicts, projections of the future and imaginations of the past. Hence, the
ways in which the events are located within particular notions of violence define interlocutors,
institutional relations, venues of debate, the affective interpolations of the case and the strategies
to achieve objectives. But they also exclude the cases from their presence in other sites, sometimes
undermining their possibility of attaining their desired goals.
In the chapters that follow I discuss the ways in which the actors define violence in a
constant negotiation between the following elements: (1) human and environmental violence; (2)
political violence/violence of war; and (3) the different temporalities and velocities of violence. I
studied the processes through which actors defined the violence at the core of their cases, fought
for the legitimacy of that definition and thus the importance of the case. More than the effects of
the modalities of violence in the lives of people and the environment, my concern with violence is
also a concern with how defining violence contributes to the creation of the value of a case. The
ways in which violence is defined, namely, the limits, actions, objects, sites and perpetrators of
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specific forms of violence create sites of action as well, relations and contacts. However, they also
restrain the actors in their attempts to find forms of articulation that could address not only
modalities of violence, but sometimes even actors and forms of accountability.
James Tyner argues that violence does not have an essence that leads to a transhistorical
definition of its meaning. In fact, Tyner considers that “violence (and, by extension crime) is an
internally derived abstraction that is a contingent and contextual product of human interaction
(Tyner 2016: 9). He argues for a material understanding of the making of the concept of violence,
by suggesting a direct relation between the mode of production and how violence is defined. In
my research I follow his claim that violence is conceptually defined in relation to human
interaction, material relations and context.
Tyner indicates that the term violence is often considered obvious, self-explanatory and
existing independent of time. The author questions the idea that there is an essence of violence that
remains stable in time to claim that violence does not exist independently of its material form
(Tyner 2016: 201). By attending to this premise, Tyner denaturalizes the idea that violence is fixed
and transhistorical, and opens a path to the understanding the definition of violence as historically
situated, the result of practices and social relations, which in turn allows to understand how modes
of violence are , hierarchically organized, legitimized or obscured (Tyner 2016: 201). For him,
the idea that the definition of violence is historically constructed, helps to inquire what becomes
defined as violence and through what kind of processes, rather than following a pre-figured
definition of what violence is. In that connection, the value of modes of violence is related to the
historical conditions that organize their relevance and define what forms of violence are
understood as more important than others.

Analyzing the making of violence that is not

transhistorical, enables Tyner to do understand why the death of a person waiting to enter a hospital
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is not deemed as violence while other practices are. As I have mentioned before, the ways in which
the term violence is defined through material and social relations, allows to analyze the limits and
possibilities of the circulation and making of the cases.
Tyner suggests violence is contextual, but in the case of my research it is also contested,
for the actors involved are constantly defying and being defied by the normative definitions of
violence inscribed in human rights institutions and discourses, the definitions of environment and
nature, challenging the political possibilities of the cases themselves. As I will show in the first
chapter, violence in Colombia is largely associated with political violence, state terror, war and
armed conflict. As the violence of war dominated the analyses and policies of scholars, activists
and institutions, modes of violence that are unrelated to war do not receive the same attention. The
events examined in this study occurred in Colombia’s Caribbean region, which experienced an
impressive escalation of violence throughout the 1990s until the official demobilization of the
AUC paramilitaries in 2005. During that period assassinations, displacements and forced land
dispossession in the area were common and a constant part of discussions in human rights circles.
They were the material manifestation of a systematic attempt to obliterate leftists’ organizations
and any sign of opposition to the economic, political and cultural projects of the regional elites.
The intensity of political violence, its spectacular character and massiveness made them
substantially relevant, and thus other forms of violence were, if not deemed irrelevant, at least
accorded lesser importance.
But the numbers and terrifying descriptions of the practices of death are not enough to
maintain people’s attention indefinitely. Although the peace process with paramilitary groups
created the first moment of formal transitional politics in Colombia, it was far from successful,
and its promises were not accomplished. The peace process with FARC and the transitional
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scenarios it created since 2016 got entangled with the unfinished businesses and riveting effects of
the demobilization of paramilitarism. Likewise, new concerns emerged, and with them new
regions, victims, illegal armies, histories of violence and ways to approach them. The cases
analyzed in this study were trapped between the different legal, political and institutional
formations that defined the ways in which they were to be processed.
While the Bruno Creek conflict was considered environmental violence, the murder of the
union leaders is a traditional form of physical violence, often defined as political violence and
connected to war, but sometimes this distinction was insufficient in itself. The case of the union
leaders was not always considered part of the armed conflict, even if it was perpetrated by
paramilitary groups and is usually defined as part of the regional elites’ plan to obliterate unions
that oppose transnational corporations. On the other hand, the Bruno conflict moved between
humanitarian concerns about protecting the life of indigenous communities, climate change as
produced by an abstract humanity, and attempts to position the case in relation to a political
ecology of water grabbing, pollution, destruction of the landscape and extractivism.
The changing nature of the event created a different temporality, and as the violence
unfolded in everyday life, it became increasingly difficult to capture it as a case for legal purposes.
Furthermore, other environmental conflicts that saw an open involvement of illegal armies or that
generated events of violence against activists acquired the status of political in ways that Bruno
did not.
Despite the attempts of several actors to find ways to articulate the different forms of
violence and not reproduce a divide between nature and society, my fieldwork showed that these
attempts are constantly undermined by practical, material, political and tactical considerations that
further reinforce the divide. In sum, the expectations of a socio-natural world or a nature-culture,
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namely, the expectation of experiencing a political world without the divide and subordination of
nature by the human, were constantly shattered by bureaucratic dispositions, legal-political
infrastructures, aid agencies policy plans and contingent interests at the different sites were the
cases were debated and arranged.
One important element of the definition of violence in this work is that of velocity. In his
analysis of slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor, Robert Nixon opposes what he
defines as slow violence and spectacular or extraordinary violence. For Nixon slow violence is a
modality that explains environmental violence and the responses, representations and discussions
over it. The author defines it as “dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that
typically is not viewed as violence at all” (Nixon 2011: 2) and considers that is characteristic of
environmental violence.
Nixon not only describes environmental violence as unfolding at a different pace,
becoming part of the everyday of affected communities, degrading their lives and usually fading
into the background becoming unnoticed. On the contrary, he presents a stark contrast between
extraordinary violence and slow violence, situating this opposition at the center of his argument.
This is important for my research for these tensions inform how the actors of this study articulate
experiences of violence in the form of cases. In the definition of slow violence, Nixon argues that
because environmental violence merges with the everyday, because its own definition of “slow”
could mean decades or centuries, it is often sidelined. The author takes the example of 9/11, “which
reinforced a spectacular, immediately sensational, and instantly hyper-visible image of what
constitutes a violent threat.” In this example, he highlights the “representational bias against slow
violence” and argues that it even redefines the value of the casualties it creates: “casualties of slow
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violence become light-weight, disposable casualties” reinforcing the hierarchies of life and their
relative value (Nixon 2011: 13).
I find this discussion useful because Nixon argues that the ways in which violence is
conceptually articulated and represented allow for the making of its relevance. Nixon concentrates
his analysis in how “imaginative writing can help the unapparent appear” (Nixon 2011: 15)
unsettling the seeming ordinariness and marginalization of such forms of violence. In chapter two,
I discuss how activists attempt to achieve this goal, constantly struggling with the unequal attention
given to forms of extraordinary violence -to follow Nixon´s distinction- that sideline the violence
of environmental degradation away from public debate. However, the cases in this study are not
solely defined by the opposition between spectacular and slow violence. The two cases taken
together complicate the understandings of violence and the practices and epistemologies that
codify them. As neither of them fall neatly within the legal, political or geo-historical demarcations
of environmental or war violence, the cases are sites of creation and contention with the capacity
of putting in question the standardized discourses, institutions and practices through which these
cases circulate.
The case of the union leaders – which does not involve what is usually understood as
environmental violence- extends almost two decades after the spectacular event of their murder. It
falls in and out of the public sight, emerging and disappearing while activists, workers, lawyers
and scholars invent forms to rearticulate its potential, sometimes in ways that create conflicts
among the actors. The murder is an extraordinary event, but the aftermath, the threats to lawyers
and workers, the fear and the feeling of frustration sink into the everyday, also becoming ordinary,
resembling the slow degradation that Nixon points to when discussing slow violence. Nixon´s
interest in imaginative forms for rendering visible slow violence is part of the making of cases,
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because the exercise of violence is inscribed in the case itself. Although not exclusively as a
spectacular event, but as a permanent presence where the very meaning of violence is constantly
disputed, stretching violence in time, making the case a formation of violence itself.

On the transnational circulation of the case
My fieldwork shows that the circulation of a case is important in order to acquire relevance.
A case that remains still and quiet is a case that easily falls into oblivion. However, the possibilities
of its circulation depend as well on political conditions that allow geographical connections beyond
the site of the event, the capital city of Colombia and into the different countries in Europe that are
interested in coal extraction in the South American country.
The places and forms through which the cases circulate are far from random. On the
contrary, these cases exist in relation to the commodity chain of coal from Colombia to Europe.
As one of the top ten exporting countries, Colombia has supplied coal to countries like the United
Kingdom, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden since the late 1970s. Similarly, the region
in the Caribbean where coal is extracted in Colombia is connected both by its geological qualities
-massive reserves of coal- and by a large infrastructure of coal extraction and transportation. In
other words, the cases are materially grounded to the political economy of coal in concrete ways.
Not only because violence occurred in relation to coal practices, but because the sites of circulation
of the case, the debates and the political considerations are always in relation to the larger economy
of the coal industry.
The Department of Guajira, where the Bruno Creek case occurred, hosts the Cerrejón mine,
created in the late 1970s. This is the largest open pit mine in South America and one of the largest
in the world. The Cerrejón operation was central to the making of the main legal dispositions of
mineral extraction in the country, the frameworks of exports and the relation between the state and
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transnational corporations. It is not an exaggeration to say that it was the process of making the
mine and assembling its infrastructures of operation and administration that made possible the
discussions, legislations and projections for large-scale extraction of minerals in Colombia.
García shows that the history of coal resembles many other histories in Latin America in
which mineral extraction is portrayed as a future of modernization and progress, as well as a
connection to global markets. In her history of the mine, she traces the first explorations to 1865,
making the mine a continuous expectation of investment and progress that is only realized in the
second half of the twentieth century (García 2016: 302). The promised modernization will be the
constant backdrop of the development of extractivism in the country, supporting economic
decisions, political assertion and legal dispositions that favor an activity mostly conducted by
transnational corporations (Garcia 2016: 325). Initially the mine was created in a consortium
between the Colombian government and BhP Billiton. But at the turn of the new century the state
sold its part, and the mine is now a transnational consortium between Glencore, Anglo-American
and BhP Billiton, each one owning a third of the shares.
It is important to mention that Guajira is historically considered a marginal site, historically
defined as distant and at the very frontier of civilization. Its geography is largely imagined (Said
1978) as inhospitable, aggressive and wrapped in solitude. This has a lot to do with its lack of
water and desert landscapes, as well as with the presence of Wayuú indigenous communities across
the department. This way of imagining Guajira served Cerrejón enormously, as it has constantly
been able to present itself as the key actor that can bring the region into a new era of development.
Meanwhile, the murder of the union leaders occurred in Valledupar, capital city of Cesár,
and it is linked to Drummond, a family business formed in Alabama. Unlike Guajira, which has
only one major -although massive- mine, Cesár has eight mines currently operating, owned by
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Glencore-Xtrata, Drummond, Prodeco and Murray Energy -at one point a Goldman and Sachs
firm. Drummond started its negotiations with the Colombian government in 1985, but only began
its operations in 1995, and was later joined by the other corporations.
As I will explain in the first chapter, the history of coal in Cesár could be told as the
transformation from cotton and cattle ranching to coal extraction. This meant a shift in
environmental practices and conflicts between landowners and peasant organizations, for regional
elites supported coal extraction and favored the move out of agriculture as the department´s main
economy. In the 1990´s the region saw an emergence of political violence, conducted mostly by
paramilitary groups allied with elites, corporations and the military. It is in this context of sustained
violence aimed for the obliteration of political opposition that the murder of the union leaders
occurs.
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Figure 1 Source: Agencia Nacional de Minería (National Mining Agency).

The sites that are part of this research are all connected by the circulation of coal, whether
it be by its logistics of extraction, transportation and administration, or by its financing and
consumption. David Harvey has questioned the idea that the term globalization defines the present
in terms of deterritorialized relations, of flows and networks that cannot be captured in space
(Harvey 1981; 1995). As Schoenberger suggests in his comment on Harvey ́s work, “the
geographic spread of investment, output and consumption is one critical avenue for the absorption
of excess capital” and “the creation of an expanded and improved built environment—investment
in the whole suite of physical installations that sustain and enhance the system’s ability to create
wealth” (Schoenberger 2004: 427-428). From the mines and the ports in Colombia to the NGOs
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and thermoelectrics in Germany and the Netherlands, capital related to coal extraction has a
material form and is distributed in uneven yet interconnected ways along the chain, producing
concrete sociopolitical relations and interests. It is at these sites where the cases emerge, are
debated and contested. The circulation of the cases is tied to the political economy of coal and
energy. Discussions about energy transitions in Germany and the U.K, the European responsibility
to Cesár and Guajira and the comparative quality of Colombian coal are all entangled through the
material networks articulated by the commodity chain with the deaths of union leaders,
paramilitary groups, water grabbing, militarization and massive pollution in Colombia.
Commodity chains are not exclusively unidirectional, and they do not necessarily depend
on an incremental value-making as the commodity moves along the chain (Tsing 2009; Sylvanus
2016). In an important way, the case can exist simultaneously at different sites across continents,
although it could have significantly different meanings, intentions and even present different
realities. I thus followed the cases as they emerged at different sites, rather than as objects that
acquire their form as they move along the chain, becoming fully formed at their arrival in Europe.
The result is that a case exists simultaneously at several nodes of the chain in contradictory and
sometimes even antagonistic ways, in turn creating different political experiences and relations to
coal extraction, violence and death in Colombia.
As I argue in the different chapters, European anti-coal activists are for the most part
concerned with three problems: energy transitions, the effect of coal in climate change and the
continental capacity for accountability of transnational corporations. From these, many tactics,
actions and interventions unfold, in areas such as labor, divestment, corporation ́s transparency
and the ethical responsibility of consumers in Europe. Nevertheless, these concerns require that
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the cases are articulated in ways that speak to European audiences and that could become part of
specific public conversations on the matter.
The cases take specific forms with the aim of impacting those discussions, rather than
being congealed in one exclusive way. The decisions of the arrangement of the case depend on the
specific articulations of coal political and economic relations in particular places, but this does not
always mean that the case maintains a concrete connection with the interests of those directly
affected in Colombia, nor with the social movements, lawyers or activists in that country. These
tensions have been studied extensively by those who have examined transnational social
movements and transnational campaigns (Seidman 2007; Gill 2009; Pellow 2007). In the
dissonance between the Global North and South in relation to a particular event or conflict, what
becomes increasingly clear is not only a question about objectives or representation, but a
significantly different articulation of the political form of the cases and through them, the ways in
which social movements imagine and enact how life should be.

Value
Anthropology has been able to unpack the term “value” by questioning approaches that
assume it as a fixed characteristic of objects and exchange. Instead, anthropologists have
understood value as a social relation in which practices are crucial. For the purposes of this
research, I am considering the approaches of authors such as Graeber, Ferry and Verdery, who not
only summarize the theoretical debates on the matter, but also propose notions of value in which
circulation and socio-material practices help to rethink value beyond fixed definitions or formulas.
Graeber aims for an analysis of the different approaches in anthropology to the concept to
articulate what he considers a materialist approach, in which value is determined by situated
practices and what Verdery defines as the contextual meaning of those practices. His approach
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aims to understand, not a general rule for the definition of value, but the material relations that
make the relative importance of an object in a given social situation. Following Marx, Turner and
others, Graeber suggests thinking of value as defined by actions and practices always in relation
to material conditions (Graeber 2001: 55).
Meanwhile, Verdery argues for an ethnographic analysis of the making of value that takes
into consideration three dimensions: meaningfulness (referring to the idea of value as a linguistic
consideration of differences), economy (as a measure of desire) and as a function of context
(Verdery 2002: 23). Finally, Ferry stresses the importance of the networks in which the objects
circulate, and the changing nature of value within those networks. In particular, Ferry maintains
that there is a crucial role in value-making processes in the institutions, discourses, actors and
practices that interact with objects (2013). She is interested in the circulation of an object and the
relation between its movement, social interactions and value-making processes.
These authors stress that value cannot be defined as formulaic, and instead suggest a careful
analysis of the social processes that make it. Building on their analyses, I see the value of the case
as relative to the sites in which it is presented, the practices and interests of the actors and the
political and material relation in which it is articulated. The Bruno dispute not only speaks to
specific interests of Germany's energy transition debates, but it is articulated in a way in which the
reality it presents situates the case itself at the center of European discussions of climate change
and the continent ́s responsibility for CO2 emissions from burning imported coal. However, in
Colombia the case remain marginal, for it fails to speak to what is understood to be more pressing
concerns about the history of war in the country. In different ways, the actors involved with these
cases have strategic analysis of contexts, desires (objectives) and material relations that mediate
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the arrangement of the cases and in turn, the concrete presentation of the different forms of
violence in Colombia.

Human rights sensibilities and the perils of an abstract universalism:
The normative framework of Human Rights defines a universal notion of the human,
promoting the idea that “human rights are the rights one has simply because one is a human being”
(Donelly 2013: 1). Donnelly calls this premise moral universality (2013: 1), and it could be
considered a cornerstone of the development and global expansion of human rights. This notion
of universalism has had a significant strength, and has enabled a powerful moral claim for the
protection of the universal human. It has made it possible for human rights NGOs, activists and
multilateral organizations to develop projects around the protection of these rights, and on multiple
occasions these have served social movements around the world to protect their existence.
However, the abstraction of the human is contentious in itself, for it has been used for very
different objectives. Several authors have addressed the ways in which the universalism of human
rights undermines local experiences, legal institutions or cultural differences, as well as justified
imperialist actions over an idea of protection of human rights, largely defining the universal as the
pinnacle of liberal rationalism, as the clearest manifestation of its victory in the post-cold war era
(Asad 2000; Hopgood 2013; Whyte 2017, Brown 2004; Mutua 2013). However, it is important to
notice that even with this critique in mind, it is not less true that social movements translate human
rights for their own contexts, intervene in global discussions of rights making and push forward
specific objectives by navigating the legal and moral complexities that human rights provide
(Edelman 2014; Merry 2006; Merry and Levitt 2017; Theidon 2012).
The making of the human as an abstraction is important for the claim of universality, but
at the same time it creates the idea of a non-historical humanity, namely, that the human is not
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grounded in histories, conflicts and relations of power which ultimately, constitute it. The
naturalization of the notion of the human and its universalism might mean, for some, that the
definition of what constitutes humanity is actually geo-historically located within the constraints
of Europe, and thus it creates a privileged subject that is associated with humanity, leaving other
groups outside this universal claim, or defined always in relation to that idealized idea of the human
(Douzinas 2000; Mignolo 2011).
Donnelly’s argument of moral universalism is widely shared by advocates of human rights,
aid agencies, NGOs and multilateral institutions, and it has become a common element for those
that question the politics of human rights (Ignatieff 2001; 2003). On the other hand, some question
it as a major factor in the difficulty of finding alternatives to the current state of liberal capitalism
and democracy, claiming that it has severed the search for alternatives and instead claimed its place
as the last utopia (Moyn 2012, 2014).
Rather than limiting this project to question the effects of the universalist abstraction as a
form of antipolitics, a global projection of liberal rationality, or a celebration of grassroots
organizations ́ human rights advocacy, I am interested in the practices that make transnational
networks of activism, how they define the kinds of rights are worth fighting for, as well as the
actors that interact and negotiate the cases and the institutions in which these discussions take
place. In summary, I am interested in analyzing the making of human rights and environmental
networks, institutions and discourses as fields of conflict, made and unmade by those participating
in them, rather than assuming a priori its shape and contours to evaluate its achievements.
Although this project discusses the ways in which social movements, NGOs and activists
translate human rights languages into local contexts, or intervene in global debates with specific
concepts and terms, its main concern is with the processes and practices in the transnational
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networks in which cases circulate -or try to circulate. In that connection, I follow Mosse (2004)
idea of a methodological approach in which the main concern is not to discuss whether cases fall
into impunity, justice is found or explain a political economy of human and environmental
violence. Nor do I have the intention of explaining the rates of impunity in Colombia or evaluating
strategies for justice or their international legal frameworks. Thus, in this study I examine the ways
in which the actors I followed, negotiate and interact with the normative discourses of human rights
and environmental activism in order to position specific cases as relevant for human rights in
transnational networks of human rights and environmental activism.
Keck and Sikkink´s analysis of transnational activism argues that because the state was an
active perpetrator of human rights violations, Latin American activists bypassed it as an
interlocutor and instead attempted to take their claims to international institutions, with the hopes
that the pressure would effectively force national transformation. This tactic, which Keck and
Sikkink call the boomerang effect was (and still is) used by Colombian activists, and is certainly
at the center of the ways in which the actors I followed planned their actions. Although it is not
without its shortcomings, the boomerang effect, even as an aspiration of international pressure that
might actually transform debates in the country, remains powerful in the minds of all of the actors.
As scholars who have studied the trajectories of human rights activism in what has been
called the Global South claim, human rights practices and discourses in these geographies often
differ in their character to those in places such as Europe or the United States (Burke 2011; Klose
2013; Jensen 2016). Because human rights have a political dimension related to the defense against
state terror and political repression, they cannot be simply be put in the oppositional spectrum of
liberalism-neutralization of the political. This observation suggests not only that is important not
to think of human rights activism as a singular experience across continents, but also to pay close
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attention to the specific formations and uses of human rights in concrete geo-historical contexts,
which might not always coincide with the liberal and monolithic framework of standardized
notions of human rights. This is certainly what many authors point out in their discussions of
vernacularization. But this is as well what scholars studying transnational social movements
constantly point to. The assumption that transnational activism is conducted in neatly coordinated
ways is defied by close readings in which conflict, geopolitical asymmetries and even radically
different understanding of what might seem the same objective, constantly emerge.
Therefore, it is not exclusively that there is a difference between the political considerations
of a liberal-Global North performance of human rights and their Global South counterparts, neither
that in certain contexts defined as local, actors translate human rights discourses to their specific
requirements. These neat geographical definitions do not always acknowledge that there are actors
and institutions in places like Colombia that act with what could be understood as a non-vernacular
appropriation of human rights, and that in fact embrace the liberal ethos in their own practices, or
that there might be collectives in the U.K and Germany with highly critical analysis of human
rights discourses and institutions, questioning the decisions and tactics of Latin American peasant
organizations. Furthermore, they do not portray the processes of decision-making that these actors
make and the conflicts that are created in, for example, a European organization questioning the
decision of an indigenous movement in Colombia. Beyond such oppositions, in this research I
follow an actor-oriented approach to analyze the practices of those involved in the institutional,
political, affective and material networks that subsequently create what is understood as human
rights. In this way, I privilege the decisions, interests, material relations and affective dispositions
that define the practices and discourses of human rights, environmental activism and that arrange
the cases. In this way, the interactions and conflicts of activists, lawyers, scholars, NGOs and aid
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agencies are crucial for the ways in which the cases are shaped and their political possibilities, but
they also shape the transnational networks themselves, the understandings of solidarity, disregard
and transformation.

On the divide
Scholarship in environmental studies has fiercely criticized the historical dichotomy
between human and nature, stressing not only the intrinsic relationality between them, but also
advocating for a research program that actively blows up the separation between humans and the
environment, and that addresses their interdependency as the cornerstone of the reproduction of
life itself. What I am calling here the divide, is nothing more that the historical process through
which the realm of nature is produced as substantially different from the realm of the human, a
process largely located within the geohistorical limits of Europe. The sharpness and one-way
directionality of this divide has been strongly questioned by scholars of all disciplines, and thus I
will not discuss it here. What is relevant for this work, however, is to pay attention to three main
elements: one, the production of nature as a resource and its effects for the production and
reproduction of capital; second, the scholarship that actively has pushed for the disappearance of
the boundaries between nature and the human; third the effects of this divide in environmentalhuman rights practices for the purposes of the cases analyzed, specifically the idea that in spite of
all the scholarship, political and moral work on the matter, the fields of environmentality and
human rights continue to operate in largely distinct ways. Both nonetheless have serious
limitations when it comes to understanding and thinking about practices of violence.
I build on the work of scholars who have studied the separation of the human from nature
as a process of subordination and differentiation of nature from the human for the production and
reproduction of capital. In this idea, the divide is not an intrinsic condition of modernity, but rather
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a key trait of the historical making of capitalism that requires the creation of nature as eternal and
pristine (Smith 2010). In the making of this nature as external, it becomes the realm of possibility
for capitalist production and accumulation. For authors such as Moore, nature rises as “cheap”
(Moore 2016), and articulates the many requirements for the making of capitalism: labor, raw
materials, food and energy. To be precise, Moore´s intention is to integrate nature in capitalism as
a web of life (Moore 2015), and thus to rethink the divide by linking nature and human in a
complex global network, a world-ecology in his own terms. Nevertheless, in the idea of Cheap
Nature, Moore recognizes that nature remains as passive and in the service of the human.
In Latour ́s famous We Have Never Been Modern (2012), the critique towards the idea of
the divide between the duality human-nature, is significantly novel. Latour aims to describe how
these dualisms, long-claimed to be at the center of the rise of modernity, have never been as sharp
as definitive, and nevertheless knowledge production operated under the assumption of the divide,
creating distinct fields of knowledge that increasingly pulled apart the world of the natural and the
social. Historians of science and environment have portrayed a significantly more nuanced picture.
From various perspectives, they have shown that what could be considered as a split between the
fields of analysis of nature and society have not necessarily been a constitutive part of their making.
In other words, moderns knew that they were not modern, and have moved constantly between
those fields, rather than reaffirming fixated lines of differentiation between human and nature.
These scholars have been able to show that it is not modernity as a homogenous process that
created the dichotomy and subordination of nature by the human. But saying this doesn’t not solve
the question of how the divide was created. What these analyses usually point to is a particular
moment in which practices of appropriation of nature, colonialism and the consolidation of
industrial capitalism became the cornerstone of the making of this dichotomy (Grove 1994; Cooper
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2007; McKusick 2000; Findlen 1996; Miller and Hans 2011). Furthermore, for authors such as
Smith and Bellamy, it is capitalist forces that create the realm of the human and nature.
In these accounts, Marx stressed that the nature-human relation were to be conceived in
terms of unity (Smith 2010: 31), and most importantly, that the fluid metabolic relation of human
and nature was broken by the forces of capital (Bellamy 2000). These authors articulate a careful
analysis of Marx ́s understandings of nature, which claims that the making of the duality and
subordination of nature is the result of the material practices of capitalist accumulation, rather than
an intrinsic (albeit fictional) quality of modernity. It is not far-fetched to argue that these attempts
to reframe the work of Marx in light of environmental relations are to an extent a response to the
claim found in the work of Latour and others that suggests that modern thought was defined by
the upholding of an anthropocentric view of the world that subordinated nature to the desires of
humanity. But unlike the idea of the divide as some sort of fiction, in these analysis socio-material
processes actively produced nature as an external field, and subordinated it for the purposes of
accumulation of capital.
The idea that nature was divided from the human became an important argument to suggest
the need for a new epistemological approach that is able to blur the boundaries between these two
fields and create a substantially different understanding of their relations. Many have argued for
different conceptual approaches that effectively dismantle the divide, arguing for the
disappearance of the term nature or a rearticulation that asserts the relationality between these two
fields (Escobar 1999; Morton 2016). These approaches usually announce a new epoch, usually
tied to the term Anthropocene, in which the articulations between the human and the non-human
are substantially redefined and based upon their intrinsic relationality.
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In spite of how important and innovative such a project might seem, the divide and
subordination of human over nature remains substantial in the practices of activists and
bureaucrats, in the definition of legal corpuses and in the ways in which actors build their
strategies, generating all sorts of political conflicts that cannot be dismissed. In the realm of legal
studies, the existence of this divide is a substantial concern, and many have argued that
environmental law is based on an understanding of nature as resilient, abundant and important
insofar as it serves human purposes (Cannon 2015 in Lamprea 2019: 23).
In the trajectories of defining an international environmental law, the environment is
constantly defined as external to the human, and therefore subordinated by it or important because
of human wellbeing. In the 1972 Stockholm declaration, the question of the environment is taken
in relation to the ways that the man intervenes in this transformation. While the declaration refers
to the idea that “Man is both creature and moulder of his environment, which gives him physical
sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral, social and spiritual growth,” it
also differentiates “both aspects of man´s environment, the natural and the man-made” (Birnie and
Boyle 2002: 3). In addition, as Birnie and Boyle remind us, the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development suggests in its Principle 1 that humans are “entitled to a healthy
and productive life in harmony with nature” (Birnie and Boyle 2002: 3). Both documents, in
different moments, are foundational for environmental discussions at an international level, and
they set the conceptual terrain in which the environmental legal dispositions are defined.
Furthermore, as Schrijver (1997) has pointed out, the question of natural resources and sovereignty
is relevant in international law. What the author calls permanent sovereignty of natural resources
is the result of a long-term discussion in which the notion of nature is directly commodified and
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considered an object of wealth and production. Nature and sovereignty are tied by the economic
possibilities of wealth and thus, nature is relevant in relation to the realm of the economy itself.
The fact that in most modern legal frameworks nature is subordinated to the human and
thus relevant depending on the ways in which environmental violence is connected to human
existence, is at the center of this project. In my ethnographic work, I witnessed a major tension
between environmental activism and transnational human rights networks. Although it was widely
recognized that environmental degradation needed to be explicitly articulated to human rights and
political violence, for the most part human rights scholars, activists and movements saw the
environment as existing in the background of the political developments of Colombia’s
longstanding armed conflict. Following Serres (1995), it could be argued that the environment
was seen as the stage where violence and politics happened, and nature was considered the prize
of war. This understanding created a situation in which environmental violence was relevant to
human rights violations insofar as they could be cast as an effect of war on humans. Hence,
environment becomes a passive actor, important if it conveys the effects of environmental
degradation as explicit in human violence, as well as a form of violence related that could be linked
to the armed conflict that environmental degradation.
In the last twenty years there has been a substantial development of what is generally
known as the rights of nature. In Latin America, Ecuador and Bolivia pioneered constitutions that
explicitly enshrined the rights of nature. The development of this idea needs to be considered in
relation to the twenty-first century transformations in these countries and the histories that they
interpolate. In the context of post-neoliberal governments in Latin America, authors such as
Gudynas (2009) considered that the proposition of the rights of nature in the constitutions of
Ecuador and Bolivia was a novel biocentric shift. Many other authors as well highlighted that the
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centrality of nature in the Ecuadorian and Bolivian constitutions was a significant recognition of
non-Eurocentric epistemologies (Walsh 2011; Tanasescu 2013; Espinosa 2019).
Quite often, the introduction of rights of nature is considered side by side with terms such
as Sumak Kawsay or Buen Vivir, which broadly explained capture a conceptualization of wellbeing and economic management by indigenous communities, peasant organizations and
environmentalist groups of the Andes.7 The assertion of the rights of nature and Sumak Kawsay
point to the establishment of a different regime of being in the world in which capital accumulation,
anthropocentric understandings of life and natural resource exploitation do not define humans ́
relation to the world (Dávalos 2011a, 2011b). This is usually understood as a contrast to the ideas
of development as modernization and part of the post-development project. Although these rights
had been established in the constitutions of the two countries, their governments pushed further
extractivist policies that were at odds with the interests of indigenous and peasant movements and
the aspirations of the Sumak Kawsay, often justifying these polices by alluding to the redistributive
measures taken from the revenues of resource extraction, a project that fell apart in 2014 when the
commodity bubble burst (Arsel 2012; Lalander 2014; Radcliffe 2012).
In Colombia both the Atrato River and the Amazon have been considered subjects of rights
by the constitutional court, which has proposed a path for their preservation. In spite of this
recognition, many questions remain about the status of nature in the country and, for the most part,
a notion of nature as a resource for economic purposes remain prevalent. It could even be argued
that the idea of giving rights to a river or the Amazon is defined in a way that situates the
environment in of subordination from a human who can protect, rather than a biocentric definition
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Le Quang and Vercoutére prefer the term Buen Vivir, for it brings together the contributions not only of
indigenous groups, but other social movements and intellectuals. They remind us that the term is not homogenous,
nor it has been composed from one single strain, making the term itself part of the heated political debates in Latin
America (Le Quang and Vercoutére 2013).
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in which the human is not an inherently superior being. In the case of this study, most activists
and scholars are aware of the initiatives and developments of other parts of the world, and
sometimes they have contributed to their conceptual and legal development. However, they work
within the legal, political and epistemic articulations in which environmental discussions are
usually located in relation to economic interests, subordinated by the humans and as a different
realm from human rights debates.
The different initiatives to redefine the status of nature and the environment are significant
and cannot be sidelined. The actors in this study are aware of them and usually organize their own
projects with the idea of transforming the ways in which the environment is understood. But the
experience of countries like Ecuador and Bolivia shows that even when written in a constitution,
these types of claims are constantly undermined by the imposition of extractivism, its promise of
development and the aspirations of capital accumulation. While in this project I consider the
presence of these approaches, I argue that the field of action where the actors work is a contentious
one, hegemonically defined by the political histories of capitalist relations that produce specific
conflicts and material possibilities. It is important to attend to the practices, discourses and
institutions that produce the normative definitions of environmentalism and human rights conflicts,
rather than defining this research by speculative flights of epistemological possibilities not yet
fully realized.
In the context of this project, environmental violence is relevant for most of the actors
insofar as it is connected to human violence. This is the result of the ways in which environmental
law has historically located at the center of its concerns the effects of environmental degradation
on humans. Moreover, in Colombia environmental violence is relevant if it has an explicit
connection to a particular form of violence inflicted upon humans, namely, political violence
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related to the long history of war. These became particularly evident when the peace accords with
FARC were signed and the transitional justice system was in place, and explicitly mediates the
arrangement of environmental cases in Colombia.
Unlike those that claim that nature does not exist anymore or that the world is following a
new path where the boundaries between nature and the human have been definitively blurred
(Morton 2016; Purdy 2015), in this study I show how this divide is present in the ways in which
activists, scholars and institutions relate to events of violence where environmental, human and
non-human violence occurs. Certainly, while the cases used for this research can be analyzed as
hybrid objects produced in the fluid relation between humans and the environment, they are
constantly pulled apart by institutional, legal and political practices that force the actors to make a
decision about the possible form in which they should be arranged, and therefore the types of
institutions, discourses, actors and objectives they will interpolate.

On the actors
For this research I contacted several NGOs, political organizations and activists working
on extractivism and its relation to violence. My first direct contact was a lawyer who became
crucial for the development of this project, not only because she is renowned in the field of human
and environmental rights, but because her insights, critical analysis and reflexivity constantly
challenged my own assumptions about any findings or insights that I would develop. Dora Lucy
Arias was part of a human rights NGO called Corporación Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear
Restrepo (CCAJAR), one of the first human rights organizations in the country, mostly composed
of lawyers dedicated to litigation of human rights cases. This NGO was part of a larger coalition,
the Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), CENSAT and CCAJAR, all of them
working around extractivist practices in Guajira. Unlike CCAJAR, CENSAT and CINEP did not

44

focused their work on litigation or legal practices but on research, campaigns, reports and
community organizing. CINEP is a Jesuit NGO formed in the late 1970s, while CENSAT is one
of the first environmental NGOs in Colombia, and in 2019 marked thirty years of existence.
These NGOs can be considered to be part of the Colombian left, and have shared members,
political affiliations, partners and colleagues for decades. Their mutual trust made them partners
in many projects, and CCAJAR has often led legal cases on behalf CENSAT or CINEP. In
addition, for the fieldwork in the departments of Cesár and Magdalena, I worked closely with a
third NGO known as Tierra Digna, an environmentalist organization composed mainly of lawyers,
most of them originally trained at CCAJAR.
Scholars have often taken a highly critical stance towards NGOs (Gill 2000; McMahon
2017), not very different from the people from these NGOs that allowed me to follow them. Most
of the actors knew me from personal relations, common friends or because we participated in
similar political processes. They knew that I had a critical stance towards NGOs and the politics
of human rights activism and victimhood in Colombia, and the fact that I had this position was
usually seen for them as a way to open up questions in their own networks. However, conducting
fieldwork allowed me to understand that the critical point of view towards NGOs is insufficient. I
do consider that it is important to maintain a critical stance towards NGOs in relation to issues
such as governmentality, management of violence, suffering and the neutralization of the political
imagination.
Certainly, the diagnosis made by scholars who consider that NGOs have been crucial for a
redistribution of governance and the state's sovereignty in favor a privatization of responsibilities
and forms of administration is still significant. Something similar could be said about issues such
as the assessment of trauma and the uses and management of suffering and victimhood. However,
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authors such as Bernal and Grewal (2014) have explored the development of NGOs in favor of a
much more nuanced and timely analysis. In their edited volume, they gather a variety of studies of
feminist organizations and the role that NGOs have had in the making of contemporary feminist
politics in different parts of the world. The authors point out that the term NGO is often defined in
negative terms, namely, as not being the state, which in turn seems to mean a transfer of public
concerns to be managed by private actors. They further argue that the term NGO usually captures
many different political projects and interests under the same label, having as a result a
homogenization of NGOs’ positions and practices, but also of the critiques towards them. In a
rethinking of past work, Sonia Alvarez (2009), who in 1998 lamented the “NGOization” of social
movements, suggests that even though her past criticism of NGOs is largely still accurate, it
manifested a limited understanding of the relation between NGOs and social movements. She
argues that NGOs have helped feminist organizations throughout Latin America to find financial
and political stability, but also that feminist social movements have created NGOs that explicitly
reject the normalized practices that have been questioned by scholars and activists all over the
world.
Without dismissing the longstanding issue of the NGOization of social movements, NGOs
as agents of neoliberalism and withdrawal from the public sphere (Bernal and Grewal 2014: 10),
the authors in the Bernal and Grewal volume argue for an analysis that begins with the recognition
of the increasingly symbiotic relationship between NGOs and social movements as a site of
analysis rather than plain critique, in order to consider the development, tensions and games of
exclusion/inclusion, private/public that are present in the trajectories of NGOs and feminisms. In
this way, they are able to pay attention to the practices and negotiations between organizations, as
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well as the flow of analytical frameworks, persons and intentions that create the political sites in
which NGOs exist today.
In a similar vein De Mars (2005) argues that NGOs cannot be defined by their purpose,
mandate or proclamations, for doing so presupposes the practices through which the NGOs
develop their work. Instead, the author considers it important to understand the making of the
NGOs in relation to the networks that they establish: their alliances, forms of cooperation and
tactical sites of action. He describes NGOs with the metaphor of wild cards, for they are
significantly more volatile in their development, interests, alliances and political orientation than
what a narrow and congealed definition of NGO might suggest.
In this work I cannot claim to conduct an analysis of every NGO in Colombia that works
with human rights and environmentalism. Although during my fieldwork the number of
organizations I stumbled upon increased exponentially -many NGOs would meet in conferences,
gatherings and even shared interest in the cases central to this study, I am interested in what these
four NGOs and the networks they created produced. The members of these networks considered
themselves part of a transnational left, in a very broad sense. As De Mars explains, most NGOs
have what he calls a “latent agenda,” a series of objectives and ideas that drives their work and is
constantly attached to specific activities and projects (De Mars 2005: 45). In the case of these
actors, they followed the general frameworks of the latent agendas of their organizations, but they
also followed their own latent agendas. The latter informed their relations to international aid, the
analysis that their NGOs would make of the relation between environmental violence and human
violence, and their own NGOs’ relations with grassroots organizing, political organizations and
the general political sensibilities that informed their work.
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The actors discussed below operated within the limits imposed by legal and political
structures, the diplomatic requirements that forced them to temper their own critiques and
expectations, the conflicts with grassroots organizations for the direction that the cases would take,
and the many financial problems that kept undermining every single move and intention. But in
this process of negotiating the limits of their own political possibilities, they created networks of
transnational actors with a significantly critical analysis of extractivism, the limits of defining their
work by relying on legal actions, and their own role in the reproduction of the field that they aimed
to transform. It is this everyday labor, which draws and redraws the limits between the different
discourses, political projects and institutions that creates the networks of these NGOs and the
circulation of the cases themselves.

Organization of the work
This study is organized in four chapters that discuss two cases and their development. The
two cases moved through different networks, because they were deemed as belonging to either
environmental conflicts or human physical violence in relation to the armed conflict. The tension
between these two fields informs the conflicts, dispositions and arrangements of the cases. I
decided to intercalate them in order to avoid the reinforcement of the divide between environment
and the human, although because of the very nature of my fieldwork, this dichotomy is present
throughout my analysis. This research shows that beyond the many attempts by scholars, activists
and NGOs to rethink the ways in which we relate to nature and the environment, in an attempt to
redefine our relation with the world we inhabit, even at the sites in which these ideas have been
embraced the most, a variety of situations force these actors to reinforce the distinction between
environmental violence and violence related to war defined as internal armed conflict.
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In the first chapter, I discuss the development of the cases of the murder of two union
leaders working for Drummond in 2001. I discuss the ways in which different actors organize the
evidence and their political interests in taking the case to different venues. The centrality of
violence related to paramilitary activities and the transformation of illegal armies in Colombia
presented a significant challenge to the actors involved, who struggled with making relevant the
case in the present, namely, to connect violence in the country with the contemporary discussion
about coal extraction and the interests of current union leaders.
The second chapter discusses the making of the of Arroyo Bruno case. I concentrate my
analysis on the practices of lawyers and NGOs interested in making relevant the disputes over the
Bruno at a national and transnational scale. In particular, I discuss the uses of scientific evidence
for the different actors involved, suggesting that in spite of the efforts to arrange the data collected
to prove the possible harmful effects of the diversion, the fact that this evidence is constantly under
dispute, creates a space of uncertainty in which the corporation is able to operate ad infinitum.
Chapter three discusses the analysis of violence in the mining corridor from the perspective
of the union of chapter one. I analyze their understanding of the presence of coal violence as a
geographical articulation of modalities of violence that cannot be circumscribed to one narrow
legal-political definition of violence. In this chapter, I describe the multiplicity of violence as the
union conceptualized it, in order to show how this current iteration of extractivist practices
overflow the concerns of European NGOs and state institutions, which are mostly focusing on the
violence generated in relation to the armed conflict.
In chapter four I follow the Arroyo Bruno case as it is presented in European venues of
debate around energy transition. I center my analysis on a two-week visit by three Colombian
activists to different German cities, ending at the G20´s parallel summit in Hamburg in 2017.
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During this time, the Colombian activists were confronted not only with the realities of coal in
Germany, which seemed surprisingly like their own, but with the difficulties of positing their own
questions beyond the political interests of energy transition in Germany. In the process, the
tensions between European activists and their Colombian counterparts surfaced, highlighting that
concerns about climate change are far from a homogenous experience, even if the actors recognize
the differences and aim to create networks of solidarity.
I conclude by discussing the attempts of social movements in Colombia to articulate their
interests around coal, through an ethnographic description of how these discussions take place in
gatherings, conferences and meetings. I concentrate my analysis on two fronts: first, the ways in
which social movements create a set of concepts as the terrain for discussion; second, the fractures
and attempts to overcome them to articulate a coherent political agenda that involves the plurality
of actors and their interests. I argue that, in spite of the many attempts to reimagine the modes of
violence produced by coal extraction, the weight of the divide between nature and society, at the
core of legal frameworks, institutional policies and political orientations, makes the efforts of
social movements and anti-coal activists futile.
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Chapter 1
Nostalgia for Death: Union leaders in the void of uncertainty
According to Dora Lucy Arias, the lawyer in charge of the case for almost a decade, the
meeting that occurred after their murder was defined by fear and silence. They knew -this has to
be a horrible certainty- that the person who stepped up to take over the presidency of the union
would be killed as well. By this time, it was clear that being president of
SINTRAMINERGETICA8 would be the easiest path to a coffin.
Six months before, on March 12, 2001, Valdemoré Lorcano and Víctor Orcasitas -president
and vice-president of the union- were forced out of the bus that was transporting them from the
mine to Valledupar, capital city of the Department of Cesár, in the Caribbean region of Colombia.
First, a paramilitary entered the bus and asked for their names. After some confusion paramilitaries misrecognized and almost murdered the wrong person-, Valdemoré Lorcano and
Victor Hugo Orcasitas were forced out of the bus. A person in a white SUV confirmed their identity
and Orcasitas was shot on the spot. While he was bleeding to death, the paramilitaries took
Valdemoré into the SUV and left the place. He was found dead in a nearby village, not long after
being abducted.
In a context of rampant violence against unions, leftist political organizations and social
movements, in which paramilitary groups belonging to Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC),
had

unleashed

a

massive

campaign

of

displacement

and

violent

repression,

SINTRAMINERGETICA leaders were aware that death was part of the job description. But this
8

Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Minero-Energética (Union of workers of mining and energy industries)
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did not dissuade Gustavo Soler from taking over the responsibilities of the union then and
becoming the new president. Six months later Soler was also killed and now, at the back of a house
in Valledupar -the official headquarters of the union- their members gathered to decide the next
step, probably sipping very sweet coffee, probably with their hands shaking, certainly scared for
their future, with that knot in the throat that is a combination of a refusal to cry and the desire to
crumble down and surrender to the pain.
Dora Lucy, who has been working on the case of Orcasitas and Valdemoré for more than
ten years, says to me that none of the men wanted to be the next president of the union because
they knew that death was certain. They sat in silence, knowing the fate of their organization.
Knowing, as they would later tell me, that paramilitaries would win if they did not take over. That
is the moment when one of them calls his mother, who says to him what they all knew:
So he calls her, and says to her that nobody wants to be president because whoever does it
will be killed. And she, who had supported the whole process of the union, says to him that
is a painful thing to say, but he must take over, because otherwise the union will be over
and the objective of paramilitaries would be achieved. So he goes back to the meeting and
becomes president. But everybody was scared.9
I arrived at the union´s office in Valledupar in May of 2017 after being picked up at my
hotel by Algemiro -the current vice president of the union, who at the moment was without a job
after being fired by Drummond-. By this moment, I already had read dozens of news and NGO
reports, as well as hundreds of pages of the legal procedures related to the case of Valdemoré and

9

“Y entonces él la llama y le dice que nadie quiere ser presidente porque el que lo haga lo matan. Y ella, que había
apoyado todo el proceso [del sindicato], le dice que aunque es muy doloroso decirlo, ‘él debe tomar el mando,
porque si no el sindicato se acaba y los paramilitares ganan. Y entonces entra a la reunión y decide ser el presidente.
Pero todo el mundo tenía miedo”. Conversation with Dora Lucy Arias, May 2018. All translations are mine unless
indicated otherwise.
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Orcasitas. My own personal experience with victims of paramilitaries and state-terror had also put
on my radar the existence of their case, for it is one of the most important cases to link coal
extractivism, corporate practices in Colombia and political violence. Nonetheless, even after
knowing in detail the development of the case and having had contact with relatives of statesponsored political violence, after hearing many times in many different contexts a myriad of
stories of murdering, disappearance and fear with the objective of achieving a specific political
order, I was not prepared for the sense of loneliness that the headquarters of
SINTRAMINERGETICA produced in me.
At the moment of my fieldwork SINTRAMINERGETICA was a fragile organization, the
result not only of a sustained history of murders, death threats, anonymous calls and surveillance
by state forces or paramilitary groups, but of a complicated articulation of legal and political tactics
aimed to undermine the existence of the union itself. For the current members of the union, their
present problem does not rely exclusively on the forms of violence inflicted upon them during the
period of paramilitary-AUC10 terror, but on the complex web of legal and political tactics that are
increasingly neutralizing their activism, and the emerging forms of violence that had been
dismissed or downplayed by government institutions, aid agencies and human rights organizations,
at least compared to the forms of violence exercised during the AUC times.
For these workers, the history of violence was to be thought of as a continuum that persisted
beyond the many transformations of the armed conflict since Drummond initiated coal extraction
in Cesar in 1995. The violence perpetrated before the paramilitaries AUC officially demobilized
in 2005 had certainly been transformed but was far from gone. However, this did not mean that
paramilitary and state sponsored violence were the only tactics deployed to destroy the union, and

10

Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia.
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it is very important for the leaders to address the fact that the complex web of practices that slowly
undermined the union would be understood as part of the strategies to obliterate political
opposition to coal extractivist practices.
The murder of Orcasitas and Valdemoré was a significant point of this history of conflicts
and violence, and thus it became an important case for human rights organizations and anti-coal
activists in Colombia and Europe. As the president and vice president of SINTRAMINERGETICA
they were in a constant dispute with Drummond, and their murder meant for human rights activists
that there was a connection between the coal corporation, paramilitarism and their death. Since
that moment, human rights NGOs, anti-coal collectives in Colombia and Europe, activists and
victim´s organizations, developed multiple strategies that aimed to undermine Drummond´s public
position, while furthering legal cases in Colombia and the U.S that were trying to prove the
involvement and benefit of the corporation in the killing of the union leaders and in political
violence in the region more generally.
Even though in Colombia several rulings confirmed that specific persons working for
Drummond were involved in killing the union leaders, it has not been possible to prosecute any
major Drummond representative or unveil a concrete or definitive involvement of the corporation
in the attempts to destroy SINTRAMINERGETICA. However, government institutions, scholars
and NGOs11 have been able to identify a process in which the prevalence of coal in the region has
benefited from the assertion of paramilitarism, the transformation of economic practices and the
overwhelming violence inflicted upon social movements and leftist political organizations.
The information gathered by scholars, lawyers, NGOs and governmental institutions -as
well as the continuation of forms of violence even after the large structure of paramilitaries

11

I will explore this matter later in this chapter.
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demobilized in 2005-, enabled the actors in the transnational human rights networks to claim the
existence of a link between war and coal extraction. In 2013 this became the cornerstone of a very
effective international campaign called “Blood Coal”. It aimed at highlighting the responsibilities
of coal corporations in fueling paramilitary groups, put pressure on governments buying
Colombian coal and opened paths towards divestment.
But this chapter is not about that campaign, although it will discuss its effects. It is not
about the memory of those killed by paramilitary groups nor about an evaluation of the peace
negotiations with paramilitary groups and their aftermath. It is about a disruption between two
elements: on the one hand, the standardized forms to articulate an analysis of war and extractivism,
that have created fixed definitions of actors, motives and practices for violence; on the other hand,
the emerging and convoluted forms of violence after the official demobilization of paramilitarism.
Although these violent practices often exceed the analytical frameworks used to analyze war in
Colombia, the public political effect that they have had is still largely unquestioned, creating all
sorts of conflicts for environmental struggles, human rights activists and organizations such as
SINTRAMINERGETICA.
I argue in this chapter that a restrictive notion of violence tied to the definition of the
Colombian war as an armed conflict, acquired an unprecedented importance for the analysis of the
Colombian historical present. The unexpected result was that it created significant limitations for
human rights organizations´ work linked to anti-coal activism. First, efforts to explain political
conflicts and material-economic transformations relied on a definition of nature as a resource for
accumulation, by defining the history of the region as the transformation from an agricultural
economy to a coal one.
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Human rights organizations only registered the relation between nature, violence and war
when nature could be defined as a force that fueled and fed the interests of the actors in terms of
accumulation of capital, and could be tied to the economic processes considered to be the root of
the armed conflict. This move, close to famous tropes like the resource curse (Auty 2002;
Robinson, Torvik, Verdier 2006; Klare 2002), instrumentalized the role of nature and reduced the
scope of the analysis of the relation between coal extraction and war.
As the result of decades of studies, debates and intellectual production, a specific analytical
framework to study violence became the standard approach to the war in Colombia, and thus the
term violence became associated to it, restricting the possibilities of considering the myriad of
forms in which violence unfolds in life. The result is a limiting fixation of the notion of violence,
the forms of its analysis and effects. Nevertheless, human rights institutions and actors found
themselves with a strong conceptual apparatus that articulated war, history and violence to render
legible the trajectories of the armed conflict in the second part of the twentieth and early twentyfirst century. Human rights activists were able to arrange with a certain level of clarity cases in the
discourses and institutions of human rights, when they had coal as a commodity to be controlled.
However, as peace negotiations and transitional practices began to take place, human rights
institutions and actors increasingly found themselves at odds to account for and analyze cases of
violence that existed outside the notion of armed conflict.
Meanwhile, unions and grassroots organizations usually consider violence and its political
purposes part of a myriad of technologies oriented towards the obliteration of political opposition.
But in a context where transnational human rights institutions, practices and discourses privilege
experiences of violence related to war, they have been forced to marginalize alternative analytical
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frameworks -and strategies- that are aimed to approach differently what political violence is and
the effects it has in their lives.

The Historicity of violence
I am not arguing in this chapter that the only form of violence that is deemed relevant in
Colombia is that connected to war and the armed conflict,12 but that violence linked to the armed
conflict has become the privileged conceptualization of violence used to analyze the processes of
the making of Colombia´s nation-state project in the second half of the twentieth century. The
trajectories that make the scholarly corpus of violence studies in the country are often traced back
to 1962´s landmark book La Violencia en Colombia (Guzmán, Borda and Umaña 2012), which
sets forth many of the foundational questions and concerns subsequently used to analyze
Colombia´s state formation and political conflicts.
This field of studies is diverse, and has moved beyond the initial concerns posed in 1962.
Its trajectory is interesting but not the main concern of this work. However, it is important to point
out that throughout the twentieth century a vast corpus of studies has been produced, and it has
become the common ground of public policy making, as well as political and academic debates.
Authors such as Jaramillo (2011) and Villaveces (2006) have studied the long history of
institutional attempts in Colombia to create commissions and scholarly groups dedicated to the
analysis of political violence and the ways in which it has built the country since at least
1962.13Their analysis point to a sedimented history of expertise in the approaches to political
violence and war, as well as the making and stabilization of what has been known, with a certain

I will discuss the effects of naming the war in Colombia an “armed conflict” later in this chapter.
This is the year of the publication of the book “La Violencia En Colombia”, written by Eduardo Umaña Luna,
Orlando Fals Borda and German Guzman Campos. This book is a landmark study of the causes, practices and
effects of the political violence after 1948.
12

13
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tongue-in-cheek humor, as Violentología. Villaveces argues that this history resulted in a robust
corpus of scholarship and institutions such university research centers and think tanks.
Through a painstaking process of creation of commissions for the analysis of the causes of
violence, books, papers, conferences and institutional appointments, Violentología became much
more than an obscure academic trend. Those involved in it have become particularly influential in
the development of political debates in the country. Not only they have produced hundreds of
scholarly products, but they have become consultants during peace negotiations, mediators at
moments of crisis between social movements, armed groups and the government, and in recent
years, key public figures in charge of institutions whose purpose is defining the terms of the
Colombian conflict for transitional and reconciliation purposes (Villaveces 2006).14
Cartagena (2013) maintains that it is during the decade of the 1980´s that, under President
Betancur´s attempt to further peace negotiations with insurgent groups, a certain kind of link is
established between scholars who have been studying the history of the Colombian violence in
relation to state formation and inequality, and the government´s policies directed to bring an end
to the war. In her view “intellectuals were called to establish dialogues, peace accords and the
reincorporation into civilian life of insurgent groups”15 (Cartagena 2013: 126), creating a certain
alliance that would be maintained in different forms to the present.

14

In 2007, and as part of Alvaro Uribe´s efforts in his negotiation with paramilitary forces, the government created
what was known as Grupo de Memoria Histórica (GMH). The main objective of this group was to create a relato of
paramilitary violence, with the purpose to contribute to peace and reconciliation efforts. The group head was
Gonzalo Sanchez, a renowned historian and often recognized as a violentologo. Uribe´s successor, Juan Manuel
Santos, dismantled most of the bureaucratic apparatuses that were created with the purposes of administering the
transition with paramilitaries -exposing their utmost incompetence-, but transformed GMH into a full institution
called Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (CNMH). The group expanded its gaze and started to conduct research
in different aspects of the armed conflict, prioritizing the point of view of the victims.
15
“En ese sentido, los intelectuales son llamados para establecer los diálogos, acuerdos de paz y la
reincorporación a la vida civil de los grupos insurgentes”.
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These authors agree that there is a relation -albeit full of conflicts, fractures and
dispersions- between the history of state-appointed commissions, designed to articulate narratives
about political violence in the second half of twentieth century Colombia, and the epistemological
and bureaucratic trajectories of Violentología, as well as with the generalized recognition of the
basic tropes that are used to explain the trajectories of the Colombian armed conflict16.
This standardization of the analysis of the armed conflict has been helpful for political
purposes, and it could be safely argued that Colombian social movements and political parties, as
well as victims of violence resulting from war, have generally embraced positively the efforts of
scholars and researchers that study the Colombian war from this point of view. Although there are
debates that have occurred over specific elements of this narrative17, the idea that there are
structural causes for the violence in Colombia -that have to do with the state’s sovereign power,
access to land and resources, lack of democratic opportunities for political participation and vast
concentration of wealth18- has been generally accepted in the public sphere as the common ground
for a conversation about the making of the country since the second half of the twentieth century.

16

However, at the moment there is not something that could be considered as an official account of the armed
conflict. In spite of the widespread recognition that violentólogos had achieved, to the extent that they have been
able to intervene directly in the making of state policies, none of the commissions have been defined as definitive
account of the armed conflict. Even the latest attempt to create a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the effects
of political violence - CNMH’s official report entitled Basta Ya! (2013)- is in constant dispute. During president
Uribe’s government a decision was made to deny the existence of an armed conflict, instead defining it as a terrorist
threat. During Santos presidency, after the transformation of the GMH into CNMH, Basta Ya! Was published with
tremendous opposition from the former government -and with criticisms of guerrilla members and representatives of
the active government. In 2019, with the far-right in power again, the new director of CNMH publicly stated that the
there was no consensus over the fact that there was such a thing like an armed conflict, arguing that the idea of a
terrorist threat where guerrillas wanted to accumulate power and wealth and destabilize democracy should be
considered as a valid point of view that the institution must explore.
17
When the CNMH published Basta Ya!, the National Movement of Victims of State Crimes (MOVICE) publicly
argued that the position of the institution with regard the state’s responsibility in political violence was weak, and
instead argued in favour of positioning the term “systemic state criminality” (MOVICE 2013: 17) as an alternative.
Similarly, when the CNMH finished the draft for the report on the massive and systematic violent obliteration of the
political Party Union Patriótica, the survivors manifested their discontent for the unwillingness of the institution to
define what occurred as a political genocide.
18
Some of these ideas are well summarized in the Basta Ya! Report, which uses the many years of analysis of
violence as the framework of reference for their analysis.
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It is common to witness leaders of social movements, political parties and media pundits
talk in public meetings, news outlets or political debates about the history of Colombia in the terms
provided by this field of research, even if there are disagreements about specific accounts.
Similarly, the ideas that have been developed in this field of analysis have been used by social
movements and NGOs as central tenets that ground their demands, help them to build the context
of their reports and make specific political, economic or legal claims.
Thus, it is not surprising to see that the explanatory narratives of how coal extraction
acquired such an importance in Cesar do not differ significantly between union leaders and official
reports made by the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (CNMH). Unions, peasant
organizations, NGOs and political parties from the left have a very similar narrative about the
processes that shifted the regional economy towards coal, vividly summarized in those reports.
In La Maldita Tierra (CNMH 2016), a report that traces the relations between land,
paramilitary violence and coal in Cesár, the CNMH argues that the department´s history until the
late 1960’s had cattle ranching and cotton as the main economic activities. Hence, the main
political antagonisms were built as the relations between big landowners and peasants, resulting
in the creation of peasant organizations19 that grew to have a significant capacity of negotiation
(Bejarano 1983; Pérez 2010; Múnera 1998; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987; Zamosc 1992). These
organizations were gradually infiltrated by the ELN in the 1970´s, which increasingly aimed to
intervene in their political orientations by the 1980´s. Although by the beginning of the 1990s
peasant leaders and social movements were vocal in their criticism of this tactical move of
infiltration, they had already been stigmatized as tied to the guerrillas.

19

Specifically the Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (ANUC) and ANUC-Unidad Y Reconstrucción.
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In the meantime, coal was becoming more profitable than the already existing economic
practices, cattle ranching and cotton. It was, at the same time, deemed a modernizing force, as it
would trigger a shift towards new infrastructures -of roads, trains, ports and buildings-, and a
palpable connection to global economies, not only through the participation in a transnational
economy, but by foreign investment and institutional presence.
Intensifying coal production would require massive processes of land use reorganization,
achieved through violent land dispossession.

Several paramilitaries have said during their

depositions that putting pressure on landowners was a common practice, for they knew that
corporations such as Drummond, Glencore and Prodeco will buy the land at good prices (Moor
and Van De Sandt in CNMH 2016: 14).In the Maldita Tierra report, the authors trace the processes
through which paramilitary groups displaced thousands of peasants, reconstructing the histories
that intersect violence, land dispossession and coal extraction. The authors trace the relation
between the processes of land restitution after the peace accords with AUC and mining titles,
showing that at least 2,841 victims are demanding the restitution of 195,000 hectares and that
“most municipalities coincide with the existence of currently valid mining titles” (CNMH 2016:
102, 106). Hence, the authors suggest, coal industries were a significant driving force of
displacement and dispossession.
Peasant organizations became defined as the enemy, and that definition legitimized
violence against them, a label that would put in motion a machine aimed to their extermination.
Drummond begins its presence in Colombia around 1985, and starts to set up the extraction of
coal. In the following years, corporations such as Glencore from Switzerland and Colombian
Natural Resources landed in the region, creating a large complex of mines through the landscape
of the department. As mentioned before, this required establishing a major material infrastructure
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that involved displacement, land grabbing, engineering projects and a variety of legal
arrangements that would guarantee Drummond´s return on its investments. By 1995, Drummond
was already extracting coal in Cesár, and the infrastructure for its circulation was in place.
The process described in La Maldita Tierra and repeated as the historical narration by
workers and grassroots organizations who are against coal operations, is based on the idea that the
development of a coal economy required a massive restructuring of land tenure and use. In order
to fulfill that objective, paramilitaries and local elites began a process of displacement and pressure
on small landowners to sell, which ran parallel to the assassination and disappearance of
individuals and members of organizations who opposed. As I will explain below, a significant
example of that story is captured in the case of the murders of Valdemoré and Orcasitas. As human
rights organizations gathered evidence to link the murders to paramilitary activities and corporate
interests, the case became a source of information and emblematic of the ways in which
transnational coal corporations benefited from the death of political leaders and collectives. In
many ways, the possibilities of situating the case within a web of historical, political and economic
relations, explicitly occurring in relation to the armed conflict, also allowed for a certain sense of
legibility of other practices of violence that were not considered part of the armed conflict.

The limits of human rights and the folders of death
Union leaders of SINTRAMINERGETICA keep track of their political trajectories in a
detailed archive of death threats, denuncias filed at the Attorney General’s regional office, public
denunciations of intimidations coming from the Colombian army and the responses that the
government has provided to the victims. Since the 2016 peace accords with FARC, more than 400
grassroots leaders have been murdered by different illegal groups, but neither Santos’ nor Duque´s
governments have been able to say anything clear on the subject.
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Juan Manuel Santos´ Minister of Defense, Juan Carlos Villegas, publicly said that these
murders where the result of “líos de faldas” (El Espectador, December 17, 2017), a phrase used to
talk about personal and intimate affairs that turn into quarrels of different sorts. In that way, the
minister suggested that the continuous murder of grassroots leaders had no relation to any form of
the armed conflict, in part because the country was starting to walk a new path towards peace and
reconciliation. In fact, since AUC demobilized in 2006, the continuation of violence has been a
contentious issue, not only because of the obvious fact that dead bodies are a problem, but because
the persistence of violent death undermines the narratives of the success of peace negotiations.
Therefore, every government since has tried to downplay the presence, influence and existence of
these groups, locating them outside the notion of armed conflict and therefore their actions as
irrelevant to the trajectories of Colombian history of war.
Human rights NGOs and social movements were critical of the outcomes of paramilitaryAUC demobilization. Since the first moment of the negotiations they were suspicious. Their
concerns became clearer as the main leaders of AUC were extradited -and therefore were unable
to provide their full testimony and name politicians and businesses responsible-, several
paramilitaries died in prison and most of the cases remained in impunity.20
Since the demobilization of the AUC, other illegal armies started to proliferate throughout
the country. For some human rights and grassroots movements, these new groups are the
continuation of paramilitarism, and are an expression of the failure -and according to NGOS,
scholars and social movements, of the fictional quality- of the 2005 peace process. Under President

20

According to the Attorney General office, by 2017 there were only 51 quality rulings related to these processes.
(El Espectador March 13th, 2019).
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Uribe (2002-2010), these groups were labeled as BACRIM21, in what was an attempt to suggest
that paramilitarism had ended and that these groups had no relation to those that had demobilized.
The nature, purposes and relations of these emergent armies have been puzzling for NGOs,
scholars and government institutions. As these groups became more and more present throughout
the country, it became clearer that these armies were neither the AUC nor related directly to it, but
could not be simply dismissed as disaggregated gangs. As one of their more intriguing traits, these
groups loosely tried to make political claims that could be seen in the threats that they circulated.
In these pamphlets, they used menacing language that continued the stigmatization of peasants,
indigenous people, grassroots activists, unionized workers and other activists, but they did not
seem to be as clear in their political articulation as former AUC discourses. Instead, they seem to
be struggling for a certain kind of recognition by mimicking the political claims of former
paramilitary groups.

Figure 2 Death Threats received as text messages directed to union members.

21

Criminal Bands.
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In the two examples above, taken from the folders of two different union members, the
relation between the attempt to articulate death threats as politically motivated can clearly be seen.
The photo on the left says “Union members guerrilla motherfuckers your time [moving from the
plural to the singular] has come you people will destroy the economy of the country our
organization will not allow it resign or die Los URABE?NOS.” The photo on the right reads “Tuto
Almeria stay with your guerrilla ideas because your death has already been paid [a way to say it is
certain] you eat because of the company and are against it: death to the guerrillas of sintra. El
Paso.” The threats are poorly written, and by doing so they convey a sense of hate that is expelled
with violence into the text. As I indicate in chapter three, the idea that unions are directly
responsible for the lack of jobs and any economic problems in the region has become one of the
most important rationales for isolating them from the public and leaving their members without
support when murder attempts occur.
But more relevant to this chapter is the way in which an organization called Urabeños
present their case in the form of threats. According to reputable media outlets, such as Insight
Crime and Verdad Abierta, which have been investigating the development of these groups,
Urabeños are one of the most powerful structures in the country. Insight Crime states that “They
call themselves Autodefensas Gaitanistas (AGC), [and] they are known as Clan Golfo by the
government.”22 The fact that they are called differently by different actors only adds to public
confusion and to the obscurity of this group. The name “AGC” is a direct reference to Jorge Eliecer
Gaitán, a mythical Liberal politician killed in 1948 and whose murder triggered a period known as
La Violencia, between 1948 and 1953. Although the group has no connection with that history or

“Se autodenominan Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) y se conocen como el Clan del Golfo por el
gobierno colombiano”: See Insight Crime. “Los Urabeños”. september 9, 2020.
22
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to liberalism, by choosing that name, they try to connect their existence to the longstanding history
of the Colombian war, although Insight Crime defines these groups as a mafia, a term that
highlights the illegal economic centrality of the group´s existence.23
Meanwhile, the website Verdad Abierta has followed the attempts of this group to acquire
a political status. On April 4, 2016, Verdad Abierta published a story about the moment in which
Urabeños enforced a regional armed strike in 2016, a tactic often used by ELN, FARC and former
AUC to publicly show their strength and articulate political claims. In this piece, the outlet focuses
on the relation that exists between the public claim of these groups as being driven by merely
economic interests and their political character, citing three different sources that point out to the
vagueness of their objectives. First, they cite Teófilo Vázquez, a renowned scholar closely related
to the field of Violentología, who says that “these are criminal groups that become ‘politicized’ by
those who have local power that could be hurt by a negotiation”.24 Max Yuri Gil is quoted as
saying “it is possible that they do not have a defined objective over the peace process, but that they
are at the service of other sectors that declare themselves as enemies of the process”25. Finally, the
outlet quotes a document discovered by the Attorney General´s office that leans towards the
political future of the group: “By 2018, the AGC will be an armed and political actor that will seek
to establish a negotiation with the national government.”26

See Insight Crime. “Los Urabeños”. September 9, 2020
“se trata de bandas dedicadas a actividades criminales que son “politizadas” por quienes tienen unos poderes
locales que se podrían ver lesionados ante un proceso de negociación.” See: Verdad abierta. “¿Gaitanistas le hablan
con las armas al proceso de paz?”. April 04, 2016
25
“Es posible que no tengan un interés definido sobre el proceso de paz, sino que estén al servicio de otros sectores
que se declaran enemigos del proceso.” See: Verdad abierta. “¿Gaitanistas le hablan con las armas al proceso de
paz?”. April 04, 2016
26
“Para 2018, las ‘Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia-Jorge Eliecer Gaitán’ serán un actor armado y político que
buscará entablar negociaciones con el gobierno nacional” See: Verdad abierta. “¿Gaitanistas le hablan con las armas
al proceso de paz?”. April 04, 2016
23
24
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By 2016 there were many scholars analyzing these post-AUC accords structures, but there
was not a clear understanding of how to approach the question of their political dimension. The
relation with local elites is framed in terms of a suggestion with little proof, but more importantly,
as something that is not explored further. According to the same piece, the tension between the
definition of these groups as merely dedicated to drug trafficking or as armed groups subjected to
local elites was fierce, and was expressed in the position of two distinguished scholars who have
been part of CNMH and its previous iteration, Comisión de Memoria Histórica (CMH). In this
exchange, Eduardo Pizarro, former CMH director, argues that these groups should be defined
merely as criminal bands with the sole purpose of controlling drug trafficking economies, while
Alvaro Villarraga claims that the Urabeños are tied to and directed by local elites27.
The piece sheds light into the debate about the nature of these groups, highlighting how
difficult it has been to put together a definition, even when they are making statements in their
death threats or by other public actions. Nevertheless, it is clear that by 2013, the idea that these
emerging groups were simply the continuity of former paramilitarism did not seem to be
sustainable anymore, even though some organizations and activists continued insist on such a
continuum. But even those pointing to continuities did have to recognize a certain kind of
transformation between the AUC and these new groups that resulted from the latter´s
demobilization.

The post-AUC period showed that the signing of different peace accords

surpassed the analytical frameworks used to analyze the trajectories of political violence in the
country, and NGOs and social movements found themselves at odds to explain the transformations
in war that resulted from these negotiations.

27

Verdad abierta. “¿Gaitanistas le hablan con las armas al proceso de paz?”. April 04, 2016
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Many NGOs and government institutions have released reports about these groups, trying
to build an explanation of how they differ from previous paramilitary formations. NGOs such as
INDEPAZ has released, since 2006, 13 reports on what they call “narcoparamilitarismo”28, along
with other reports on the subject matter29. Likewise, the Ombudsman Office of Colombia
(Defensoria del Pueblo) has released several reports on the murder of activists in the last five years.
Think tanks like Insight Crime, Ideas Para la Paz (2016, 2013), Fundación Paz y Reconciliación
and more recently the de Kroc Institute (2017, 2018a, 2018b), are just a few of the many that have
evaluated the effects of the peace processes and the emergence of these groups, as remnants of
AUC or more recently FARC.
Most of these reports focus on the immediacy of the analysis. They are published policy
papers that try to intervene in political discussions about a particular stage of the aftermath of peace
processes. Most of their analysis centers on how illegal groups try to seize specific resources and
control strategic locations to guarantee their economic interests. In essence, and as one scholar
said to me during a conversation about the subject, “numbers matter because we can intervene in
the public with that. Journalists ask for that, you can write columns and get called to meetings”.30
By this he meant that most of the analytic attempts of those involved in studying these emergent
groups concentrated on affecting directly the public sphere, as well as government policies.
Showing numbers, maps and analysis tied to illegal economies and geopolitical control, would
allow a certain possibility of intervention that otherwise is not available to those interested in the
development of violence after the different peace accords.

28

The term highlights the idea that these new groups are mostly motivated by drug trafficking, rather than by the
former AUC, which in spite of being part of the drug business, had a counterinsurgent motive.
29
All of their reports could be found in their website. Since they are many and the discussion is spread among them,
I suggest that the reader see their website directly here: http://www.indepaz.org.co/category/informes/.
30
Personal conversation, March 2019.
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As argued by Prieto (2013), a common definition of these organizations is “delinquent
structures nationally de-articulated, with a high corruptive capacity, threatening and armed power,
that have combined the production and commerce of drugs with violent affectation of the rights
and liberties of the citizens in rural areas and the peripheries of urban centers (Prieto, 2013: 3).”31
According to this author, there is a general acceptance of the fact that these illegal groups
are “theoretically not tied to the logics of the armed conflict in legal or military terms (i.e.,
international humanitarian law)” (Prieto 2013: 3). Meanwhile, NGOs like INDEPAZ argue that
the “anti-subversive activities” of these groups are only exercised when there are direct economic
interests that need to be protected. The CNMH also took upon its task an analysis of the post-AUC
accords, aimed to clarify the character of these groups, which according to them became a debate
between a definition of “criminal organizations and third generation paramilitarism” (Villarraga
2015: 9). In this distinction, the CNMH highlights the difficulties that researchers and
bureaucracies have had defining the character of these groups, stressing the problem of their
political motivations:
In spite of the analytical effort, there is no consensus about the characterization [of these
groups], due to the complexity and novelty of the phenomenon. Such complexity is the
result of the fluid relations between paramilitarism, drug trafficking, common and
organized crime, active and retire members of the National Army and Police and regional
elites32 (Villarraga 2015: 61).

31

“estructuras delincuenciales nacionalmente des-articuladas, con un alto poder corruptor, intimidador y armado
que han combinado la producción y comercialización de drogas con la afectación violenta de los derechos y las
libertades de los ciudadanos en las zonas rurales y en la periferia de algunos centros urbanos del país”
32
“No obstante el esfuerzo analítico, hasta el momento no se ha logrado una caracterización con un consenso
amplio, debido a la complejidad y reciente aparición del fenómeno. Tal complejidad tiene que ver con las ﬂuidas
relaciones entre paramilitarismo, narcotráfico, delincuencia común y organizada, miembros activos y retirados del
Ejército y la Policía y elites regionales.”
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The diagnosis made by the CNHM is a summary of the debate around the subject at a
national and international level. As a renowned academic said to me during a conversation in which
I asked about the state of the research on the subject, “I am sure there are a lot of people working
on this, although most of what you see is in the form of reports and policy papers. The truth is that
for political reasons, we mostly focused on supporting and achieving the peace process, and so
these discussions of the war after AUC and the [FARC] dissidences were sidelined33”. This opinion
was shared by a member of the support team for the indigenous senator Feliciano Valencia, who
told me that “for the case of BACRIM, but mostly the FARC dissidents, things are written more
from a reaction logic, of containing and denouncing the situation than with attending to it as a
structural issue. And in that last point, what operates is the remaining hope that what was agreed
[in the peace accords with FARC] is actually accomplished”.34
The modalities of violence usually understood as part of the armed conflict have been
transformed since the AUC demobilized. Massacres and disappearances, two modalities that were
common practice by paramilitary groups, have been reduced significantly since the peace accords
signed in 2005. Similarly, the murder of prominent figures -like politicians, regional leaders and
human rights lawyers- decreased. In the decades of the 1980´s, 1990´s and the beginning of the
2000´s, physical violence perpetrated by legal and illegal armed forces was massive and displayed
in public,35 it aimed at the annihilation of any form of opposition to political and economic projects
in the country. But in the last decade it started to change its targets, its forms of appearing in public,
its possibilities of tracing it to specific determinations. In some regions, like Cesár, that display of
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Personal conversation, May 2019.
Personal conversation, May 2019.
35
In that regard, for example, massacres are often defined by the fact that they are public events of violence. Whether
it is because people are killed in front of an audience, because the persons are taken away in a particular event that
impacts a whole village, or because the bodies are displayed later for others to see.
34
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violence did not seem necessary anymore: unions had been controlled; leftists’ political parties
obliterated; peasant movements diminished and economic projects like coal extraction operated
with little opposition while being protected by the Colombian army.

The strap of the armed conflict
Seen in this light, the words of Santos´ Minister of Defense might take on another meaning.
Since the end of peace negotiations with paramilitary groups, the different governments in charge
have been trying to dissociate these groups from what is known as “the armed conflict.” The
definition is important, because the notion “armed conflict” directly ties the practices of violence
in the context of war to the Rome Statute (establishing the International Criminal Court) and the
Geneva Protocol II (on the protection of non-combatants in non-international conflicts).
By defining the war in Colombia as an internal armed conflict, the intention has been to be
able to subject the actors involved to the regulations stipulated in the International Humanitarian
Law (IHL). According to Torres, since 1960 Colombia has approved the Geneva Convention, and
in 1994 the constitutional court signed Law 171 (ley 171 de 1994) “a norm that regulates in a
specific and detailed manner everything related to International Humanitarian Law concerning
armed conflicts of not international character” (Torres 2007: 157). Finally, in the 2000, the
Constitutional Court introduced in the Colombian penal code a “catalogue of violations” against
persons and property protected by the International Humanitarian Law.
The definition of war is not irrelevant, and it has been a major debate in the country.
Defining the Colombian war as an internal armed conflict was a form to legally establish forms of
violence that differed from common illegal practices of violence. It was a way to render legible
the practices of violence occurring within a specific context, and therefore rule on them. Likewise,
linking violence to IHL created a variety of responsibilities -and possibilities- for those involved
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in it. Among other things, the recognition of the political status of the parties and the historical
conditions that created war, but also ideally creates forms of accountability if the parties submit to
the IHL regulations. As many involved in this debate have said, the IHL provides the rules of war
and defines its legality. Hence, it became an important site of debate. For some actors opposing
this definition, it might enable illegal armed groups to attempt an international level of recognition
that would allow them to have their own ambassadors and achieve a level of international
diplomacy. However, the latter ceased to be possible when at the beginning of the 2000s, the
United States and the European Union officially defined guerrilla groups in Colombia as terrorists.
Meanwhile, authors like Valencia Villa (1989) argue that the Colombian state had a longstanding
responsibility to obey IHL, due to its historical legal commitment, and the multiple sources from
which the Colombian state had accepted the importance of the law.
Valencia Villa argues that the conditions of war in Colombia require engaging with the
question of the humanization of war, namely, the idea that the IHL would effectively bring a certain
level of relief and regulation to a war that seemed brutal and without any sense of restraint.
Accepting the IHL would mean the political recognition of the parties – in particular guerrillasand the setting of rules of war, a normative framework that would regulate violence within war
itself. However, as mentioned before, not everybody was in favor of this definition (Villa 1991).
When the Uribe government decided to officially drop the definition of the Colombian war as an
armed conflict by using the term “terrorist threat”, the aim was to strip away any sense of political
status from the Colombian insurgencies.
The debate over how to define the war in Colombia is not irrelevant for our purposes. In
spite of the many discussions that the definition might have brought, NGOs, scholars, aid agencies
and multilateral organizations kept defining the war as an internal armed conflict, and analyzing
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the practices of violence in war in direct relation to the regulations of the IHL. Relying on
international legislation, its protocols and ethical and moral dispositions, helps to render legible
and accountable -or at least bring a sense of possible accountability- the practices of violence
occurring within the war. Moreover, despite Uribe´s attempt to change the definition of the
Colombian confrontation, the legal definitions of it remained established as armed conflict, with
its legal ramifications and already established rules.
In Colombia, different processes of transition have been created in the last fifteen years first with AUC and later with FARC- with varying degrees of efficacy and many uncertainties.
However, ten years separate the peace processes with AUC and FARC, which means that
regardless of the evaluation of the AUC-accords results, a form of the armed conflict remained in
place at least until 2016 when FARC signed its own peace accords.36
Although for social movements, scholars and human rights NGOs the AUC process is a
failure, the fact that there is a proliferation of new paramilitary groups that do not have the same
political and military trajectory of AUC became a puzzle difficult to solve. The motives, alliances
and forms of organization seem to be different, and the historical trajectories and political
intentions do not seem to match the established frameworks of analysis that are articulated through
the notions of armed conflict.
Since the paramilitary demobilization, and despite the many criticisms and debates, human
rights NGOs and social movements in Colombia and internationally have embraced the transitional
processes. Uribe´s government set up a series of institutions aimed to help in this transitional
process. When Santos became president, he transformed most of these institutions -and created a

36

It could be argued, nonetheless, that there are still insurgent organizations active, such as ELN, and therefore
Colombia is not able yet to claim to have moved beyond the armed conflict as such. This is still a matter of debate in
the country, as advocates of peace in Colombia argue in favor of a “paz completa”, namely, the idea that the only
way to achieve a complete for of peace is through a negotiation with ELN.
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new law of victims, known as ley 1448 of 2011-, giving them a more relevant status and sometimes
actually making government institutions with specific objectives related to peace and reparations37.
The peace process with FARC created new institutional apparatuses, dissident armies and
transitional procedures as well.
The different transitional attempts in Colombia have produced their own iterations of
political violence that have merged with the forms of war -defined as an armed conflict- that have
remained in place. AUC demobilization did not mean FARC/ELN demobilization, nor did FARC
demobilization mean ELN demobilization, nor did addressing the state of the illegal armies created
after the AUC demobilized or FARC dissident groups that roam the country. As a result, the
expectations of transitional politics became entangled with emergent formations of war, and the
promises of reconciliation, justice and no repetition were forced to coexist with the presence of
forms of armed violence that institutions, scholars, NGOs and social movements did not know
how to analyze without compromising the promise of peace that transitional politics was
providing.
The fact that the governments of Uribe and Santos claimed the existence of a post-conflict
scenario led to a national and transnational acceptance of such transition, even with the many
criticisms, doubts and levels of impunity that remained. Institutions, legal definitions of
victimhood, official reports on massacres, disappearances and other forms of violence were
created, as a certain kind of transitional machine designed to take the country into a post-conflict
scenario. NGOs, think tanks and scholars mostly focused their efforts on monitoring the tactical
transformations of the regions, analyzing the practical power arrangements between elites, illegal
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Santos dismantled Uribe´s office of Acción Social, which was attached to the Human Rights secretary, and
instead created the Land Restitution Unit and the Unit for Attention and Reparations of Victims.

74

economies -like drug trafficking and illegal mining- and the achievements of the goals related to
reparations of victims or demobilization of guerrillas.
But while the term “armed conflict” continued to be a marker of the remaining forms of
violence against insurgencies like ELN and FARC, other forms of violence exercised by these
post-AUC groups were considered extra-conflict forms of violence. Hence, these groups
increasingly killed, threatened and harassed activists throughout the country. And while grassroots
organizations argue that the murders were connected to political motivations, local disputes about
land or natural resources, they remained largely obscured as they could not be explicitly connected
to the forms of politically motivated violence often regarded as existing in the armed conflict.
The emerging forms of violence after the peace accords seem to be located in a space
between the illegality defined by the sovereign power of the state and the attempts of international
law to render legible -legally, politically and morally- the forms of violence that occur during a
war defined as an armed conflict. In that space, the murders and forms of violence oriented towards
the neutralization of political activism of organizations like SINTRAMINERGETICA, since the
post-AUC period, are obscured by existing legal formations, transitional institutions and
contingent political dispositions, which favor cases of death that could be explicitly related to the
armed conflict, and that could be processed through the transitional apparatuses. Human rights
organizations in Colombia and Europe have privileged the AUC conflicts and forms of violence.
I argue that this is not only because cases like Valdemoré and Orcasitas remained in impunity or
show a link between corporations and illegal armed groups, but also because they create a legible
image of violence that could be clearly transmitted to European audiences and achieve the desired
objectives of putting pressure in those corporations in Europe.
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Blood coal and the centrality of the armed conflict
In October 2016 the peace negotiations between FARC and the Santos government
suffered an irreparable defeat. After signing the accords and declaring that the country was going
to initiate a transitional process towards a democracy without war, one final step was required: a
referendum in which people would be asked if they agreed with the peace process and the
transitional process. Not even the winners believed that the answer was “no.” The government did
not have a backup plan, for as I was repeatedly told “who wants to say no to peace?” As a result,
all the peace negotiation plans were put on hold, re-negotiated and re-discussed.
Before the referendum took place, activists, pundits and public figures argued that the
accords were very complex and that they required a pedagogic endeavor. People all over the
country started to create study groups to analyze them at neighborhoods, towns and universities to
break their complexity and show their positive effects. It was common to hear in the radio famous
journalists in favor of the accords, and there was a generalized sensation that those against were
marginalized. But they were certainly campaigning. Christian groups were famous for opposing
the accords. Daniel Torres, a famous Colombian soccer player playing for Alavés in Spain said in
a video that “Jesus is the only one who can bring the peace that we so much desire”.38
His position was not unique and was being spread by evangelical churches all over the
country, adding the idea that the so-called gender ideology was hidden in the accords with the
purpose of destroying the country. The director of the “No” campaign, Juan Carlos Velez, publicly
explained during an interview that they wanted people to “vote with anger”, which required a fierce

“Jesucristo es el único que puede traer la paz que tanto anhelamos” En: El País. “El Voto Evangélico, Clave en la
Victoria del “No” En Colombia.” October 12th 2016.
38
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campaign of misinformation and intensification of debatable elements of the accords 39. Finally,
politicians, business persons and other important figures from the right, voiced their concerns for
what they thought was a project of impunity that was going to give the country away to FARC,
that Colombia was going to become like Venezuela, and considered that equating the military with
the guerrilla for judicial purposes was an unacceptable offense to the Colombian army.
The three major institutions that compose the SIVJRR have been under a lot of scrutiny
and have faced many problems, but certainly it is JEP40 the one that has suffered the most. There
are many different critiques of the JEP, but two of them are of importance for this chapter: first,
that there are certain crimes committed by guerrillas that are crimes against humanity and that
therefore should not be covered by this special form of justice. Second, as mentioned above, that
the guerrillas are a terrorist force, and that they should be treated accordingly rather than as
equivalent to the Colombian army, business people or civil society. In the peace agreement, an
important point of the negotiation related to unveiling truth was the recognition of third-party
responsibility in financing paramilitary groups and war activities. This point, which would have
allowed JEP to prosecute corporations and their representatives was taken out from the final
resolution of the JEP statutes, effectively impeding JEP to actively prosecute third parties involved
in war.
This is a highly contested scenario that it is currently unresolved. It is, at the same time, a
major political interest of social movements and NGOs, which see in JEP an actual possibility of
fighting the rampant impunity of Colombia´s legal apparatus. Furthermore, there is a global

Newspaper El Espectador, “La Cuestionable Estrategia del No” October 16th 2016.
JEP is the alternative transitional justice institution that would prosecute crimes in the context of the armed
conflict. In this regard, it has been deemed as the most important and contentious of the transitional system. As it
was negotiated in the peace process, it aimed to situate in a similar moral-political field the actors involved in war,
privileging truth and victims´ reparations over punitive actions over the actors.
39
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interest in finding ways to hold accountable transnational corporations for crimes committed in the
context of their activities. It is not surprising, then, that one of the interests of solidarity networks
with Colombia would be directed to transnational forms of accountability of corporate
responsibility in contexts of war. The case of Valdemoré and Orcasitas became substantially
important for these purposes, not only because it articulated many geographic points of political
interest, but because it seemed like a plausible case to win.
The account of the links between Drummond and paramilitary groups -and in that
connection, with the Valdemoré and Orcasitas murders- is summarized in the Maldita Tierra
Report (CNMH 2016) and the NGO Pax-Netherland´s Blood Coal report, The Dark Side of Coal
(Moor and Van de Sant 2014), but they mostly come from the legal cases put together by lawyers
in Colombia and the United States since 2002. Both reports lack conclusive proof of Drummond
representatives giving a direct order to finance paramilitary groups.
What exists is a complex web of actors and determinations which, taken together, suggest
an alliance with paramilitarism, or a situation in which coal corporations benefitted from
paramilitary activities. In that regard the reports suggest several points. First, a history that resulted
in the stigmatization of leftists grassroots organizations as being co-opted by guerrilla political
initiatives. Second, Drummond´s decision of isolation, which derived in a fierce infrastructure of
security and militarization, as well as lack of accountability. Third, the increasing escalation of
Colombia's armed conflict, which has as a direct consequence that specific persons involved with
Drummond colluded with paramilitary forces in order to guarantee the corporation´s extractivist
goals. The account of the murders of Orcasitas and Valdemoré unveiled these connections by
showing how different actors41 interacted with each other in order to murder union leaders and
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The list and responsibility of these actors is highly complex and extensive. It involves the contacts that former
CIA agent Jim Adkins -in charge of Drummond security- had with paramilitary warlord Jorge 40, many low level
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impose a regime of fear in the region, with the intention of neutralizing political activities that risk
coal extractive practices.
In 2002, the families of the victims filed a federal suit in Alabama under the Alien Tort
Statute, a law “passed in 1789 [...] created to give legal rights to diplomats in the United States,
and to prevent the country from becoming a haven for sea pirates. However [...] plaintiffs in the
U.S and abroad are using it to sue multinational corporations suspected of human rights abuses in
developing countries” (Whitmire: July 13 2007). Likewise, the investigation in Colombia was
furthered after the peace process with paramilitary groups, under the Ley de Justicia y Paz of 2005.
The legal results are generally disappointing. In Colombia, four persons were condemned
for the murder of the union leaders: Blanco Maya – the highest ranking person, who owned a
company that provided food for the mine and who, according to the union, was laundering
Drummond money to finance AUC, and three paramilitaries of low and medium rank. In the
United States, Drummond was found not guilty. However, according to Blanco Maya himself, his
company was a facade to direct Drummond payments to paramilitary groups (Moor and Van de
Sant 2014: 57) and, with his prosecution, Drummond was deflecting its responsibility and
“cleaning its hands” (CNMH 2016: 65). Nonetheless, the case stirred up controversy, and served
on multiple occasions to articulate legal-political strategies. In 2009, for example, the Drummond
case was among the many used to force President Obama not to sign the free trade agreement with
Colombia, arguing that union leaders in that country were being murdered with a 97% level of
impunity.

paramilitary infiltrates working at the Drummond facilities providing information about union leader´s actions,
police and military officers providing information as well, and Jaime Blanco Maya, the CEO of a company who
provided the meals for the workers and the only high-level actor condemned for these murders.
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The Valdemoré and Orcasitas case contains thousands of pages that include the testimony
of paramilitaries, informants, military officials and workers; the different forms of material
evidence gathered at the scene of the crimes; and the different legal venues where the case was
discussed. The use of the case is effective for it helps to ground and exemplify the complexity of
the alliances that existed between paramilitary groups and coal extraction. However, it cannot be
said that the case was successful in its legal sense. Although several persons were found guilty,
Drummond faced no consequences and the investigation stopped short at Blanco Maya ́s
responsibility. Meanwhile, in the U.S, the case was rejected and re-submitted several times, with
no positive effect for the plaintiffs.42
In 2012, the Dutch NGO Pax started an investigation on the relation between the coal that
European countries were buying and the violence in Colombia. The result was the aforementioned
report The Dark Side of Coal, which subsequently became the cornerstone of the international
campaign Blood Coal.43 Most of the information it contains is from the 2009 case submitted in the
Alabama court, but it broadened its scope by conducting interviews and visiting the sites of mine
extraction. It aims to provide a comprehensive view of violence in which coal corporations -like
Drummond, but also Vale, Prodeco and Glencore- benefitted from the processes of dispossession
and terror inflicted on the region.
Blood Coal is a fundamental reference of anti-coal activists with relation to Colombia in
Europe. According to several activists on that continent, Blood Coal has become a response to
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In 2003 the plaintiffs filed the first legal action, which was rejected. In 2007, after a resubmission, the court
accepted the case, but only directed to Drummond ltd and not the matrix house of Drummond. The case favored
Drummond in 2015, based on the fact that the events happened outside the U.S. In 2009, a new attempt was made,
but failed again in 2013.
43
In 2011, the Berlin-based NGO Urgewald made what is often deemed as a precedent of Blood Coal, called Bitter
Coal, producing a report with a transnational scope, namely, not only based in Colombia. However, because the
report was written in German, it did not have the same kind of impact that Blood Coal would have (interview with a
member of Ugerwald, July 2017, Berlin).
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BetterCoal -an NGO funded by major coal buyers to promote better practices along the coal chain
of value-, and the reports, statements and cases are widely used by NGOs in Europe to support
their claims against their countries´ use of Colombian coal. Blood Coal has had concrete effects in
places like Switzerland, Germany and Italy. For example, in 2017, the Italian company ENEL
ceased its contract with Drummond based on these accusations.
Because Blood Coal relies extensively on the accounts of the murder of Valdemoré and
Orcasitas, as well as accounts from scholars of the armed conflict and human rights NGOs, the
form that Colombian coal conflicts take in Europe is deeply influenced by the Blood Coal report.
As I was repeatedly told by NGOs and activists from Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and the
UK, NGOs and activists rely on the political histories that the Blood Coal project has highlighted,
with additions that are often the result of special visits that activists and NGO representatives
conduct in the coal mining region44. In spite of the many dead ends that this case has -Drummond
has never been held accountable, the land grabbing for extractivist purposes has been successful
in its transformation of economic and political relations, and the responsibilities for paramilitary
violence remains in impunity-, the case provides a coherent picture with uncontestable events:
violence against union leaders; connections to an economic project of large scale extractivism;
illegal armed forces intervention linked to counter insurgent tactics. Even if there is not a definitive
recognition of the role that paramilitary violence played in the transformation of Cesár into a coalbased economy, NGOs and government institutions like the CNMH have established the relation
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I will discuss this later, but it is important to say that in 2016 Pax-Netherlands published an updated report,
including new testimonies by paramilitaries, information gathered by the Maldita Tierra report and stories of
peasants and inhabitants of the mining corridor. Likewise, European activists have been interested in investigating
the links of Glencore with paramilitary groups, and have visited Cesar to gather information that is later used for
lobbying in Switzerland. In 2012 supported by the German NGO MISERIOR, several NGOs started a project called
Red Sombra (Shadow Network), with the purpose of observing and evaluating Glencore’s activities. Their work
mostly consist in documenting specific cases of Glencore’s activities in Latin American Countries.
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between the two of them, while paramilitaries’ testimonies keep pointing to concrete
responsibilities of regional elites and transnational corporations.
Drummond has contested the claims made by Pax in its report. In a public letter signed
July 1, 2014, Drummond disputes the facts contained in The Dark Side of Coal, and instead argues
that the paramilitary testimonies are inconsistent, questioning the ethics, motives and rigor of the
NGO. Among their most important criticisms is the claim that “Drummond strongly suggested that
Pax study the archives from the Public Archives to Court Electronic Records (PACER) before
publishing their report. […] Apparently, PAX did not do it, or intentionally ignored the public
record from the court”45 Similarly, the president of Drummond sent a letter to the NGO in 2016,
stating that PAX was “making false accusations about alleged human rights accusations and
demanding that we offer reparations to the victims of the armed conflict that have existed for over
50 years in Colombia”, and that Drummond warned PAX about the false witnesses that they were
encountering for their investigation in Cesár. 46
In addition, the case in Alabama has gone through several setbacks. The most important
occurred when Drummond lawyers argued that the U.S lawyer representing the victims had been
offering different retributions to witnesses to testify against Drummond. The claim came through
an intricate set of allegations and interrogations and sits in a gray area of interpretation.
Nevertheless, the development of these claims have been enough to put in question the legitimacy
of these testimonies, and overall the involvement of Drummond in the development of
paramilitarism in Colombia. As an immediate effect, Drummond has put in question the report

Drummond, “Carta abierta en respuesta al informe The Dark Side of Coal: Paramilitary Violence in the Mining
Region of Cesar, Colombia, publicado por PAX, Países Bajos”. 2020.
46 ”Haciendo falsas acusaciones sobre relación a supuestas violaciones de derechos humanos y pidiendo que
ofrezcamos remediación a las víctimas del conflicto armado que lleva más de 50 años en Colombia”. Revista
Semana Sostenible. “¿Qué hay detrás del veto al carbón colombiano en Italia?”. May 10 2017.
45
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made by PAX, suggesting that the NGO´s unawareness of the tactics to taint the company´s
reputation, is an example of the quality of the report and their inherent bias.
Beyond Drummond’s allegations, for this chapter is relevant to consider that the case has
been arranged largely through the lenses of the Violentología’s analytical framework. This has
make for an effective public political intervention, even if there are many elements that remain in
obscurity or are disputed by the different parties involved. In this history, there is a economic
transition in which dispossession and accumulation for coal extraction takes place; elites, state
institutions and transnational corporations; social movements attacked and a myriad of human
rights violations that are fueled by a political economy where nature is a resource to be seized.
The possibility of having clearly-defined cases was one of the major reasons that made
Colombia such an important source for European anti-coal activists. And while there is a sense of
solidarity and a non-interventionist perspective from these activists with regard the extent of the
influence that they can have on Colombian concerns,47 when I asked about their thoughts on the
political upheavals that JEP was producing in that country, and the problems regarding the
exclusion of third parties from JEP prosecution possibilities, their response was unanimously a
strong “That is not our responsibility.”48
This response was shocking, for one of the most important concerns that Colombian social
movements had at the moment was not only the future of the peace process, but how the
prosecution of business-related actors could impact the transformation of power relations in the
country, hoping for possible redistributive policies, both in terms of an expansion in democracy
and economic diversification. Their response came from the idea that every activist has a
responsibility tied to their place in the chain of value, and their objectives were related to

47
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I will develop this point in the next chapters.
Conversation with German anti-coal activist. Berlin, August 2018.
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accountability at three levels: (1) businesses based in European countries with transnational ties;
(2) pressure on states for corporate accountability; and (3) public interventions on civil society. In
their account it is not that they do not care about what occurs in Colombia, but that in order to
impact the chain of value, they must focus on what they are more able to impact.
There have been several initiatives aimed to address corporate responsibility. The
Maastricht principles on Extra-Territorial obligations is one of these examples. In 2014, CCAJAR
was involved in a continental initiative based on these principles, specifically directed to force
Canada to be held accountable for the violations committed by Canadian companies in Latin
America.49 Likewise, the effort at United Nations to adopt a binding treaty for transnational
corporations continues to be discussed, and is certainly part of the many elements that activists
take in consideration when developing their strategies.
Despite the developments on this field, transnational corporations remain largely out of
reach from accountability. Given the global difficulties in this front, a transitional process in which
corporations could be held accountable for their responsibilities in fueling war seemed like a
relevant scenario to advocate for. Likewise, the European Union was vocal in its support to the
political transition in Colombia, and thus it was not far-fetched to consider transitional justice as a
tactic to pursue. What I was told by members of different organizations was that small NGOs in
Europe do not have the resources for that kind of transnational activity, and that Colombian politics
was particularly difficult to follow. In that way, it is arguable that these organizations privileged
the coherency of a case as a political artifact over the transnational political contestations,
transformations and uncertainties that the case was embedded in.

Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo. “Informe sobre responsabilidad extraterritorial de los estados en la
minería a gran escala. El caso de Canadá”. May 14, 2019.
49
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In July 2017, when the Colombian Congress was discussing for the first time the results of
the peace accords, a new development complicated the responsibility of corporations. For months,
many business owners and representatives of different economic sectors, publicly expressed their
discontent in relation to the fact that JEP was able to prosecute what came to be known as terceros,
namely, third parties that supported illegal armies by financing them, providing intelligence or
other means. As a result, the Congress denied JEP´s capacity to force third parties to give
depositions at JEP, and instead it became a voluntary act by those who fell in the category of
terceros. This decision, ratified in 2019, feeds into the already highly difficult intentions of
prosecuting corporations, whether in Colombia or at an international level.
There have been many attempts, since at least the 1970´s, to produce binding forms of
legislation that could make transnational corporations accountable. In a blog post for Allegra
Laboratory, Marc Edelman (2014) summarizes the efforts of civil society to press towards a
binding treaty for corporations. He shows that this issue has been highly debated in the last decade
at the United Nations, with different attempts coming from NGOs and social movements at various
moments. The problem of corporate accountability is certainly a major concern of transnational
social movements, which seem to be fighting on uneven ground precisely because there is a serious
lack of accountability regarding transnational corporate responsibility.
My intention is not to summarize nor follow the achievements and shortcomings of
attempts for a binding treaty, but to point to something else, namely, that the lack of accountability
for transnational corporations’ economic practices has left social movements with few strategies
at hand. Retracting back to the field of human rights normativity is considered the most effective
move, even if that means sidelining other concerns and political possibilities that grassroots
organizations see as crucial for their activities The legal and political limitations at the international
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level and by the transitional justice apparatus, led NGOs and unions to make a tactical decision,
to bypass the many obstacles that impede accountability. Therefore, retreating to cases that are
clear, and in which the responsibility of corporations could be, if not legally asserted, at least
suggested - in order for the more traditional strategies of putting pressure on governments, civil
society organizations and politicians, could be effectively performed-, were preferred over
alternatives that could be seen more accurate politically, but more uncertain in their possibilities.

Nostalgia
I ask the reader to go back with me to the beginning of this chapter, when Algemiro Tobo
brought me some of the folders. Each one had the name of a person written in red marker. Each
one contained the different threats and responses of government institutions. A funeral wreath sent
directly to the house of a person, with his name in it and a letter full of insults asking him to leave
Valledupar; text messages that were saved and later xeroxed to be archived in the folders -as shown
in the pictures before-; letters with the names of persons who attended a meeting. Denunciations
of military surveillance with no response, for as I was told “they say that the person was just there,
doing nothing, so he was not breaking the law”; brochures by the Attorney General’s office
containing a number of strategies for personal protection.
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Figure 3: A funeral wreath sent to the house of a unionized worker. The picture on the right is the death threat that
came with the wreath, handwritten and saved in its original form in the folder

.

The sources of these threats are uncertain, as is the nature of the groups that supposedly
hold those names: Los Urabeños, Los Rastrojos, AGC or Aguilas Negras.50 Unlike the case of
Orcasitas and Valdemoré, the emergent practices of violence and intimidation recorded in these
folders lacked the coherence that past forms of violence had. There is something striking about
this difference. In spite of all the dead ends of the Valdemoré-Orcasitas case, NGOs and grassroots
organizations are able to situate the their killings in a framework that allows for its legibility: there
are clearly defined paramilitary groups, political antagonisms, historical processes, illegal and
legal actors fighting over a particular geography in the midst of a war that is defined as an armed
conflict.
But since the AUC disappeared, the remnants of these groups often seem to be extrapolitical bandits (Cassia 2000), with political motivations driven by geopolitical (i.e. controlling
routes of drug trafficking) or economic objectives. As such, the compilation of death threats
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All of these groups are often considered BACRIM or neoparamilitaries. Regardless of the name, they are
considered to be the remnants of the AUC demobilization.
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followings and murder attempts appear as diffused practices of violence, rather than articulated to
emergent forms of organization of power.51
Pax-Netherlands published an updated account of Blood Coal in 2016, recording 27 threats
and murder attempts directed at grassroots organizations and unions in the mining corridor
between 2012 and 2016 (PAX-Netherlands 2016: 13-14). But this update only uses two pages -of
a total of 21- to address the context of these forms of violence, suggesting that there might be a
relation between the Land Restitution Law and the modalities of violence and intimidation. They
point to the fact that “in several of the signed pamphlets or communiqués neo-paramilitary groups
have claimed to defend the interests of the mining companies and other economic actors in the
region. Despite this, neither Drummond nor Prodeco/Glencore have publicly distanced themselves
from these claims” (PAX-Netherlands 2016: 5). But for the most part, the update repeats the stories
of the links between paramilitarism and Drummond between 1996 and 2005, namely, the period
that reports like Maldita Tierra and the 2009 case discuss.
In turn, the networks of human rights related to Colombia struggle to make sense of a
tension between two political situations: on the one hand, the transformation of violence resulting
from the demobilization of illegal armies; on the other hand, the idea that achieving peace and
ending the armed conflict is the cornerstone of the country's future. In that context, it is difficult
to organize what union leaders have experienced -threats, surveillance, murder attempts and callsin the form of a coherent case of human rights violations in the same way that the Orcasitas and
Valdemoré case had been organized. The latter is grounded in a notion of the armed conflict as a
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Since 2016, when the murdering of grassroots leaders spiked significantly, the discussion about the diffused
character of these practices of violence changed. Specifically, human rights activists began to advance the idea that
they should be understood as systemic rather than diffused. The immediate effect of considering these practices of
violence in those terms would be that the government would have to recognize that there was a political motivation,
a plan organized and directed to the obliteration of grassroots leaders in Colombia.
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confrontation of different actors with concrete political and economic interests in the region, in
which land and coal play major roles as resources, and paramilitary forces, regional elites, social
movements and transnational corporations are situated as antagonistic characters. It is grounded in
the rich analytical field of analysis of the Colombian armed conflict, adding conceptual and
historical clarity to the case. In turn, in spite of the many dead-ends, forms of impunity and
transnational legal difficulties, the Valdemoré-Orcasitas story provides a legible narrative of
violence, in which its practices serve specific objectives tied to economic-political interests.
The difference between the strength of the Valdemoré-Orcasitas case and the present
abundance of seemingly loose threats against union leaders challenges the tools used by human
rights and anti-coal activists. It seems that the lack of an analytical framework creates a situation
in which making sense of the developments of politically motivated violence

does not seem

possible. On the contrary, for at least a good part of the last decade, confronting the multiplication
of forms of political violence tied to illegal armies after the AUC seemed like a jump into
uncertainty.
But there is also a reluctance to consider the political effects of the succession of changes
in the Colombian war. Svetlana Boym reminds the reader that “nostalgia is a longing for a home
that no longer exists” (Boym 2001: 14), and uses the story of Odysseus to argue that “Modern
nostalgia is a mourning for the impossibility of mythical return, for the loss of an enchanted world
with clear borders and values” (Boym 2001: 30). She uses Kosseleck´s notion of the relation
between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation to argue that “nostalgia, as a
historical emotion, is a longing for that shrinking space of experience that no longer fits the horizon
of expectations” (Boym 2001: 33). This definition of nostalgia evokes a home that does not seem
to fit, and a fracture between experience and expectations. In the case of Kosselleck, it is a form
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of discussing the ways in which humans experience time and, in our analysis, how certain NGOs
have articulated the tensions between the past and the present of extraction and violence in
Colombia.
The succession of peace accords and their different webs of transitional institutions,
practices and legislations, eroded through time the explanatory strength that the notion of “armed
conflict” has had. But transitional processes overlapped and coexist with new formations of war
and the remaining forms of armed conflict. While the legibility of the armed conflict fades and
new forms of armed violence emerge, NGOs and activists in Europe seem to be struggling to
articulate the political character of these changes. Furthermore, given that their interest rests
strongly in the explicit relation established between illegal armies and transnational corporations,
the difficulties of even suggesting this link in the new scenarios also add to the existing sense of
discomfort.
Human rights NGOs and anti-coal activists long for a past that felt more like home. The
present seemed like a disruption, one to which they did not have the tools to make sense of.
Considering that the state of a binding treaty for accountability of transnational corporations is still
precarious, and that the analytical framework of armed conflict allowed for a particular narrative
of violence and accountability, the reports of European NGOs like Pax and the uses of the
Colombian experience of coal extraction are largely focused on a moment where, in spite of the
many remaining forms of impunity, the exercise of violence could be situated within a larger
framework of moral and legal accountability.
The past of violence linked to the notion of the armed conflict was a safer place, already
forged by decades of analysis and legal arrangements that could be summoned for political
purposes: International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and even transitional justice, were all
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available to argue about the relation between corporations, illegal armies and coal extraction. Even
if they were flawed, limited or could not effectively produce a transparent link between
paramilitaries and corporations like Drummond. On the other hand, the convoluted present of
armies with dubious names and sources, that operate in what is apparently an extra-political realm,
that resemble bandits rather than coherent armies with a concrete project, is cannot be apprehended
with the same coherence, and thus the violence that these groups produce do not seem to have the
same capacity to articulate the critiques that European NGOs, think tanks and anti-coal activists
are interested in. As the nature of the groups that produce death are not defined in relation to a
form of war with political roots, the people that get killed are also questioned. It is not, however,
that NGOs, multilateral institutions and scholars are completely uninterested in them; they are
highly concerned, but the substantial obscurity of the practices, sources and political relations, as
well as the lack of an analytical framework to make sense of them, simply forced to the margins
the present of violence in favor of a past that, as powerful as it is to further political strategies to
stop the use of Colombian coal in Europe, does not seem to exist in that form anymore.
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Chapter 2
On contested modalities of dying: Fighting Over the Bruno Creek.
In this chapter I argue that the process of making a case against the diversion of the Bruno
is defined by the constant arrangement of pasts and ongoing forms of human and non-human death
in Guajira, with the objective of showing how the diversion of the Bruno would result in the
complete impossibility of life in the future of the region. I will analyze two main challenges that
the Bruno dispute had for those against its diversion: one, related to the temporalities of the case
and what I call the speed of death and its forms of capture. Two, the concerns about the hierarchies
that the making of the case creates for those who are involved in its making, circulation and its
effects. The chapter will examine the processes through which lawyers, communities and
environmental activists arrange environmental studies, political sensibilities and moral
considerations to make the case, negotiating the authority of the data used, the status of the
different forms of knowledge and the epistemic practices that make the case against the diversion
of Bruno.
In 2015 environmental and human rights activists celebrated a major victory against coal
extractivism, when the Colombian Supreme Court52 ruled against the Cerrejón conglomerate and
its attempt to divert the Ranchería River in La Guajira to expand its operations in the country.
Cerrejón, the largest open-pit coal mine in Latin America has existed since 1978. After the relative
success of Cerrejón, the extraction of the mineral expanded to Cesar and Magdalena, and it has
been deemed as the example of the form that extractivism should take in Colombia. Colombian
business conglomerates, transnational corporations, politicians and different governments, have
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This is the highest court of the country. After the 1991 constitution, a new institution called Constitutional Court
was created to rule on issues explicitly related to the constitution. Therefore, the Supreme Court mostly rules on
Ordinary Law disputes.
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used it as an example of responsibility, effectiveness, development and legality, largely in
opposition to the forms of extraction in the south of the country, usually portrayed by corporations
and state institutions as dirty, illegal, violent and obscure (Ramirez and Muñoz 2012; Casallas and
Martinez 2015; Falus 2013).
The Ranchería River is essential for Guajira. Historically, the department is a semi-desert
landscape, but scholars debate the extent to which water has been as scarce as it is in the present,
the reasons for the scarcity, and the economic practices that have transformed the landscape since
the colonial period. According to Proyecto de Formulación e implementación del Plan Integral de
Cambio Climático para la Guajira53 (Corporación Ambiental Empresarial -CAE- 2015),
IDEAM,54 the South Pacific Oscillation phenomenon strikes particularly hard in Guajira. During
its warm phase (El Niño), precipitation is reduced between 20% and 40% in the Caribbean region
of Colombia, but in La Guajira it falls more than 40%. On the other hand, during its cold phase
(La Niña) severe precipitation more than 40% above normal occurs there as well. Since 2010, the
region has faced these events, first with the Niña phenomenon, which according to
CORPOGUAJIRA55 affected 15% of the department, and through 2014 to 2016 with El Niño,
which intensified droughts, famines and human and non-human death. According to the CAE
report, between 2008 and 2013, 4,151 children died in Guajira, largely with signs of malnutrition
and diseases heightened by the Niña and Niño phenomena. The same report claims that 7,000
cattle died by August of 2014 (CAE 2015: 20).
In Colombia there is a public acknowledgment and concern about the vital lack of water in
the department. At a national scale, Guajira is usually used as one of the clearest examples of a
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Project to Formulate and Implement de Climate Change Plan for Guajira.
National Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and environmental studies of Colombia.
55
This is the departmental institution in charge of regulating, monitoring and administering environmental concerns.
54
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crisis that combines intense drought, corruption and extreme poverty, which create the conditions
for death56. Therefore, the idea of diverting its most important river to expand the operations of
one of the largest coal mines of the world was viewed with suspicion. Cerrejón was not only trying
to divert the largest river of an extremely dry region affected violently by climate change, it already
was consuming around 24 million of liters a day for its operations: cleaning tools, human use,
environmental mitigation of coal extraction effects (Fierro and Llorente 2016). The local
government was no better. Major corruption scandals erupted in the previous years, with governors
imprisoned and stories about money for health and childcare diverted to private hands. This made
for a stark contrast with the massive death of Wayuu children throughout the department57.
The combination of these elements might have helped the court to rule against the
Rancheria diversion. But as soon as the Ranchería case ended, Cerrejón started another -less
visible- project: the diversion of Bruno creek (Arroyo Bruno). This was a different political
scenario. Despite the Ranchería victory, the conflict left the actors involved and their networks
exhausted, creating a significant fracture between the main NGOs from Bogotá involved with the
case (CINEP, CCAJAR, CENSAT and INDEPAZ), the grassroots organizations and indigenous
reservations in Guajira. Similarly, public discussions in Colombia were moving on to other
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In the last decade, Guajira comes in and out of the news as national and multilateral agencies address the problems
of water and famine in the region. According to the newspaper El Espectador, UNICEF expressed its concern over
the death of 48 children in 2014 (“UNICEF pide mayores acciones del Gobierno frente a la desnutrición en La
Guajira”, El Espectador: June 15th 2015). The same newspaper reports that President Santos will personally address
what is called a humanitarian crisis in 2016 (“Santos encabezará mesa de diálogo sobre Crisis de La Guajira”, EL
Espectador February 9th 2016). BBC reported the 20th of August of 2015 that there was a major water crisis in the
region since 2012, “Colombia: la tragedia de la Alta Guajira, la región en la que no llueve hace tres años”. A Likewise
, the Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia, released a report in 2014 called “Crisis Humanitaria en la Guajira: Acción
Integral de la Defensoría del Pueblo en el Departamento” (Defensoría Del Pueblo, 2014).
57
Governor Oneida Pinto was removed from her post in 2016 after several corruption scandals became public.
Wilmer Gonzales, the governor that followed her, was found guilty of corruption and sent to prison in 2018 (El
Heraldo, November 14, 2018). According to El Espectador, The Attorney General´s Office opened an investigation
called “Crystal Pockets”, that inquired about the many forms of corruption that diverted resources to support
government institutions dealing with the humanitarian crisis to private hands (“Los Graves Casos de Corrupción en
La Guajira, October 20th, El Espectador 2016).
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concerns, like the peace negotiations with FARC and the upcoming elections, leaving behind the
discussions about Guajira.
The Arroyo Bruno is a tributary of the Ranchería River, and for the NGOs, activists and
grassroots organizations involved, the possibility of its diversion was the continuation of the
struggle over access to water and the possibilities of life in the region. For them, the diversion
involved multiple forms of environmental violence, the extensive transformation of the regional
ecology, disputes around the rights to the uses of the land and a diversity of actors with a variety
of interests and needs.
The diversion of the creek did not occur during my fieldwork. Although the Cerrejón
conglomerate made plans and even began the construction in anticipation of a positive decision,
the debate took place in the realm of possibility rather than the definitive execution of the project.
By 2019, even almost a year after the Constitutional Court gave its final ruling on the case, the
parties had not been officially notified about it. It differed from many other conflicts that were
occurring more or less simultaneously, that to this day impact the possibilities of life in the region,
and that were used in order to argue against or in favor of the diversion: water grabbing and
contamination, coal dust and health, explosions and forced relocations, among them.
I argue that the Bruno as a case is a political artifact that speaks to the possible futures
imagined by the actors involved. These actors turn to the myriad of past and present environmental
conflicts and their evidentiary collection, especially the studies and reports of contamination, water
grabbing, soil damage and land use as means to articulate their desired future in the form of the
Bruno´s future. The transnational networks of scholars, institutions and activists gathered different
forms of documentation and moral and political support to make palpable in the present the future
that they did not want to be.
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Set up: the imaginations of the possible around the Arroyo Bruno
Samuel Arregocés -an Afro-Colombian leader from Guajira and a key actor who connects
communities and activists across the department with NGOs in Bogotá and Europe- likes to take
visitors to Campo Alegre, a Wayuú reservation located on a hill in a zone of mostly semi-arid
plains in the Caribbean region. Once there, Samuel walks with the visitor, usually explaining that
the reservation has no water and depends on what the Cerrejón conglomerate provides via tanker
trunks that fill water containers every week. He proceeds to show the coal dust that covers rocks,
leaves and trees -mostly dead or dry-, and finally walks to the brink of the hill, where a surprising
image hits the eyes of the spectator: in a landscape of gradations of yellows, grays and black, a
green line crosscuts the horizon, right in the middle between the reservation and the Cerrejón
mine. That line, Samuel says, is Bruno Creek.
It is easy to see why Samuel creates this experience for the visitor.

Cerrejón´s

environmental violence unfolds to the eyes of visitors as they approach the brink of the hill. First
the colors and the obvious lack of water that is palpable in the surroundings; then the coal dust that
portrays a particular dimension of environmental violence in the form of micro-particles, so small
that seem to go unnoticed, yet so pervasive that they invade the lungs and make it difficult even to
breathe; this is followed by an explanation of the measuring mechanisms of air contamination and
the tactics of the mine to tamper with the evidence; finally, Samuel takes the visitor to the brink of
the hill, and shows the landscape of aridity with the color green as a contrast line of possibility
that, from Samuel´s point of view, has been taken away from the communities to favor large
extractivists´ projects.
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Cerrejón had acquired the rights for the Bruno´s diversion in 1998, when the environmental
consequences of extractivism were not at the center of Colombian debates. For the conglomerate,
the diversion of the Bruno was part of an enlargement of the operations of a section of Cerrejón
known as P40, aimed at expanding three mining pits and divert several water sources (CENSAT
2015). The project that affects Bruno is related to the expansion of “La Puente” mine pit, and
according to the local newspaper La Guajira Hoy, it would guarantee job creation and allow the
mine to maintain its regular level of coal extraction for exporting purposes 58. The project would
divert the Bruno by 3.6 km, redefining its natural course, but maintaining its starting point and
ending in the mouth of the Ranchería River.

Figure 4: The blue line shows the original course of the creek, the red line shows the intended diversion. Source:
Análisis sobre el Proyecto Cerrejón de Desviación del Arroyo Bruno, Universidad de la Guajira
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The newspaper La Guajira Hoy would use the same paragraph repeatedly throughout 2016 and part of 2017 when
reporting about the development of the Bruno dispute: “The works of the La Puente pit, required to maintain the
current level of production at Cerrejón as well as jobs, revenues and benefits, have generated to this day the
employment of 150 persons, 83% from Guajira, from communities and villages, including Wayuús ”
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Cerrejón is considered a transparent conglomerate -at least compared to other projects in
the country operated by the corporations that are part of it-, in the sense that it is open to the
dialogue with communities, activists and government institutions, and it also provides information
about its operations. In its website, corporate gatherings and public presentations, Cerrejón
highlights the many awards it has received for corporate responsibility, development, community
relations and proper environmental administration59, and is known in Colombia for its “open door”
policy. Unlike other mining corporations that are part of this research60, Cerrejón gives tours in
the mine, invites researchers to its headquarters in Bogotá and Guajira and remains open to
conversations with activists, communities and NGOs.
The newspaper La Guajira Hoy -that for some read as an ad paid by Cerrejón- presents the
public position of the conglomerate, a position that would be replicated with small changes
throughout the dispute. The image of coal extraction by the conglomerate in one of the largest
open pit mines of the world as transparent and environmentally friendly would be central for
Cerrejón´s public stance and the justification of the diversion. It is grounded in a well-known idea
of development that articulates notions of progress, modernization and the promise of a life within
the framework of modern values, a discourse that has been sufficiently studied in anthropology
(Escobar 2005; Bedoya and Martinez 1999; Cruz 2018; Lander 2000). However, unlike previous
years when these kinds of projects faced little public opposition, now Cerrejón was facing a public
debate in which the traditional discourse of development, progress and investment was questioned
not only by those involved in anti-coal activism, but by the general public concerned about
famines, droughts and corruption in the department.
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According to Cerrejón’s 2017 Sustainability report, between 2011 and 2017, the conglomerate had received 15
awards related to health, environment and community relations (Cerrejón, 2017: 7)
60
Drummond, a protagonist of coal extraction in Cesár and a central corporation for the remaining cases, is known
for a close door policy and contentious relations with workers, NGOs and even regional state representatives.
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The Ranchería ruling showed Cerrejón that the field of contention was significantly
different from what they expected. Activists and NGOs showed an understanding of the tactical
importance of using studies, technical reports, numbers and statistics to contest corporations´
objectives (Rappaport 2008; Gow 2008; Edelman 2018; Hetherington 2013). On the contrary,
Cerrejón´s focus on standardized notions of development, job creation and progress was outdated,
limited and counterproductive for their purposes. Even SINTRACARBON, one of the most
important coal unions in the Caribbean -and an organization that the corporation assumed would
be in favor of Bruno diversion for its job creation possibilities- saw the conglomerate’s argument
as problematic. It became important for the conglomerate to build a thorough strategy that would
also take into consideration the same concerns that activists took, adding one important element:
uncertainty.
Although the Bruno had a strong precedent in the Ranchería legal case, Cerrejón did not
base its strategy on such ruling. On the contrary, it explicitly avoided mentioning that dispute in
order to find a more innovate and effective approach for the Bruno diversion. The conglomerate
combined studies aimed at analyzing the possible scenarios of the diversion, highlighting the
corporation´s reputation through its many awards and international recognition of good practices,61
and stressing the positive effects of the expansion for la Guajira and Colombia. These arguments
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Among them are: Andesco Award for Social Responsibility (2015 & 2014) Special mention as Best Company

not belonging to Public Services sector BHP Billiton HSEC Awards (2014) Highly Commended Award in the category
Community To programme for Improvement of health conditions in neighbouring communities. Britcham Lazos
Award (2014) Honourable mention for Best Programme of Great National Impact Presented the British and
Colombian Chamber of Commerce.Diamond Award (2013) Awarded by Positiva (Insurance Company), for Integral
Chemical Management System. Portafolio Awards (2014) In the category Protection of the Environment, for the Land
Reclamation programme. Sustainable Colombia Environmental Responsibility Award (2014 & 2013) Golden Seal
recognition presented by the Siembra Colombia Foundation. Andesco Award for Social Responsibility (2014)
Category Major Company. BHP Billiton HSEC Awards (2014) Highly Commended Award in the category
Community To programme for Improvement of health conditions in neighbouring communities. Britcham Lazos
Social Responsibility Award (2013) Category “Best Stakeholders Management Programme”.
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were articulated as a projection into the future, serving two purposes: first, suggesting a clean break
from previous failed projects and second, reinforcing the idea that future ventures aimed for the
development of the country could not be restrained because of past mistakes or fears for an
unknown future.62
It is certainly true that is not conceivable to predict every possible outcome of a particular
project. However, as Edwards (2010) has suggested in his work on climate analysis, the need to
predict future scenarios of environmental change led to a complicated process of analysis of the
past and the creation of models to foresee the future. Although the case of Bruno is not defined by
models like those studied by Edwards, Cerrejón did seemed to consider that by presenting a
significant amount of environmental studies, it would be able to control the future, to anticipate
undesired outcomes of the diversion.
The strategy of Cerrejón relied on two elements: on the one hand, the anticipation of the
future in the form of studies, projections and prognosis. On the other, the radical rejection of the
past, based on the denial of former rulings about similar projects. The two tactics produced a
temporal suspension, which added to the constant delay of legal and political decisions about the
Bruno, allowed for the creation of uncertainty as a temporal-political field in which Cerrejón could
indefinitely operate. In other words, if there is not a definitive ruling and the evidence of
environmental degradation could always be put in question, Cerrejón can continue to operate and
use its set of studies, reports and data that supports its practices.

62

This cannot be considered exclusive of the Bruno project. Recently, for example, when the Hidroituango dam project
started to collapse in Antioquia -leading to the risk of a massive catastrophe in the region-, engineers, biologists,
politicians and CEOs related to that project constantly argued that what occurred could not be expected, and that these
kinds of projects could not be stopped by speculating about catastrophic futures that seemed impossible before they
actually happened.

100

Business expansion related to colonial rule and the assertion of a moral regime of
adventure, risk and freedom are of significant importance in Latin America. Historians have been
particularly incisive in their analysis of corporate expansion in the region, not exclusively in
relation to the creation of new markets, but as a specific regime that combined private ventures in the form of corporations- and foreign intervention directed at Latin American states (Donoghue
2014; Grandin 2009; Gilbert, LeGrand and Salvatore 1998).
The idea that there is a strong relation between adventure and possibility is at the core of
the global expansion of capitalism. Scholars have shown how the practice of business creation,
exploration and discovery, has served an important role in the making of colonial efforts and the
global organization of capitalism63 (Gobat 2005; Colby 2011; Klubock 2001). Therefore, business
ventures, even at their outmost risk, are considered the driving force of progress, the leap of faith
that transform the world.
Cerrejón´s argumentation aimed to claim for the conglomerate the field of uncertainty as
the possibility of success, of freedom as risk as the necessary condition of progress (cf. Harvey
2007). Cerrejón began by focusing on the fact that they had acquired the concession for the
diversion in 1998. From that moment on, as the map above describes, they studied the best possible
ways to develop the project, considering a move that was significantly different from the Ranchería
case: they would reproduce the original condition of the creek, from its meanders to the ecosystems
that it made possible. In this way, they claimed, the reproduction of the original conditions of the
course would guarantee the minimum impact on life, protecting the environment while making
possible the expansion of the coal mine. Hence, the studies presented, the reports and projections,
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From European expansion in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, to U.S strategies to expand its power at the
wake of the twentieth century, these ideas, embodied in business practices of global accumulation have become very
important. In the case of Latin America, scholars have traced how the U.S governments actively encourage
international business expansion in relation to ideas of adventure, risk and success.
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were fundamentally focused on the future and were articulated in terms that portrayed an image
that isolated the Bruno from current or past conflicts.
When Cerrejón made public its decision to divert the Bruno, it presented at every possible
venue the studies, statistics, contingency plans and environmental projects that would guarantee
its proper making. This would involve, “more than 15 years of studies” that began in 1998, when
the Colombian government accepted the project, and the subsequent analysis to shift the course of
the creek. Video clips, conferences, public meetings and invitations to researchers to visit their
headquarters are only part of the actions held by Cerrejón to present in public what they considered
to be a thorough and careful set of studies that justified the diversion of the Bruno. It could be
argued that the Ranchería dispute showed Cerrejón the futility of limiting its arguments to their
providing of jobs and revenues, for environmental concerns were beyond these issues. Similarly,
the strategy of NGOs, activists and communities, that publicly denounced the Ranchería practices
by providing legal critiques, studies about water grabbing and analysis of public policies, seemed
to be more effective.
The actors against the Bruno diversion moved fast to respond to Cerrejón´s strategy, and
filed a lawsuit that at first slowed the process, but that at the end of 2016 ordered the conglomerate
to consult with the Wayuu communities that could be affected, as well as to suspend operations
until a decision was reached. By the time, these operations mostly consisted of engineering studies,
building the new route of the creek, biological analysis and cutting down trees. Between 2016 and
mid-2017, the project was ordered to be suspended for analysis in several occasions as
communities took legal actions that required immediate attention by the different legal institutions.
These legal actions argued the following:
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1) Cerrejón argued that it did not require an environmental license -a legal procedure created
in the last years to regulate projects that would affect the environment- for the original
approval of the Cerrejón open pit project took place in 1983, decades before the
environmental license was required. Instead, they considered that they only needed a
management plan for the possible impacts.
2) Several communities affected by the diversion had not been consulted about the project.
3) The ANLA64 did have doubts about some of the possible effects of the diversion.
4) The project jeopardized the rights of previous consultation, food security and water
access.65
The suspensions cascaded into one another, as the lawsuits moved up in the legal chain of
Colombian institutions until they reached the Constitutional Court, the final instance of legal
ruling. Therefore, the project was never fully completed, moving its development to the courts,
congresses, national and transnational venues of debate. Although the legal procedures were
significant, the strategies to achieve the objectives of stopping the diversion required a
combination of political, affective and moral tactics that went beyond the realm of legal disputes.
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National Agency of Environmental Licenses. As its name explains, it is the government institutions in charge of
providing the environmental license for the operation of any extractivist project.
65
These ítems are defined in the legal action made by the communities of Horqueta, La Gran Parada y Paradero, in
the legal action of January of 2016.
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Capturing death and violence: The Trajectories of advocacy in Colombia
NGOS like CCAJAR,66 CINEP67 and CENSAT68 have a very long tradition in human
rights advocacy. They began their work -although through different processes- in the late 1970´s,
and established themselves as human rights NGOs in the 1980´s. While CCAJAR originally
formed as a lawyers´ NGO -and therefore focusing their work in litigation of human rights cases
originally related to political violence and state repression-, CINEP was what in the U.S would be
called a think tank, with a strong emphasis on popular education. As a Jesuit organization, they
were deeply influenced by theology of liberation, Investigación acción participativa and popular
pedagogy in the line of Brazilian scholar Paulo Freire. CENSAT, on the other hand, was one of
the first NGOs explicitly working on environmental issues, while also focusing its work on popular
education and grassroots community organizing.
Whether because their members have similar political trajectories, their paths have crossed
many times or because they have joined forces more than once in their more than thirty years-old
history, these three organizations were part of the Ranchería case, sharing the victory over Cerrejón
while facing the political tensions and weaknesses resulting of such experience. In fact, while
working on the Ranchería case, the organizations joined forces to create an online platform known
as La Guajira le Habla al País69 and several on-the-ground projects that would help them to push
in the same direction in relation to the objectives of the Ranchería case. However, when the Bruno
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Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo. Is one of the first human rights NGOs in Colombia and one of the
most important ones. They have been active for forty years.
67
Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular. A jesuit-based NGO, it works in a similar way to what is often
defined as a Think Tank. Their work is largely informed by theology of liberation, and therefore many of their lines
of action are defined by it. They also have research groups in different areas, mostly in state formation, social
movements and the Colombian armed conflict.
68
Created in 1989, CENSAT is one of the first environmental NGOs in Colombia. Most of their work is directed
towards grassroots capacity building, but in the last decade they have been increasingly paying attention to the
production of reports and political-ecology based analysis.
69
La Guajira Speaks to the Country,
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dispute began, their funds had depleted and only CCAJAR was able to maintain a constant
connection with Guajira. Meanwhile, CINEP and CENSAT were trying to find ways to use other
projects that would allow them to keep a connection to the people in Guajira.
This would not stop these NGOs from conducting their work, creating projects aimed at
making visible the Bruno struggle or articulating their work with international networks of anticoal activists and human rights organizations to stop the diversion of Bruno. However, a set of
questions guided their actions: What kind of advocacy should they pursue? What networks should
they privilege? And, if they wanted to continue their work around coal-related issues, how should
they organize the available data to reach their objectives?
Human rights organizations in Colombia acquired international recognition for
their capacity for acting at a transnational level and for being able to establish strong networks for
advocacy and accountability. The flow of exiles to European countries in the 1980s and 1990´s, a
result of the escalation of violence against leftist organizations, helped to strengthen these
networks, their political uses and the relevance of human rights advocacy.
At first, for those activists, solidarity collectives, aid agencies and NGOs, environmental
violence was not a priority, for they had to deal with the overwhelming violence that killed and
disappeared tens of thousands in the eighties, nineties and the beginning of the 2000´s. Concern
over the environment was often defined in terms of nature as a resource, highlighting revenues,
development and a political economy that made Colombia a neo-colonial site exploited by the U.S
(Sábato 1975; Bodenheimer 1971; Cardoso and Falleto 1979).
That kind of response -which was often used by political exiles, members of leftist
movements and human rights activists- not only shows a moment in which advocacy efforts had
to do with grassroots collectives who had organized their actions around war and war-related
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topics.70 It also pointed to the status that environmental conflicts -and the environment in generalhad for these groups, which to an important extent controlled transnational networks of activism.
NGOs like CCAJAR also have transformed themselves over time. Even if the core of their
litigation was -and still is- related to the armed conflict and the civil and political cases that came
with that, they also embraced the discussions of Colombian social movements, as well as the global
debates on the limits of human rights advocacy. In the early 2000´s they created a DESC71 office,
aiming to address the debates about third generation rights and articulate forms of advocacy in that
field.
This office was transformative in several ways, for it created significant challenges to the
traditional forms of litigation, the making of cases and transnational connections that CCAJAR
was used to having. In spite of the international lack of acceptance of third generation rights,
CCAJAR decided to take cases that would fall in that category, in part because it was an increasing
demand of grassroots movements in Colombia and, as a result, new fields of inquiry, conflict and
dispute were created. One of those fields was explicitly related to extractivist projects (mining, oil
and palm among them) and environmental violence (contamination of water or fumigations to
destroy coca leaves). In 2016 this office was not called DESC but Territorio,72 an attempt of
CCAJAR to keep up with the changing times and address the conceptual, legal and political
developments of the last two decades.
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I will come back to this subject later in this chapter.
Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). This particular field is often
understood as third generation rights in the genealogies of human rights recognitions.
72
According to several scholars (Offe 2003; Bryan 2012; Correia 2019) the territorial turn is a widespread political
transformation in Latin America that stresses a highly complex conceptual elaboration. As a term, it aims to
articulate identity-based rights to collective property in which there is an explicit connection between land and
cultural identity. The term territorio has become significantly relevant in Colombia, not only for pragmatic purposes
in which identity politics make possible access to land tenure, but also because it has triggered political articulations
from peasant, indigenous and afro communities that explicitly reject political violence, displacement or abuse from
armed forces by asserting their autonomy in the territory.
71
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Nevertheless, CCAJAR´s lawyers are experts on human rights advocacy, and they are
effective at building strategies for cases of human rights that deal with the Colombian armed
conflict and political violence. As one of the lawyers told me, the combination of their expertise
and the fragility of third generations rights´, sometimes required that cases related to cultural rights
or environmental conflicts to be organized in relation to the armed conflict and political violence,
namely, that a case of illegal extraction of minerals would have to be framed by focusing on its
effects on the reproduction of the armed conflict.
But unlike massacres, disappearances, death threats, targeted killings or torture,
environmental violence does not always has a definitive temporal mark to ground the case. Nixon´s
notion of slow violence has become an important concept to point out the cumulative effects of
pollution, massive landscape transformations and in general, environmental degradation. Nixon
defines it as “a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction
that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as
violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time,
explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility” (Nixon,
2011: 2). Unlike traditional understandings of violence, that are often understood as spectacular
events or extraordinary situations that break the mundanity of the everyday, Nixon argues that
environmental violence becomes part of quotidian life. The effects of such violence are evident
through time, as they become part of the lives of those affected.
For Nixon, human rights violations related to political violence in contexts of war, on the
other hand, usually pertain to the realm of violence as extraordinary events. Colombian lawyers,
who usually understand violence as connected to political violence in war contexts, have been
trained to follow specific procedures for these forms of violence, often looking for stable facts that
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could create a transparent chain of events. A witness that hears or unveils a plan, a shot in the
street, the video of a car in a crime scene, the money transferred to pay for the murder. All of these
are moments that ideally can be put together to bring clarity to what happened. Therefore, as a
lawyer described it to me, in cases of violence of war, lawyers take a given case, get the
authorization or “poder”73 from the relatives and then put together a legal case, often gathering
concrete sets of evidence that would ideally point out to factual responsibilities. They would visit
prisons, notarias and courts; they would gather testimonies, forensic evidence and go through
archives in order to create an evidentiary support for their particular argument, connecting events,
creating timelines and links between actors, weapons and decisions.
Although Nixon argues that there is a fundamental difference between environmental
violence and other forms of violence based on its pace, I consider that there is something else at
work. Nixon claims that the extraordinary event leaves a temporal mark, and that is true. But this
is not the same as saying that the violence that creates the extraordinary can only understood,
defined or though within that temporal mark. In fact, that violence easily surpasses the
extraordinary, and moves beyond it in time. Thus, in the same way that environmental violence
requires representational strategies to show its existence, what Nixon deems as spectacular
violence requires as well strategies to maintain its relevance in time.
What Nixon defines as extraordinary violence is, nevertheless, a significant requirement
for cases related to war. Human rights actors, legal frameworks and institutions, require a mark to
create a shared understanding that it occurred. They need a temporal delimitation to ground the
case. This is not something that can be so easily captured in environmental violence, because even
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The legal power of representation is the official contract between the lawyer and the person represented. It is often
mentioned as poder.
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when a source of violence is defined, the unfolding of its effects is distributed in time and space,
merging with quotidian until it becomes more difficult to notice.
In other words, the murder of Valdemoré and Orcasitas needs to recognized, at least, as a
death. In this particular case there are more details, such as the shared recognition of the spectacular
event of their murder. This is a starting point for the different parties. State institutions
acknowledge the death and the murder, as well as union leaders and lawyers. There could be fierce
disputes about the intellectual and material perpetrators; about the chain of events or the motives;
testimonies for conviction or the burden of proof can be defied; it could even be argued that they
were killed for personal reasons. Justice and clarification depend to an important level in the
possibility of organizing the existing data in a sequential way that clarifies motives, actors and
perpetrators.
Furthermore, an epistemological architecture that could make sense of what happened is
needed as well. Nixon focuses on the use of representational strategies to publicly present the
unfolding of environmental violence and, in that connection, the way in which that which is
unrecognized or disputed becomes stabilized and articulated in a narrative. The concern over
representation is for Nixon a question about the legibility of slow violence, which is not only
unnoticed, but also messy and disperse. This is not just the result of a distinction between the
spectacular and the ordinary that falls in the everyday, but of the categories and strategies that
allow capturing the marks of violence in time and their conflicting nature. Fabiana Li indicates
that the term conflict, in relation to extractivism, is quite often taken for granted and that in these
contexts “maintaining the stability of objects requires continuous effort (Mol 2002). What are
usually glossed as conflicts […] consist of these ongoing efforts at stabilization, efforts that are
fraught with tensions and which do not always produce the intended effects” (Li 2015: 21). The

109

concern around the stabilization resemble Nixon´s idea that in slow violence the signs of violence
spread in time and escape its capture by the public or legal frameworks. On the contrary, a stable
fact is what creates the shared understanding of violence related to war, it is the starting point of
debate grounded and defined in time.
Lawyers and activists often work under the assumption that they can reproduce the
practices of human rights litigation on cases of environmental violence, bringing the techniques
for clarification and justice to the realm of environmental conflicts. When the Bruno dispute
started, the main lawyer of the Territorio office at CCAJAR was on a sabbatical. As she had been
leading the office since its creation, she was aware of the nuances and requirements that taking
cases of environmental conflicts had, as well as their status within human rights NGOs. But since
she was not available, CCAJAR had to distribute the cases she was working on to several younger
lawyers, most of them trained in traditional human rights litigation, or who were working at
CCAJAR for its high reputation as a human rights NGO in Colombia, Europe and Latin America.
For these persons, the work required in the territorio office was unexpected, novel and certainly
difficult to understand. As one of these lawyers told me:
I come from the area of victims, and of course, I do workshops and that kind of stuff. But
when it comes to taking up a case like this it is very different. In the civil cases you basically
go to the relatives, receive their authorization and then you follow the case in notarias,
juzgados and archives. You call the families if there are any developments, or to know how
they are doing. But the thing already happened. In La Guajira is different, because things
are happening, and you need to be on top of every single new development every day; you
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have to follow, not only the case in the traditional way, but arguments by the corporation,
reports, studies and all of these things that are constantly changing.74
Her words point out to the fundamental difference between the ways in which cases of
political violence are approached by human rights lawyers, compared to forms of environmental
slow violence. The latter are challenging because there is not a definitive fact that stabilizes
environmental violence. The earth mutates and the evidence of violence, its source and dangers
are continually changing. Evidence is constantly undermined by the actors involved and every
single detail is put in question.

The shape of death to come: the present of slow violence
Activists, lawyers, NGOs and social movements are confronted with a challenge resulting
from the instability of data to make cases of environmental violence and its speed Adding to the
problem mentioned above, is the fact that the Bruno was not an active project but a possibility of
one. Therefore, the information about its negative effects could not be extracted from the site itself,
forcing a different kind of strategy to suggest the possibility of negative effects.
The case of air pollution is a good example on the first part of the problem. Coal extraction
leaves its trace of dust throughout the landscape. This is a pervasive problem and one of the most
evident for the people who inhabit these areas. Stories about lung problems are told in the ports,
the villages around the train, the reservations and towns close to the mines, and of course the
workers of every single mine in the Caribbean.75
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Interview conducted in Bogotá, November of 2016.
At provincial, a Wayuú reservation less than a kilometer from Cerrejon, visitors are invited to be present in the
moment when, at 2 pm, explosions occur in the mine, resulting in a rain of dust that settles slowly in the water, the
trees and the houses. In Cesar, the towns of Hatillo and Boquerón are required to be relocated because it has been
established that the levels of pollution make the zones around the mine inhabitable. At the ports of Santa Marta,
peasants claim that coal dust have polluted the beaches and harm the crops. The unions of Cerrejón and Drummond
75
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The dust creates respiratory problems, and children, men and women throughout the region
claim to suffer from its effects. Cerrejón responded by placing air monitoring stations in different
parts of Guajira, with results that contradict the argument that coal dust is in any way responsible
for air pollution or lung problems. NGOs contest these studies, arguing that Cerrejón uses a variety
of tactics to obtain their results: the monitoring stations turn off at specific moments, the company
claim that the level of microparticles is within the acceptable 10Pm by the Colombian government
-although the international standards of WHO require measuring for 2.5 PM-, they blame lung
problems on the use of wood fires by Wayúus. In the meantime, inhabitants claim that their lives
are slowly degrading and health problems proliferate, and the studies conducted by third parties
support the communities´ claims. Cerrejón argues that the measurements in these studies are made
at specific moments and sites and that constitute inaccurate data.
The result is an unresolved conflict in which whenever new relevant data is presented, it is
contested by the different actors. Furthermore, by continually undermining the arguments of
scholars, experts, communities and grassroots organizations, the conglomerate not only avoids its
responsibility, but actively creates a shroud of doubt about the existence of environmental
violence.
The politics of the making of scientific data have been thoroughly studied. But in the
making of cases that have a strong legal component to constitute their status and legitimacy,
struggling with data that is always evolving, contested and never definitive -unlike the fact that a
person was shot and is dead- creates a significant problem that, shows the limits of the traditional
strategies used by activists in Colombia in which the legal realm has a significant status (Lemaitre

have a particular group that focus specifically on the effects of coal dust in the lungs of workers. These are only some
of the examples that show the extent of the effects of coal dust in the region.
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2009). Therefore, it is not exclusively about the fact that the making of scientific data depends on
political networks and their forms of validation, but that its constant contestation produces a space
of uncertainty in which the operations, projects and plans for extraction could operate indefinitely.
Coal creates multiple conflicts simultaneously. There are disputes around water, the
transformation of the landscape, the possibilities of growing food, the transformation of the dry
tropical forest (bosque seco), coal dust, revenues, jobs and the future after the mining closure in
2034. Even when there is a decision about a specific issue, the multiplicity of conflicts produces
many fronts of action, often overwhelming activists. Furthermore, as the Bruno dispute shows,
even the resolution of a dispute (such as the ruling on the Ranchería River diversion) does not
mean that related projects could not be pursued. The environmental conflicts are never completely
resolved, but constantly delayed and multiplied across the landscape, enabling iterations of the
same dispute and the possibility of continuing the operations for the corporation.
Bringing in the coal dust discussion is not a random choice. If the problem of the data as
always contested is recognized by the actors, the fact that the Bruno deviation had not taken place
by the end of 2018 -and therefore there is no data about its effects- does not escape their analysis
either. The NGOs and grassroots organizations considered that the best way to arrange the case
would be through the following paths: one, by analyzing similar experiences of environmental
violence to present a particular future that is already present in the conflicts already occurring, that
is, the use of the past as a prognosis for the future. Two, by presenting inconsistencies in the studies
presented by Cerrejón that would articulate political solidarities with organizations with similar
interests; Three, by furthering the analysis of the possible effects of the Bruno made by universities
and NGOs; Fourth, by finding ways of making the case as material as possible at sites -or with
persons- who could not sense its material importance.
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As Veenman and Leroy (2016) explain, environmental studies use forms of organization
of time to make predictions and suggest policies through what is known as environmental outlooks.
One of those techniques is called backcasting (Veenman and Leroy 2016: 66), which relies on the
use of past studies in similar areas -geographically or thematically- to argue for specific actions to
be planned based on those pasts. The authors consider backcasting as “looking back from the
future, often with a roadmap” (Quist 2007 in Veenman and Leroy 2016: 66). For them, the
techniques used in environmental outlooks are modes of negotiating the uncertainty that
environmental studies are often dealing with. Backcasting creates a palpable “road” from the past
to the future by using concrete images and already existing data to reduce the presence of
uncertainty.
The diversion of the Bruno entails multiple possible effects in an extensive geography.
Thus, the case against the Bruno diversion increasingly became a case about life in la Guajira and
the ways in which coal extraction was threatening its possibilities. For legal purposes, lawyers and
activists had to focus on the specific considerations of the geographic and demographic limits that
the different courts established as the direct zones -and people- of impact of the Bruno diversion.
But the lawyers’ strategy considered the many ways in which the Creek was entangled with the
life of Guajira at large. For this reason, larger conflicts over water use, previous diversion projects,
and effects for indigenous communities or air quality became increasingly important, and part of
the analysis of the material effects of Bruno.
The general concern became the increasing degradation of the environment that coal
extraction had been causing in La Guajira since the operations started at the beginning of the
1980´s. It was a commonplace for the person in charge of the office of extractivism at CENSAT
to begin her presentations at conferences, seminars or political meetings, reminding audiences that
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the history of coal extraction ran parallel to environmental regulations. One of the main problems,
she would say, for a long-term analysis of environmental harm -and therefore a situation that
played constantly in favor of Cerrejón, was that there is not an environmental base line76 to
compare to the contemporary bio-physical state of Guajira´s geography. She argued that Cerrejón
operated by taking advantage of that void of information. Nonetheless, there were several studies
that have been trying to gather evidence to analyze the harm that coal had created, and that would
point to a structural degradation of the environment specifically tied to coal extraction.
Among the studies are those conducted by Julio Fierro, a renowned geologist who had been
working for years analyzing the effects of the operation of coal in Guajira. Although his concerns
had not been exclusively on Bruno, his work is considered by all activists and NGOs the
fundamental reference to guide their own political strategies. His studies are deemed as
independent, and have an authority that emanates from not being produced by government
institutions or sponsored by Cerrejón. He analyzed the interactions of the mine and the
environment, paying attention to bio-scapes, aquifers and geologic formations, but mostly focusing
on the use and distribution of water in relation to coal extractive operations, and his conclusion is
particularly striking. In a report published in October of 2016, Fierro and his group developed the
tools for a historical base line of Cerrejón bio-physical impacts, arguing that:
This document shows that the environmental studies submitted by the corporation to
further the mining project, which are the technical base line for decision-making and
environmental authorization, are deficient and omit key aspects like the hydrological cycle
and the composition of the rocks that are dumped and placed in gigantic amounts at
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A base line could be defined as an environmental inventory of what existed before the open pit mine was created.
Its existence, with is now mandatory, could create the basis for a comparative analysis of the impacts of a particular
project.
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dumping sites perpetually located in the territory. Second that the control by environmental
authorities (ANLA and Corpoguajira) is almost non-existent even though they receive
information that suggest anomalies or distortions that could indicate the pollution of
superficial and subterranean waters. The actions of the authorities and in particular
environmental authorities (especially ANLA) has been limited to receiving documents
from the corporation without making any analysis. Most of the information for this report
will be taken from such documents.77

The text presents a general picture of the inconsistencies and omissions of Cerrejón´s
technical analysis, while providing a view of the development of environmental degradation
because of such negligence. Fierro examines the geologic faults in Cerrejón complex and their
active neglect of what their effects might be, to conclude that “It is not correct to affirm that open
pit extraction could alter subterranean waters, because such alteration is inevitable and irreversible
[…]contrary to what Cerrejón argues, subterranean water extraction to depressurize mining pits
has environmental impacts […] for they affect the availability of water at a regional scale” (Fierro
and Llorente; 2016: 18).
This study summarizes many of Fierro´s work, and it has become an important point of
reference for activists from what they define as a technical point of view. One of the most striking
“Este documento demuestra que en primer lugar los estudios ambientales remitidos por la
empresa para permitirles avanzar en el proyecto minero y que son la base técnica para la toma de
decisiones de autorización ambiental son omisivos y deficientes en aspectos clave como el ciclo
hidrológico y la composición de las rocas que son desechadas y dispuestas en cantidades
gigantescas como botaderos de manera perpetua en el territorio. En segundo lugar, que el control
por parte de las autoridades ambientales (ANLA y Corpoguajira) es casi inexistente y que a pesar
de recibir información con indicios de anomalías o distorsiones que pueden indicar la
contaminación de aguas superficiales y subterráneas, la actuación de las autoridades y en
particular de las ambientales (particularmente la ANLA) se ha limitado a recibir documentos de la
empresa minera sin efectuar ningún análisis. De dichos documentos, en particular de los Planes
de Manejo Ambiental (de aquí en adelante PMA) se tomará la mayor parte de la información de
base para este documento” ( Fierro and Llorente; 2016: 5)”
77
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considerations made by Fierro is that Cerrejón consumes 24 million liters of water every day in
the following way:

Figure 5: Fierro, Quintero and Cuida, 2014. In Fierro and Llorente: 2016.

The analysis and numbers serve the anti-coal activist networks to show a stark contrast of
water use at every venue where they present the case of Guajira. As suggested at the beginning of
the chapter, the water crisis in Guajira is considered to cause the massive death of Wayuu children,
and is depicted as a major humanitarian problem. Cerrejón explains that most of the water they
use is not for human consumption, and that besides the potable water for workers inside the mine
the remaining percentage is for the control of possible environmental negative effects (such as
watering the soil to impede coal dust). In that way, Cerrejón questions that they are responsible
for the water crisis in the department. However, the amount of water and the difference of access
throughout Guajira present a clear image of inequality and concentration of a resource. While near
the mine towns and reservations lack a constant access of water – with cistern trucks being the
main source for inhabitants-, inside Cerrejón there is a 24-hour access to the resource.
A different study from Guajira University (2016) suggest that the conglomerate does not
significantly use the water from Bruno. However, it considers that the conglomerate’s argument
for the Bruno project -15 years of studies to conduct a proper diversion that reproduces the course
and bio-physical conditions of the original course- is flawed, as it fails to understand that in the
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new course the Bruno will not be able to move, because its meanders and its general artificial
course would be rigid and not in a dialogue with the movement of water.
The discrepancy between Ferro and Guajira University around the use of water by Cerrejón
is not much of an interest for the activists. Although it could be considered an obstacle for a legal
debate, as mentioned before the goal for the anti-coal networks is to establish a general picture of
environmental degradation and negligence produced by coal extraction. In that regard, these
studies and the information they provide have become a major source to produce legal actions,
reports, policy papers and presentations at many different institutions interested in the discussion
of the Bruno.
Sometimes there are intentions taken by allies that share similar objectives but that might
have contrary effects. Activists are constantly paying attention to the research published by
universities at different levels, for they know any new study adds to the ongoing discussion
supporting one side or the other. There were many times that lawyers and NGOs representatives
working against the Bruno diversion would talk about undergrad or master theses at different wellknown universities that would argue about historical trajectories of cattle ranching in the region
and its effects on contemporary conditions of land and water. There was a famous story about the
attempt of a university to run a simulation of the biophysical conditions of contemporary Guajira
without Cerrejón´s presence. They were hoping to show that the simulation would show an
alternative environmental future, greener and without the problems around water that exist today.
However, the results were mixed and could not comply with the expectations. An allied NGO was
planning to run blood tests to measure the levels of pollution in people´s bodies, but some of the
NGOs were against it, as it might be a counterproductive measure if for any reason the data were
unreliable.
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Most of these concerns are the result of the way in which the conglomerate occupies
uncertainty as the site from which it can conduct their coal extraction operations. As evidence is
never definitive, activists and institutions focus for the most part on those things that leave as less
space for doubt as possible, even if they know that is not completely achievable. Legal rulings, as
well as the evidence of the relation between extraction and environmental degradation are
constantly changing and on dispute, making uncertainty as the condition for existing of the overall
operations of the open-pit mine, and this to never be definitively questioned and stopped. As
Cerrejón has been particularly effective in debunking and creating doubts about studies, reports,
analysis and testimonies, the never-ending disputes and the always-changing data create
unresolved issues in which Cerrejón could operate indefinitely.
Hence, the coalition of NGOs, experts, communities and anti-coal activists prioritized the
creation of a network of solidarities, not through the gathering of new evidence that could
eventually be considered as undisputable, but by already existing studies that would provide
connections and political strategies in a conflict based on uncertainty and constant dispute.
Nevertheless, as the realm of legality and the world of evidence keeps failing as an effective
strategy, it has become clearer that is absolutely necessary to move beyond the centrality of the
law and institutional action.

Feeling the water
There are many positions within human rights activists and the relations they establish with
the communities, social movements and political organizations they work with. The critical stance
that argues against the tendency of human rights institutions, discourses and practices to lean
towards a certain kind of anti-politics, is not unfamiliar for these organizations. Although there is
an overall admiration of the work that human rights activists conduct in Colombia, the criticism
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of grassroots organizations, victims´ collectives and social movements has increased in the last
decade. It is not the purpose of this chapter to trace the genealogy of this discontent, but it is
generally accepted that grassroots collectives and coalitions have become vocal in their
questioning of the actions and orientations of NGOs and aid agencies that work in the country.
For the most part, the people I followed for this research believed that the criticism of the relation
established between NGOs, grassroots organizations and communities required an examination
that was not in the agenda of NGOs and aid agencies in Bogotá. Among the elements that they
considered important to question was the centrality of the realm of law as the privileged site for
conducting or defining political actions. The idea that human rights institutions, practices and
discourses became the ultimate site for effective political transformation, and that other forms of
politics or actions are subordinated to what could be achieved in the sphere of human rights
advocacy, is certainly widespread and has acquired traction in the country. There is a relation
between the formation of human rights NGOs and activism and radical politics in Colombia. Even
if the legal realm is generally understood -or even inevitably understood- as the privileged site for
political action, and concentrates the interests of activists and institutions while organizing their
tactics, sometimes the actors view legal rulings, or legal disputes as “lawfare” and maintain that
they are not enough (Gloppen and Saint Clair 2012). This is what happens in situations of
environmental disputes in which slow violence is central and the evidence is unstable. As described
previously by the lawyer who was taking over the cases of environmental violence, there are
practices and procedures for the making of cases related to environmental conflicts that are
significantly different from human rights violations related to extraordinary forms of violence.
Activists -especially lawyers- are pushed into a different kind of relation with the particulars of
environmental conflicts, their victims and development. A paradox and a tension are created: the
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centrality of legality and the idea that the ultimate site of political dispute is the legal realm, is
faced with the necessary redistribution of its relevance, namely, to the forced recognition of its
political limitations. Hence, it becomes necessary to create forms of political, affective and public
pressure that do not depend on legal rulings as the privileged form of political action and goal
achieving.78
Legal decisions are indefinitely delayed or suspended, and even when there are rulings in
one direction or the other, they can be constantly undermined by questioning the data that served
as the base for those decisions. The uncertainty can be paralyzing, and NGOs, activists and
grassroots organizations develop tactics for furthering their objectives that, either help to advance
legal actions, or move beyond the stagnation of legal disputes to show that environmental violence
has a pervasive quality with moral and political ramifications.
Before moving in Chapter Four into the transnational circulation of the Bruno and the ways
it participates in global discussions of climate change and the possibilities of life, it is important to
follow how non-legal scenarios are arranged within the making of the case. As I mentioned earlier,
tension exists between the actors that work for NGOs or are involved in the networks of human
rights and environmental activism. This takes the form of a debate related to the centrality of the
legal sphere as the privileged form of political action, as well as the status that certain workpractices have in relation to others. To make it clearer, the words of one of the lawyers working in
the cases of this research:
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Scholars focused on transnational social movements have explored the development of campaigns that articulate
different geographies and tactics in order to achieve a particular goal. In these analyses, the combination of legal
actions (at various scales), rallies, conferences, ads and reports could be part of the overall strategy aimed to achieve
the intended objective. Nonetheless, my interest is not in the combination of these tactics, but in the status and
authority that they produce. The legal realm has become particularly important for social movements in the world,
and certainly Colombia. The way in which it captures the political imagination of grassroots movements, NGOs and
activists in general, certainly is disputed by its own limitations and practices. It is such conflict, which leads to a
dispute on the redistribution of relations of power, sites of action and their relevance, that interest me.
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Oscar, sometimes I think that they kind of think of this work as a punishment, or as the
lowest level of the work we do. I think they sort of force younger lawyers to work these
cases and make them think that it is less important because we have to travel, sleep at the
territories, constantly be in touch with the communities. Meanwhile the important sites are
the cocktails and meetings of Bogotá, or the prize you get to travel and be part of a
conference or something like that. So these cases become less important because they do
not connect to those other sites, because there are no meetings at aid agencies or
newspapers calling all the time. The sad thing is that we were supposed to care more about
the communities because that is where the political work is supposed to be.79

This comment came after three days of visiting several communities affected by
Cerrejón, during the Bruno disputes. It summarizes the tension that some activists felt between the
urgency of showing results in the form of legal rulings, and the consideration that it was only
through active processes of capacity building and organizing that long term effects could take
place. Many times these activists argued that the goal of their work was for “NGOs to disappear,”
which meant that the communities were sufficiently strong that they would not need NGOs or
experts to conduct their political projects. As one of these activists told me:
What I would like is for the communities in la Guajira to be like another community I work
with in the south. They do not need legal counsel because they tell us what we should do
and how it should be done. They negotiate directly with the state and aid agencies for the
projects the do. We only serve them because we have the university degrees.80

79
80

Conversation with lawyer of CCAJAR, Riohacha, November 2017.
Interview to member of CENSAT, May 2017.
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As shown in the introduction, the literature about NGOs has extensively focused on the
well-deserved critique about the anti-political tendencies, the ways in which they have created new
regimes of governance that have emerged alongside neoliberal transformations and the forms of
representation that neutralize grassroots organizing. Although these criticisms are still valid, vivid
and, as shown by the lawyer quoted above, still part of the contemporary disputes within NGOs,
they do not show the whole picture.
The Bruno case, as being largely pushed forward by a group of NGOs and communities
shows, if not a resolution to these concerns, at least a recognition of the limitations of the traditional
forms of activism in NGOs. It is important to acknowledge that at least to a point, these questions
are the result of the fact that members of these NGOs have a strong background on political
organizations and social movements, and that sometimes it is such backgrounds what help them to
land a position at NGOs. By mentioning this I want to stress that these critiques of NGOs are
actually part of ongoing debates in social movements and political organizations, and even though
these positions are not necessarily accepted within the practices and political orientations of the
NGOs at large, they are not unfamiliar for them.
In the Bruno case, the NGOs and experts had a major and unresolved concern, which
required constant attention: the internal problems of the different communities in Guajira and the
concentration of the development of the cases in the work of NGOs. On the one hand, Wayuú
communities differ in their internal and geographical organization from other indigenous groups
in the country. Their geographical distribution is based on small settlements throughout the
Guajira, and their interactions depend on the different clans of their internal organization. A Wayuu
decision is not always shared by all the clans, and therefore a collective decision takes significantly
more time. Some observers see this as a certain kind of fragility compared to other indigenous
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organizations in the country. It also means that Wayuús often are unable to articulate general
arguments for their national representation as an ethnic group.
Furthermore, Arroyo Bruno does not exclusively impact Wayuú communities, but also
Afro-Colombians and towns in Guajira. Organizing these different groups is not an easy task, and
it becomes significantly more difficult when the conglomerate promises jobs and development in
the region as the result of the making of the diversion (Banks 2017). For the NGOs, the
combination of this lack of organizational capacity and the recent history of fragmented
negotiations between communities and Cerrejón,81 often forcing NGOs to step in on behalf of the
communities, even if this jeopardizes the legitimacy of specific organizations.82
The decision was that it was not possible to cease their presence, be at the forefront of the
debate or stop the case. But there could be forms of re-distributing the concentration of the
relevance of the voice of experts and NGOs, in order to point to the importance of the knowledge
of peasants and indigenous communities in relation to the Bruno and its effects. By shifting the
balance of the relevance of legal and political expertise concentrated in scholars and NGOs, these
activists were hoping to achieve two objectives: first, strengthening Guajira organizations, and
second, introducing forms of knowledge that would escape Cerrejón´s capacity of capture.83
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As part of their projects of corporate responsibility, Cerrejón is continually negotiating with the different
communities of the region. This creates a shifting ground of political alliances, mostly because a particular village
might be negotiating at a particular moment and three months later denouncing Cerrejón for failing to fulfill the
agreements. Hence, it would be difficult for the main leaders and NGOs to establish a clear plan of action. Not staying
in constant communication with a particular community might result in a decision that might affect the overall strategy
against a Cerrejon policy or project. A good example of this is the negotiations between Cerrejón and the Provincial
community, which occurred unexpectedly in the midst of a project held by CCAJAR and CINEP in the reservation.
Provincial negotiated a settlement and CCAJAR was forced to publish a public letter, distancing itself from the
reservation and condemning the negotiations and their results.
82
This is the case of Fuerza de Mujeres Wayuú, one of the -if not the most- strongest Wayuu organizations with a
significant national and international recognition within human rights organizations. They questioned CCAJAR
procedures for conducting their work, constantly suggesting that the NGO was not considering the actual work of
grassroots-based organizations such as Fuerza.
83 In their study of the making of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants, Claeys and Edelman
examine the conflicting process of the definition of expertise. As they point out, academics are easily situated as
experts. But the effective creation of the Declaration required a much more complex process, in which state and
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Namely, Cerrejón was constantly undermining geologists, lawyers and engineers by bringing their
own experts on the field to dispute what the NGOs would arrange. However, it would not be as
easy to do the same operation to contest what indigenous, black and peasant communities would
have to argue.
The organizations planned two events that, in their different moments and performances,
aimed to situate at the forefront of the discussion not the NGOs, but the communities and the ways
in which they articulated the conflict of Bruno. The events could be seen as part of an ongoing
discussion on the status of the knowledge of communities and persons who are not considered to
be experts of different sorts. Anthropologists have long pointed to the complexity of the relations
that constitute the status of knowledge. But the different negotiations required for specific
epistemic regimes to acquire validation, and the consideration that non-western forms of
knowledge need to be recognized in their own terms, pitted lawyers, activists and scholars against
communities in the case of the Bruno conflict. Both groups were constantly about how to elevate
the status of the knowledge produced by peasants, indigenous communities and coal sector
workers.
NGOs activists and lawyers were often at the forefront of the making of the cases,
constantly writing, gathering or contesting reports, going to meetings with government and
corporative representatives or visiting courts and legal sites. It seemed that the circulation of the
case largely depended on the coherence and connections that technical and scientific data could
make possible. Even when recognizing that it was important to create alternative spaces in which

NGO representatives engaged in a deep collaboration with peasants, often not recognized as experts. In this context,
peasants´ knowledge cannot simply be dismissed or subordinated, for grassroots members are experienced in the
politics of these negotiations, as much as they are on the political economy of agricultural discussions, legal
frameworks on the matter and environmental debates. That becomes recognized by all parties involved fast enough,
and is a status that peasant leaders fought hard to achieve (Claeys and Edelman 2020).
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community and grassroots leaders could actively participate, the specificity of the sites in which
the Bruno case circulated sidelined the concrete knowledge of these leaders, and it was often
presented as a testimony to support legal, political, economic or technical claims.
This might go against contemporary literature that highlights the increasing presence of
indigenous people and peasant communities in realms that have usually excluded them because
they are not considered to have the capacities or forms of expertise that those places require. Even
though several leaders might be actively involved in these debates, and have a vast knowledge of
legal, technical or political procedures with regard environmental conflicts, their marginalization
remains.
As the Bruno dispute takes the form of a multiplicity of modes of environmental
degradation (water pollution, water grabbing, destruction of ecosystems, coal dust), Cerrejón
articulated its argument through technical analysis that would undermine not only the studies made
by NGOs and scholars, but that also would aggressively dismiss any kind of knowledge by the
communities affected. NGO activists, on the other hand, increasingly started to see this knowledge
as valuable, not exclusively as a testimony that would become a note to reinforce a legal-technical
study, but as a sedimented and geo-historically situated knowledge that was carefully analyzing
the everyday transformations produced by coal extraction.
The realm of techno-legal knowledge not often recognizes that knowledge in scientific or
legal disputes as well. Although it might be considered as having the capacity of strengthening
specific arguments, it is more of an addendum than the base of an argument that could stand for
itself. But in sites that were not legally-driven, such knowledge might actually have different
consequences.
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That is why Arregocés chose to carefully present the conflict through the combination of a
sensory approach and technical-economic arguments. For him, it is important that people that do
not experience the materiality of environmental degradation on a daily basis, are able to sense why
is it that the communities are as worried as they are. As specific communities and leaders organize
the visits, the sites, be part of interviews and establish the terms that mediate how a visitor get
access to a particular experience, they acquire the control of the Bruno conflict as a case.
The Bruno conflict is heatedly debated at many sites where particular forms of expertise
are required. Certain forms of knowledge are recognized for their particular authority and are
valued accordingly. At the court, the voice of lawyers and the expert testimony of the geologists
often establish the legitimacy of a particular argument. Thus, for example, a testimony with a
certain kind of scientific authority is valued over the comments made by indigenous people or a
peasant. But this is not necessarily true for all sites of discussion, and in sites like NGO meetings
or conferences, a tension around the status of different knowledges and the way they are valued
emerges strongly.
Grassroots activists claim the authority of the case for themselves, take control of the data
shared and how it could be articulated for the purposes of making sense of a case, such as the
Bruno, even if only momentarily. NGOs from Bogotá put together conferences in Guajira and
Bogotá in which the problems of coal and extractivism would be discussed, and in which certain
information would feed the elements to make a case from a scientific point of view.
But these situations had two significant problems that NGO members kept noticing: first,
they sidelined grassroots organizations by creating a scenario in which indigenous knowledge is
labeled as “experiences,” while the experts’ words are defined as “analysis.” Second, the
information gathered, and the subsequent planning of actions, generally reinforces the geographic
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and political articulation of the sites and actors that privileged the legal realm as the central form
of action.
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Chapter 3
Beyond War, Forbidden Landscapes of Devastation.
At the SINTRAMINERGETICA headquarters in La Jagua de Ibírico there is a banner at
the entrance that reads “Abajo la minería de carbón.” At first sight it might look like an oddity, or
a joke. The coal union asking for its own destruction and advertising it. But it does not take long
to understand where they come from. The present of the workers differs significantly from the
promises given by coal extraction in the 1990´s, while the landscape and the environment contain
the extent of the deceit. What was presented as a well-calculated future of jobs, good salaries and
overall regional modernization, became an avalanche of murders, threats and terror that
simultaneously reorganized the geography to secure the continuous flow of coal.
Every time that I asked how the union remained after three of its leaders were murdered,
they failed to provide a clear answer. Like many organizations, some of the leaders fled to the
cities and operated in exile during the peak of paramilitary violence; they also changed their public
positions and became less contentious, both in their public speeches and in their negotiations with
other actors. They navigated a world of suffocating violence by shifting from the radicalism of
their past to privilege demands for democratic participation and the protection of human rights
(Gill 2016).
However, the union maintained its political strength beyond the capital of Cesár,
Valledupar. Their headquarters at La Jagua de Ibirico, in spite of its very open claim against coal
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industries, was alive and strong. The contrast with Valledupar´s headquarters was striking, mainly
because La Jagua is closer to the different coal mines that operate in Cesar.
Valledupar, as the capital city of the department, is still an important node that concentrates
most of the administrative and political relations of this part of the Caribbean in Colombia, as well
as the connections to Bogotá. The city links the coal industrial complex (Watts 2005) beyond the
location and ownership of the mines, and several NGOs, multilateral organizations and aid
agencies operate from the city. It might be surprising that the main headquarters of the union
convey a feeling of abandonment, while what is supposed to be a smaller office is constantly
crowded, with people coming and going all day long.
But La Jagua is where the “mining corridor of Cesar” begins. This is a term used to describe
the interconnected landscape of coal circulation, from the mines in Cesár to the ports in the
Caribbean Sea in Magdalena. The mining corridor is made of four municipalities linked by the
coal extraction economy, its infrastructures and the administration of mines, jobs and towns. There
is a train line that carries coal, personnel and machinery, linking the mines and towns of the
corridor, extending to the Caribbean Sea port in Santa Marta, the capital of Magdalena Department.
The transportation method embodied by the train (but also the roads created from the mines) is the
most common reference point through which the corridor is imagined. Its presence of noise and
metal, the way it cuts through small towns paralyzing their every day, the vibration of its passing,
the satellite control of the trains and how it expels coal dust as it passes by become the sensory
relation that inhabitants have with coal mining, even if they are not close to a mine.
The corridor is the backbone that connects the geography of coal extraction, not only the
mines and roads, but a network of administrative institutions, towns, grassroots organizations,
companies, flows of workers and dumping sites. The corridor extends beyond the limits of the
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department, reaching the ports in Santa Marta, the companies’ headquarters in Valledupar,
Barranquilla and Bogotá, the ports in Europe, the thermal power stations and the houses of millions
of Europeans. This answers why the union in La Jagua is such a vibrant place, while the
headquarters in Valledupar does not have the same kind of agitation. The leaders of
SINTRAMINERGETICA are more interested in being close to the everyday requirements of the
workers, peasants and mining town inhabitants as these sites and persons experience the everyday
conflicts and negotiations, while Valledupar is mainly a site of administration, of policy making,
endless meetings and bureaucratic alliances.
The mining corridor is a geography that union leaders know well. They know the different
conflicts that coal extraction creates at each site and that each node of the value chain creates a
modality of contentious politics. The train cuts villages in half and the unending noise of the
machines have driven people to the verge of insanity; health issues have become unbearable at
certain villages and reverberate throughout the mining corridor, sometimes forcing urgent
relocation of villages; labor conflicts that forced workers to hold hostage machinery to force
negotiations with phantom corporations; fishermen who have been forced to join a different
industry because there are no more fish available.
This has led the union to pursue one objective: to articulate the different modes of violence
produced by coal practices throughout the mining corridor as a single case, based on the material
conflicts of coal extraction, namely, the infrastructures of coal that connect different nodes,
persons and experiences. The workers understand the central importance that war, defined as
armed conflict, has for the political history of the country, the making of the region and their own
trajectory as a union. But SINTRAMINERGETICA is aware that the centrality of the notion of
violence linked to war has sidelined other formations of violence for human rights and extractivist
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actors, institutions and discourses. Union leaders face the challenge of how to redefine the ideas
of war and violence that present the pervasiveness of violence, and how to create political strategies
that address the manifold violence that are produced by the different processes of coal extraction.
By using ethnographic information from visits I conducted with the union workers to the
mining corridor, as well as interviews with injured workers and community leaders affected by
coal extractivism, this chapter analyzes the ways in which SINTRAMINERGETICA tries to
articulate all the of coal-related struggles, which in turns required a re-definition of the normative
conceptualization of violence. In chapter one I argued that the centrality of a normative making
of war as “armed conflict” has pushed other practices of violence into the margins. These forms
of violence fail to be captured by the standardized conceptual tools, institutions and practices of
transnational networks of human rights activism.

La unión of the Union
The fact that a mining union is openly against mining is often surprising for European
activists visiting the area, for they often see coal unions as a direct opponent in their countries. As
I was told in Europe and the U.S., coal unions have privileged the idea that the mineral has brought
-not only workers, but the country- the foundations of their nation's development. The histories of
coal in the United Kingdom and the U.S. stress the fact that the mineral was decisive for the radical
transformation that occurred at the mid-nineteenth century (Johnson 2014; Malm 2016; Mitchell
2011), a transformation that created the industrial world we got to live in the twentieth century. In
these accounts the role of workers -and unions- is crucial not only because their labor made
possible the present, but because coal created forms of contentious politics where workers - with
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their actions, tactics and decisions- became actors with a strong capacity of disruption and
negotiation.
Mitchell argues that the material conditions of coal enabled forms of political intervention
for the workers based on their capacity to interrupt the flow of energy. The possibility of
manipulation of machines that enabled sabotage -and not only strike- was, according to the author,
an effective action in the coal industry at the turn of the nineteenth century (Mitchell 2011:22).
Andrews (2010) highlights something similar when discussing the events that led to the famous
Ludlow massacre in 1914, describing the ways in which working conditions created not only a
form of radical politics at the heart of coal workers’ relations, but also the definition of the
massacre as a central tenet of the narration of the making of the United States. In these accounts,
the input of energy provided by coal, boosted industrial capitalism, shaped the global strength of
nations and defined the forms of living of the U.S and Europe (Malm 2016). Miners were defined
as being at the core of the making of the present; they were at the engine-room of the rise of
industrial capitalism, providing the energy required for its success.
However, the historical importance of the miner is fading away today. Coal workers have
become the embodiment of the uncertainty of the future in countries like the United States, as can
be noticed in the many news articles detailing the transformations of their everyday life and
expectations84. In these accounts, journalists such as Eliza Grizwold vividly describe the
progressive decay of mining towns in the U.S. Midwest, where inhabitants long for a past that is
not only about jobs and a sense of future, like their parents and grandparents had, but also of a
sense of a country that is forgetting what made its present85.

See Campbell Robertson, “in Coal Country, the Mines Shut down, the women went to work and the world quietly
changed”. Inc NYT. August 10, 2019. Goldstein, Dana. “How a State Plans to Turn Coal Country Into Coding
Country” Inc NYT.
85
Grizwold, Eliza. “The future of coal country”. Inc New Yorker. July 03, 2017.
84
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The relation between the sense of loss and the vital role of coal workers in the making of a
country is not exclusive to the United States. In the U.K, coal workers also consider themselves as
having had a fundamental role in the making of their country's present. It is probably because of
such history, that it is surprising to me when I hear anti-coal activists constantly criticizing coal
workers, locating them as adversaries when it comes to discussing the country’s process for
phasing out of coal.
According to these activists, coal workers usually try to undermine political projects aimed
towards energy transitions or the increasing closing of mines in Europe. Miners question not only
the loss of jobs, but the fading away of their historical importance in the making of a working class
that is the foundation of the industrialized present. Several scholars have inquired about that sense
of instability in the lives of coal workers in the U.K. As a story that repeats in multiple countries,
the inevitability of a transition out of coal is a direct threat to the lives of these workers and has
led an important group of coal unions to galvanize around the protection of their already
established ways of existing (Thorleiffson 2016; Balthazar 2017).
During a visit I conducted to Durham in the United Kingdom, where a group of anti-coal
activists from different parts of Europe were trying to stop the making of one of the last mines in
the U.K, this became very clear. Miners were not actively impeding the protest, which was
conducted by combining different forms of direct action, including the occupation of the land and
community outreach. Anti-coal activists mentioned their conversations with those working in the
construction of the mine. In these accounts a sense of disappointment, sadness and frustration
lured. Although most of the inhabitants of the small village in Durham were supportive and
affectionate towards the activists, they told me that the few attempts of reaching out to coal unions
were futile. Occasionally, the question of miners emerged during discussions about tactics and
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actions to come, and anti-coal activists talked about how they wished that their relations were
different, how they hoped that they were able to understand what for anti-coal activists was at
stake.
I am aware that for a reader in the U.S. or in most western European countries what I just
described is obvious. In fact, in the last years different iterations of right-wing political projects
have summoned the histories of coal, as examples of the demise of their countries and the ways
environmentalists are undermining the future of their nations. Trump's campaign in 2016 largely
relied on the slogan of “make America great again” that had as one of its promises the idea of
reviving the coal economy, the jobs and the role of the workers. Griswold discusses how the decay
of the coal industry feeds into the hopes that someone like Trump provided. The same can be said
about Brexit, the increasing move towards the far right in England and the critique of climate
change policies such as the coal phase out.
It should also be noted that the decline of the living standards of the working class in the
U.S and U.K is not exclusive of coal workers but a generalized situation. This process has certainly
been intensified by the increasing defense of political parties -like the Democrats in the U.S and
the Labour party in the U.K- of neoliberal policies that undermine the working class. Likewise,
there has been a significant reduction of coal mining jobs, not only due to energy transitions, but
also to technological interventions and machinery that has been able to replace human labor. But
the reason to briefly sketch the debate around coal and labor in these countries is because Colombia
offers an interesting contrast. Coal meant a connection to a global economy that promised to put
Colombia on the path of modernization (Sachs 1996; Esteva 2011; Escobar 1999; Gudynas 2011).
As a sign of industrialization, coal (and extractive industries in general) provided an image of a
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transformation of life, from a rural-backward world to landscapes of concrete, roads, global
connection and modernity (Ferguson 1999).
Workers embraced this promise of modernization at the beginning of the 1980´s, even
though at the time the left questioned transnational corporations for being imperialist agents with
the purpose of extracting nature as a resource and accumulating capital. Since the 1970´s leftist
organizations, social movements and unions maintained that foreign investment came with
increasing militarization, political violence aimed to secure coal extraction and the concentration
of revenues in elites and major cities, while most of the profit went to foreign investors rather than
the Colombian state.86
The mirages of a future of modernization are common in extractivist projects all around
the world, and militarization -supported by state´s armies or private armies- to protect investment,
conservation and the steady circulation of commodities is a known feature where extractive
industries operate (Finley-Brook 2018; Ovadia 2014; Poncian 2019). The term resource
nationalism has been coined to describe national projects of a future of development and
modernization based on extractivist industries (Bremmer and Johnston 2009; Childs 2016; Wilson
2015; Stevens 2008). In Latin America neo-extractivism has played this role during the first part
of the twentieth first century, with countries like Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador supporting their
political projects on the revenues of mineral extractive industries (O'Faircheallaigh 2013;
Chiasson-Lebel 2016; Perraut and Valdivia 2010). The phrase that a SINTRAMINERGETICA
leader said to me while travelling across the corridor, “there is no development, no investment,
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This is the description of a typical enclave economy. As Ferguson (2006) would argue, in these economies the
flow of money would move directly from the enclave to the corporation outside of the country where the extractive
process takes places. Hence, the hope of investment flies away with most of the revenues obtained.
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only a hole in the earth while the money flies away”87, summarizes a common ground of critical
descriptions of extractive industries in Colombia. In his words, it is easy to see the shattered
promises of a future of abundance exchanged for a present of environmental devastation as a form
of deceit that has been analyzed for years by social movements in Colombia, and has led them to
question foreign investment in the form of extractivist industries.
The position towards extractivism of the unions in Colombia is informed by the political
background of each organization. As a renowned engineer who has been involved in the different
debates about energy in the Colombian left since the 1970´s told me:
We did not care about health or environment back then. We knew that the mine [discussing
asbestos in a region close to Bogotá] had its problems, but we lived with that and our main
concern was modernization. What we criticized was not the extraction, but the fact that the
revenues were being taken away from Colombia. They were robbing the country and
subjecting it to poverty.88
This account is part of a larger history of Latin American debates about the ways in which
nature is used and transformed into revenues that leave the countries with little benefit. The idea
of nationalizing sub-soil has become important in Latin America at least since the beginning of
the twentieth century and the practices of foreign corporations extracting nature for capital
accumulation have been a matter of much debate in the hemisphere (Tucker 2000; Sawyer 2004;
Grandin 2009). Coronil, in his study of the making of the Venezuelan state, questions the idea of
petro-states as being defined by royalties. Rather than considering that the value of nature is
intrinsic to itself -and thus, revenues appear and circulate magically while nature remains external

“Aquí no hay desarrollo. Lo único que hay es un hueco que hicieron en la tierra mientras la plata se va a otros
lados”. Informal conversation with union member of SINTRAMINERGETICA, November 2017.
88
Interview conducted in Bogotá, February 2017.
87
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to the human-, he argues for a re-introduction of the role of nature in the analysis of the relation
capital-labor. In that way, nature ceases to create revenues as an intrinsic quality, instead becomes
the result of the relations of production and, importantly, of the privatization of land (Coronil 2002:
53).
Even though coal unions from the left have criticized the practices of transnational
extractivist corporations and historically pushed for the nationalization of the infrastructures that
makes extractivism possible, their position has changed and is far from homogenous. Even if the
nationalist interests of unions and leftists organizations have considered nature as an externality,
the description above, of a devastated landscape as the main material result of decades of
extraction, show that this has changed. The violent presence of a mine as a hole in the earth is a
clear example that nature cannot be thought as an external realm that magically produces revenues,
In a similar view as Coronil, coal workers have incorporated the role of the environment in their
analysis of state formation and the future of Cesár. The original promise of development
presupposed nature-as-coal as magically providing value, nature became an eternal force of
revenue and its degradation was disregarded. Furthermore, in the analysis made by leftist
organizations, what Coronil calls the triad of nature-capital-labor did not exist, for nature was not
really integrated into the capital-labor contradiction.
But as environmental violence became materially unavoidable and more palpable in the
everyday life of the region, unions ceased to take nature as external, and began to recognize its
active role and their interaction with nature through labor. A personal friend, who has been
involved in workers’ rights struggles for more than ten years, told me that he was surprised when
SINTRACARBON, the main union of Cerrejón, marched with t-shirts that said “No al desvío del
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Ranchería”89 in 2013. This was an important change, since according to him and other leftist
activists, the union is known for a position that proposes the nationalization of all the mines and
infrastructures required for extraction, to keep the revenues for the Colombian state.
SINTRAMINERGETICA has been influenced by its interaction with indigenous, AfroColombian and peasant communities, and has underscored the concerns of coal transition and a
fierce critique of the environmental effects of extractivism. This might be the reason why at the
entrance of the headquarters in La Jagua, the banner that reads “abajo la extracción de Carbón” is
exposed for the eyes of any visitor. Although SINTRAMINERGETICA still considers its political
role as a political vanguard -namely, they understand their role within social movements as being
of the forefront of the confrontation with transnational corporations, as well as they consider that
they have a superior understanding of politics- they have assimilated in their discourse different
conceptualizations that are elaborations of indigenous, peasant and Afro-Colombian organizations,
as well as recent concerns brought by German experts and Colombian environmental NGOs about
the global phase out of coal.90
In these interactions, and as shown in previous chapters, the notion of territorio is crucial.
Different authors have conceptualized the term by concentrating on the relations that are
established in the geography known as territorio and that produce it as such. In these approaches,
the central principle is the interaction between humans and other beings that produce the space as
an entanglement of forms of life and being (Escobar 2008).
For the purposes of this chapter, I am interested in highlighting territorio as a device that
enables political negotiations, legal interventions and public positions with a tactical quality. The
term has been helpful to translate notions of identity and place into legal frameworks and public
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No to the diversion of the Ranchería River.
I will expand on this point later in this chapter.
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policy and has become a source of tactical positions for indigenous groups, Afro-Colombians and
peasant organizations. The International Labor Organization (ILO) 169 Convention on Indigenous
and Tribal people was ratified by Colombia in 1991, playing a significant part in the uses of the
notion territorio. The ILO 169 implied collective rights and governance within a for indigenous
groups. The constitution of 1991 defined Colombia as pluri-ethnic and multicultural, creating a set
of differentiated policies for these groups. The combination of these two elements heightened the
political use of the term territorio and its legal and strategic possibilities.
Authors such as Bocarejo explain that Colombian constitutional multiculturalism has
created a certain kind of paradox: on the one hand, it has opened political possibilities for
indigenous groups that were certainly closed before. On the other, it has grounded the definition
of indigeneity to the geography defined by its resguardo (Bocarejo 2009). In that tension,
indigenous politics are often isolated from larger national political debates (Bocarejo 2011),
creating a context where indigenous politics cannot impact larger debates or create lasting alliances
with other groups. Carlos Duarte argues that multiculturalism and identity politics created to
protect indigenous groups have not only isolated these communities from possible articulation with
other groups but have escalated what he calls intercultural conflicts between peasants and
indigenous organizations. The latter, using legal tools for their protection, often move in directions
that undermines peasant claims, further dividing the two of them (Duarte 2015).91
Despite this, peasant organizations, inhabitants of towns and Afro-Colombian communities
have largely embraced the tactical possibilities of the term territorio because it ties place and
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One of the most important indigenous organizations of Colombia, Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca (CRIC),
was originally formed within the peasant union Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos. As Archila and
Gonzales argue, CRIC was originally conceived in relation to land tenure struggles in the 1970´s, and started to
change into an indigenous-centered organization in the 1980´s. The two organizations grew apart throughout the
years, and in the 1990´s, with the definition of several legal protections for indigenous communities, disputes over
land between these two groups became increasingly common (Archila and Gonzales, 2010).
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identity in ways that allow for specific political arguments against extractivist projects at specific
locations (Offe 2003; Correia 2019, Bryan 2012).
Unions like SINTRAMINERGETICA, have participated in diverse coalitions where the
concept territorio is underscored as a cornerstone of grassroots organizing and have informed their
own position using this term.92 The concept territorio articulates a critique of extractivism as a
process of depletion, accumulation and degradation of the environment that actively destroys
human life. But it also presents a relational analysis of extractivism that refuses to reduce its effects
to a single antagonism that subordinates others.
Although the union is defined by labor relations and the multiple identities of its members
are still defined in terms of the labor-capital-nature antagonism, the material articulation of mining
practices throughout the coal extraction landscape challenges the idea that conflicts and violence
could be reduced to capital accumulation and labor disputes. Thus, if the term territory has been
used to ground identity to place in ways that usually restrict political activity to geographic-legal
limits, SINTRAMINERGETICA has a different idea in mind.
Territorio in their case is not bounded by a resguardo or an identity tied to a place. It cannot
be this way, for it would fracture the many different forms of violence that are produced by the
interconnected practices of coal extraction. The union has no legal claim for a territorio in the way
that has been used and extended within social movements in the last three decades in Colombia.
But the question of what kind of claim to a territorio can be made by labor organizations is not
irrelevant. The term and its political use is pervasive, informing political discussions, the making
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SINTRAMINERGETICA is part of a national coalition of social movements called Congress of the People
(Congreso de los Pueblos). This coalition is the result of a national strike known as Minga, organized by the Nasa
indigenous community in 2008. Although the latter group helped to make possible this coalition, around 2010 they
withdraw from it, according to several participants in Congreso, because they risk undermining the indigenous
political objectives.
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of coalitions and the articulation of political strategies, regardless of the actual legal possibilities
that the relation identity-territory enables.
Brighneti reminds us that a territory is more a practice than an object or physical space,
and signal to the necessity of analyzing “ these drawing technologies [that] enable us to capture
the role that acts of inscription play in the creation and constitution of territory” (Brighneti 2010:
53). By stating that a territory is not an object, the author states that a territory is a social relation,
and by such understanding, the notion itself extends beyond the legal-political inscriptions and
normative definitions, including the idea of territory as bounded by identity claims tied to a place.
Mitchell argues that “people forged successful political demands by acquiring a power of
action from within the new energy system. They assembled themselves into a political machine
using its processes of operation” (Mitchell 2010: 12). He builds a history of the contentious
character of fossil energy -coal and oil- by focusing not only on the grandiosity of capital flows
and nation-state geopolitical maneuvers, but on the role of workers and their capacity of
intervention, control and interruption of the material flows of coal in the value chain. Mitchell
draws a direct connection between the capacity of organized workers for political intervention and
the materiality of coal extraction. Through this link, he also establishes, not only the idea that
workers are somehow determined by their proximity to such infrastructure and their capacity to
intervene on it, but also that they are somehow embedded in the global circulation of energy as
much as roads, trains, mines and ports.
Since the geographical distribution of coal infrastructure determines the presence of
workers -and thus the union- and their capacity for political action, it follows that for the union
there is a binding relation between that infrastructure and their political identity, namely, their
articulation of their understanding of territorio. Thus, for their political purposes, territorio is
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defined by the infrastructure that makes coal extraction to Europe and the U.S possible. The
extension of the territorio for SINTRAMINERGETICA is the mining corridor with its myriad of
conflicts, forms of violence and environmental destruction.
The relation between paramilitarism and Drummond -established in the cases of
Valdemoré and Orcasitas- shows elites, landowners and corporations´ goal of securing the political
and

economic

reorganization

of

the

region

through

coal

extraction.

But

for

SINTRAMINERGETICA this does not convey the complex articulation of forms of violence or
their effects. On the contrary, the union worries about the possibilities of life in the region, which
are threatened by environmental violence, militarization, paramilitarism and monocrops. But these
interrelated forms of violence cannot be restrained by the notion of war as internal armed conflict,
arguing for the need to understand their connection without privileging one experience over others.
Inasmuch as they do not think that coal extraction can be reduced to a single realm of power
relations, union workers also consider themselves as not defined exclusively as workers, but as
campesinos, Afro-Colombians, and inhabitants of towns. They are concerned not only about their
position as workers but about the relation that humans and the environment establish with each
other. The idea echoes Marx's notion of the metabolic rift, which according to Bellamy (2000)
explains the relation between humans and nature as transformed from codependency and
coproduction to their increasing differentiation and distance. This requires two processes: first, the
progressive dissociation of human labor and the environment -making the latter a commodity-;
second, the creation of human life as separated from nature, expelling the human from the realm
of nature and subordinating the latter in the service of the former. In this analysis, the concern is
that the disregard of the role of the environment for the analysis of political conflicts fails to
recognize that the human/environment metabolic interaction is the condition of possibility for the
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reproduction of both human and non-human life. Capitalist production need of nature leads to its
progressive destruction, thus risking the very possibilities of human survival.
One of the claims made by the union, stressed in their analysis of coal extraction, is that
humans and non-humans are not able to live in most of the mining areas anymore. The idea that
the continuous degradation of the environment has slowly ruined the possibilities of life in the
region is reiterated not only by the way in which the landscape is presented to visitors, but by the
explanation of labor conditions, threats of physical violence and health problems. Although the
union was not founded with this critique in mind, the notion of territorio has certainly transformed
its view on the relation that it has established with the environment and its conflicts.

Labor paralysis
I interviewed ten unionized workers who were injured conducting their coal-related duties
and are unable to work anymore. Probably for life. They had suffered different types of workrelated injuries. All the workers I followed had back problems that eventually took them out of the
coal business. Their stories were not very different. All of them looked forward to getting a job at
the mine. They imagined a future of comfort and stability that inhabitants of mining towns viewed
with jealousy.
In the eyes of peasant organizations and the inhabitants of mining towns, coal workers are
privileged, for there is a widespread idea that mining workers get good salaries while working little
time; similarly, unionized workers are criticized because inhabitants think that the union wants to
keep the mining jobs to themselves and impede other people from working in the mines, which
has become an effective rumor that argues for the end of unions. Several times, while driving
around these towns, it was possible to hear on local radio shows discussions in which callers
referred precisely to this fact: unions against progress, unionized workers monopolizing access to
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coal-related jobs, coal workers imagined as wealthy but lazy people. However, often these workers
have been severely injured and, while out of work and trying to settle an arrangement with the
corporation, they depended on what the union could provide.
The stories of the workers I interviewed were defined by a conflicting relation with the
corporations that hired them. Their narrations were made by the sedimented histories of the
transformation of Cesar into a wasteland where pasts of agriculture are not possible anymore. The
transformation of the uses of the land, from cattle ranching and cotton to coal extraction, as
depicted by the Centro de Memoria in reports like Maldita Tierra (2016), is palpable in the present
landscape of big holes in the earth, dumpsites that became artificial mountains and unbearable
heat. Union leaders organize trips through the corridor with strategic stops to talk to local leaders,
who would constantly be introduced by phrases such as “20 years ago, this was green”, “this was
a place to plant cassava” or “that mountain is the waste of soil of the mines”.93
The mining workers describe the process through which life in certain places has become
not possible anymore, whether because of air quality, proximity to mines or biological diversity in
terms of agriculture and the regional biome. The practices of agriculture are described in two ways:
on the one hand, as a past where self-sustainability was an option -albeit full of conflicts- opposed
to a present of wage labor and dependence on the corporation. On the other hand, agriculture is
imagined as a direct practice of working with the earth, as the action of creation and transformation
of the environment through labor. In this present of machines, coal dust and artificial and sterile
mountains of soil, agriculture is portrayed as creation and restoration of life.
The remembrance of a past that was ecologically and economically diverse, namely, when
palm monocrops did not prevail and multiple economic practices coexisted, seems appropriate to
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ground the description of a present where production is controlled by foreign corporations in the
form of coal, cattle ranching and monocrops of palm oil. Although union leaders choose to omit
pre-coal conflicts in their description of history, when such stories come out, they point to a general
loss of hope for the future, along with a critique of their own role in the process. It could be argued
that before coal it was possible to imagine and re-imagine political futures. Now, with the immense
devastation of the landscape, those futures do not seem available anymore.

Military fears
The histories of violence and the alleged involvement of coal corporations have created a
massive project of securitization of the mines, first to avoid attacks of guerrillas, and second, to
guarantee the constant circulation of the mineral and capital. As Algemiro Tobo drives me through
the mining corridor, he stops at the side of the road for a few minutes to show me how, inside the
mines, there are military posts specifically designed to protect it. They are not easy to spot, and we
could not stay long in one place for fear of calling the attention of the army. But these posts are
not only strategically located, they are hidden from public sight, as the mines have been isolated
by palm oil projects or barbed wire, preventing anyone from forming an idea of what the mines
look like from the inside. Drummond -but also Glencore, Prodeco and CNR-, from the moment it
landed in Cesár, defined its presence by obscure practices of operation and withdrawing from the
public in the department.94 The mines are highly protected, distant from public view, and the same
could be said about their financial practices.
In November 3 of 2015, Senator Iván Cepeda conducted a public hearing in which he linked
the contracts made between mining corporations in the region and the Colombian army to a

94

Jenny Pearce (2004) argues something similar with regards to the practices of British Petroleum in Casanare.
According to the author, BP established a policy of radical withdrawal that was informed by previous histories of
guerrilla activity against oil corporations in other parts of the country. By doing this, they aimed both to distance
from the quarrels of the armed conflict and to guarantee the undisturbed extraction of oil.
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renovated form of private security. According to the Senator, these contracts resembled earlier
paramilitary practices and created an infrastructure of security paid by different corporations to
public military institutions. Cepeda argued that since 1990 there have been at least 1,229 contracts
between infrastructure or extractive industries and the Colombian army, with 20 battalions
specially designed to protect them. In his analysis, Cepeda argued that these battalions, called
(Batallones Especiales Energéticos y Viales (BEEV),95 were often created with the purpose of
protecting one corporation, suggesting the privatization of the national army in a process paid with
the taxes of the citizens of Colombia. The senator also pointed out that Battalion 17 was dedicated
to the protection of Cerrejón and located in the municipality of Albania in Guajira, while Battalion
2 was in La Jagua de Ibírico, dedicated to the protection of Drummond mines. In addition, there is
an intelligence center in Valledupar for the protection of the mining infrastructure. Finally,
according to the Senator´s team’s estimate, Drummond had spent around 3.5 million dollars on
these agreements between 2009 and 2014.
This alliance between private capital and the national army reverberates in the lives of
social movements and leftist political organizations in various ways. This is not only the result of
the historical collusion of Colombian military and paramilitary forces that appears to be repeating
itself in a present of transitional politics. Neither is the relation private business-public army proof
that the Colombian military exists with the purpose of protecting foreign interests. Rather, in a
present of transitional politics, peasants, unions, anti-coal collectives and indigenous organizations
believe that these alliances indicate that for the armed forces, organized civil society is a military
target and a threat.
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Many forms of death, many ways to destroy a union.
Travelling from La Jagua to the ports where coal is shipped in the Caribbean Sea takes five
hours. But with the union leaders these trips take one, two or three days, depending on previous
arrangements with the union. I travelled with them in different cars, sometimes with bodyguards
and SUVs assigned to union leaders as part of the government protection program for grassroots
and political leaders who have received threats.96
In the visits that union leaders organize for activists, NGO representatives and scholars,
they try to make sure that the visitor gets a clear picture of the plurality of conflicts that are
produced by coal and that go beyond labor concerns. This is a move with two objectives: on the
one hand, it shows the multiplicity of forms of violence inflicted throughout the region; on the
other, it presents the idea that the union, as a vanguard of political struggle, understands and works
with peasants, villages and other grassroots movements against the pervasive presence of coal
extraction. This last point is relevant, as the union is eager to show that its work is not exclusively
related to labor negotiations related to coal, but also to the well-being of a region that struggles for
better conditions of existing. Hence, while travelling to the different points chosen by the union,
they kept reminding me the many different projects to support cultural efforts, provide legal
counsel and help with grassroots organizing.
The union chose carefully a combination of labor-related conflicts along the corridor and
visits to different grassroots leaders to present their conflicts. We visited Bosconia, a small town
where the coal train used to pass in front of houses every 10 minutes 24/7, until a community
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The government program usually follows a procedure to analyze the level of threat that a person is in. After a
person submit its case, they get a risk assessment and are situated in a scale of threat that defines the required
security measures. If the threat is not high, a person receives a bulletproof vest and a cellphone. If the level is high,
they often receive a bodyguard and a bulletproof vehicle. Some organizations, not trusting the state, train members
of their community to serve as bodyguards. This is partially because of the many stories where state-appointed
bodyguards provided intelligence that helped in assassinations.
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leader submitted a legal action demanding it to stop between 10 pm and 7 am. He told us how the
house walls cracked as a result of the vibrations of the train, and how the noise drove him close to
insanity. He mentioned a story where a government representative went to make noise analysis,
and instead of locating the sensors at the sites suggested by the leader, he put them close to a picó97
throwing a champeta98 party. The government representative concluded that the noise was not the
result of the train, but the constant noise of parties and their picós.
We visited a town where the train passes right through the middle, splitting it in half. Here,
we were told by a community leader who had been threatened multiple times, of a child who died
in an ambulance waiting for the train to pass. As he explained, the train stopped in the town,
blocking the road the ambulance had to cross, and while they demanded that the train, move it
could not, for the trains are monitored and moved via satellites. According to the inhabitants, the
train was stopped remotely, and thus there was no way of making it move for the ambulance to
pass. The child died waiting for the train to move.
We also visited a camp where a group of workers had held hostage the mining machinery
after the company they were working for suddenly disappeared between shifts. In their desperation,
the workers decided to block the parking lot where the machines were located, to guarantee a
negotiation for proper dismissal. At the moment of my visit they had been camping outside the
yard for two years, they had been threatened, their belongings set on fire and according to their
reports of the judiciary hearing, the owner of the firm said that he would rather pay paramilitaries
than settle with the workers. While we walked through the parking lot, taking photos of the
magnificent machinery struck by sunlight at noon, one of the leaders of the camp told us that by
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A soundsystem common to the Caribbean, used to throw big parties in the streets.
Music style created in Cartagena, Colombia.
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selling one of those machines the corporation was able to settle with the workers, but the owner
refused.
We also visited Hatillo, a town that according to a Constitutional Court ruling requires
relocation because its proximity to the El Hatillo mine had made impossible for inhabitants to
continue their existence there. Inhabitants suffered from the effects of coal dust and were
surrounded by the mountains of disposed material where nothing was able to grow. Furthermore,
in recent years armed groups have been terrorizing the inhabitants and anti-coal activists, having
killed two people in 2018.
According to SINTRAMINERGETICA, transnational corporations created phantom firms
that fragmented to the public and legal eye their operations. At first sight, the workers claim, it
appeared as if different companies were in charge of different moments of the coal industry
logistics. This affected workers´ capacity of unionizing99, as well the state´s capacity for taxation,
revenues and figuring out the income of the companies. However, SINTRAMINERGETICA
argues that this is a tactic to masquerade the beneficiaries, impede unionization and avoid taxes.
According to the president of SINTRAMINERGETICA, the union has been able to legally prove
what they call “unidad operacional”,100 which means that the different processes required for the
extraction circulation and administration of coal and its revenues, management of mines and
personnel are distributed among fragmented firms, but are effectively articulated into a single
extractivist operation. What they have not been able to prove is what they call “unidad de
empresa”,101 which means that at the bottom line, all these firms are part of a major operation that
constitutes one corporation, one big process of capital accumulation. According to the president
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of the union, in order to prove this, they must follow the different transnational legal
transformations, ownership and financial flows of the corporations, and they do not have the
resources, the capacities nor the access to this information.
The creation of unions by the corporation was considered by SINTRAMINERGETICA
another tactic with the intention of minimizing the capacities of unions that were publicly critical
of corporate practices. As Dora Lucy Arias said,
We need to think of this like a fish skeleton. You have the spine of the skeleton, which is
the strategy to destroy the union. And then, as you peel off the meat of the fish, you can
find smaller bones attached to the spine, some of them we do not see because they are too
small. But these bones are the different strategies created to intimidate, produce fear and
destroy the union. They go beyond the armed conflict and can‘t be explained by its
violence.102
There is a careful combination of environmental destruction and different aspects of coalrelated conflicts in the places and persons that the union chooses as interlocutors. In some sense
these are visible conflicts that differ from the alluring yet obscure presence of illegal armies. Most
of the people at these different sites had experienced, in the past and the present, encounters with
paramilitary groups. I was advised not to mention this explicitly before meetings, because it is not
a topic that comes easily during conversations and creates distrust. Sometimes, European activists
press to hear about these encounters, creating uncomfortable situations in which grassroots leaders
would stare into different directions and wonder if they were going to be heard by unknown ears.

“Yo lo que te he dicho es que tenemos que analizar esto como un esqueleto de pescado. Tú tienes la espina del
pescado, la estrategia de destruir al sindicato. Y mientras vas comiendo, ves las espinas más pequeñas que están
pegadas a la grande. Algunas no las podemos ver porque son muy pequeñas. Pero esas espinas son las diferentes
estrategias que usa la empresa para, intimidar, asustar y destruir el sindicato. Eso va más allá del conflicto armado, y
no lo puede explicar esa violencia”. Meeting in Bogotá, July 2018.
102
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The latter would not usually happen with Colombian activists, often used to the histories of
paramilitary rule and the fear that it produces.
Grassroots activists find it difficult to strike a balance between explaining a conflict and
suggesting -without explicitly mentioning- the presence and activities of these illegal armies103. It
is clear for government institutions, social movements and NGOs that these groups operate in the
area, but this knowledge does not facilitate an easier discussion about their presence and
connection to coal-related conflicts. However, these activists would discuss disputes in ways that
do not explicitly link the coal industry to their presence, for they often fear being stigmatized as
subversivos and becoming targets of physical attacks.

Visiting the texture
The visits are organized with surgical precision and with the explicit objective of showing that
narrow definitions of violence only lead to their invisibility. They capture a modality of violence
in a given site with its texture, complexity and relation with other modalities. As the images of the
visit pile up, a puzzle of interconnected forms of violence based on the material activity of coal is
slowly unearthed. The workers are interested in asserting the relational dimension between humans
and their environment. Each conversation, site and landscape chosen for a visit become an
expression of the conflicting relation between humans and the coal industry via the machines,
roads and sites that make it possible.
The visits in their own are a critique of the ways in which conflicts are portrayed by experts
in maps, charts and other forms of organization of data. Elden, citing Weizmann, discusses a move
of geographical analysis from area to volume. For Weizmman “maps are two-dimensional.
Attempting to represent reality on two-dimensional surfaces, they not only mirror it but also shape
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the thing they represent. As much as describing the world, they create it.” (Weizmann on Elden
2013: 3). In that regard, he proposes an analysis of vertical geopolitics that pays attention to the
volume, shape and form of constructed landscapes, rather than the two-dimensional forms of
analysis. Elden, reviewing the work made by those interested in this form of analysis, points that
verticality allows to understand “lived practices of people in those fractured and hierarchical
spaces” (Elden 2013: 6), the forms of warfare in urbanized terrain with its subways, buildings and
towers or the aerial warfare (Elden 2013:5).

Figure 6: Source: Observatorio de Conflictos Ambientales (OCA) (Montoya-Dominguez 2018). This map is only a
fraction of the map created by OCA and referenced in footnote 105
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Maps are an incredibly useful tool for activism. But the forms in which maps are presented,
who present them and the information that they present have effects. In his work on the Botanical
exploration of West China and Tibet, Mueggler describes the dialogue between a botanist from
England and one from China. Their geohistorical positions defined the validity of their
observations within a transnational network of knowledge circulation, as much as coproduced an
enormous corpus on their field. Their conflicted interaction, recorded in hundreds of maps, letters,
photographs, essays and drawings, contain the geographical asymmetries of power that constitute
the production and circulation of knowledge. But the process of gathering and organizing data also
creates the landscape that they seek to capture. In Mueggler´s terms, the landscape is
fundamentally a social relation that is archival in its form (Mueggler: 2011: 15). The process of
understanding, analyzing and representing information is a contentious process in which different
forms of knowledge participate. The land contains, on the other hand, contains the traces of its
own history.
Mueggler is concerned with the differential practices of the two men for record keeping
and world-representation in what he calls “archival regimes” (Mueggler 2011: 47). He juxtaposes
the modes of gathering information, its organization and representation by the two men as
contentious practices of forms of knowledge and appropriation of the world. Far from suggesting
that one is simply used by the other (reproducing an idea of mere appropriation and knowledge
subordination), Mueggler pays attention to the different techniques for gathering data, their
histories and the process through which, through their own clashing, create a botanical
compendium of a region in the world.
The maps that were presented at meetings and conferences I attended relied in different
forms of GIS analysis, with the location of the mines, military bases, roads shades of color for
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vegetation and environmental changes and towns in the mining corridor. With few exceptions,
maps often derived from the one presented above or were based on google earth mages with pinned
locations over them. Partially because of their technical requirements needed for their making and
their capacity to put together in a single image many different elements of coal related violence,
maps have a high status within the coal and human rights networks to explain coal and political
violence104. These maps are undeniable useful for any anti-coal project. Beyond the discussion
about what they represent, they have the capacity to intervene with authority at the sites in which
they are exposed. The technological aspects required to make them -software, satellite images and
GPS locations- transform a testimony -i.e., the stories of pollution in towns resulting from the
mine´s proximity- into a claim validated by the map. What otherwise can be dismissed as a fragile
story or even considered a conspiracy theory, is suddenly uphold by the juxtaposition in the map
of two or more references: a mine, a train rail and a line of bodies representing murders parallel to
it, bring a sense of correlation between mining and political violence that re-affirm a testimony on
the same subject.
But despite the tremendous work required for their making, and their significance for the
ongoing struggles of activists and workers against coal industries, maps are unable to capture
certain aspects and relations of violence that are important for the union. The juxtaposition of sites
and marks of events -such as murders- appear often as self-explanatory, that is, as if locating one
next to the other would unveil a hidden truth about the interconnections of violence.
To continue with Elden and Weizmann´s idea, the two-dimensional representation misses
volume and texture, and the idea that practices and processes of violence are deeply entangled. A
map shows a mine as a scar in the earth, but it does not always show the oppressive feeling of
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One of the most comprenhensive maps in this regard can be found here https://conflictosambientales.net/oca_bd/env_problems/map/4

155

being surrounding by mines or the progressive creation of artificial mountains by dumping sites.
It can show a murder close to the mine, but the two events seem only relevant to each other insofar
as they occur in the same area. A point in the map represents a military base, but it fails to show
how the base is hiding, located on a small mountain where it can impose its gaze upon the land. It
might show a line that represents the train, but not the vibration that cracks houses open nor the
ways in which the noise spreads.
These maps do not register the human-environment activity as a relational experience that
produces the landscape that is inscribed in the topography of coal. Achieving this is crucial for
the workers. When the different modes of violence appear in these maps, their entanglement, flow
and coproduction is only suggested, defined in terms of cause and effect or explained as an obvious
conclusion that could be derived from observation of the map.
The union does not have the tools required for three dimensional maps, renders, remote
sensing analysis of progressive land degradation and other technological tools that might be
required for geopolitics of verticality. They quite often do not have the tools for a two-dimensional
map either. They do use and value immensely the work done by those cartographers that represent
the effects of coal extraction. In the visits they organize, the union is producing an analysis of their
geography that highlights the limits of two-dimensional maps. If the maps have the capacity to
travel across geographies to render visible the conditions for environmental and political violence
in the region, they quite often fail to show the volume and vibrancy of life that produces the
landscape as a social relation.
The decisions made by workers of which sites to visit, where to stop and who to talk are
the creation of a cartography that emphasizes volume, depth and the continuous flow of
interconnected violence, rejecting fragmented conceptualizations of violence. In this way, the

156

union directs its effort to filling the gaps that cannot be filled by two dimensional maps, presenting
formations of violence interwoven practices that could be felt, seen and sensed in all their
complexity. This move is not an attempt to undermine the significance on highly technical maps.
Instead, the union creates its own experiential cartography of the coal industry to assert the sensible
presence of workers in their territory while at the same time produces a geographical analysis that
pays attention to those things that escape the maps themselves. What is presented side by side in a
map and circulates in anti-coal conferences in Germany or the U.K, become in this union´s
cartography the flow of forces of violence that reverberate throughout the landscape.

Flows of violence
The union argues that a shift is occurring away from modalities of violence such as
massacres or targeted killings -commonly associated with armed conflict- to a dispersal of the
practices of violence in order to achieve whole-scale annihilation, as direct physical violence did
not entirely succeed in fulfilling this objective:
If you notice, we are getting killed and harassed and followed. But there are these other
things happening, like the creation of unions by the bosses, the stigmatization to say that
we are destroying the possibilities of work and we are getting sick. It isn´t just the armed
conflict like Dora Lucy says, it is something that goes beyond the armed conflict. It is
power that threatens us.105
Union leaders use the term poder to refer to the intricate web of actors and institutions that
have historically produced the political and economic organization of life in Cesár. It is a
conception of power that points to regional elites, big landowners, corporations and high

“Si se da cuenta, nos están matando. Pero es más que eso, son los sindicatos paralelos que crea la patronal, la
estigmatización que dice que estamos acabando con el trabajo y además nos estamos enfermando. Eso es una cosa
diferente. No es solo el conflicto armado, como dice la doctora Dora Lucy, es el poder el que nos está atacando”.
Interview with union leader, La Jagua de Ibírico, 2017.
105
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government officials, that is historically produced and that has as one of its effects the
marginalization of large sectors of the population of the region. Although this notion resembles
the questioned idea of power as fixed and vertical, in my ethnographic work I found a different
kind of analysis.
Defining a historically constituted web of actors by the term poder, namely, by their
capacity to hold and project it, is a political tactic. First, is helpful to locate political adversaries
and responsibilities in relation to the trajectories of violence that have made the present of the
mining corridor. Second, it highlights the many blind spots in the relations that these actors have
with former and newer paramilitary groups. Third, it evokes the connection between the economic
and political organization of the region and the actors that have benefited from it. Considering
that there is not a definitive way to define concrete responsibilities on the matter along with the
staggering numbers of impunity this is not a minor tactic.
But discussing power in this way exposes the difficulties in trying to articulate into a single
case the plurality of legal devices, institutional arrangements, environmental threats and physical
violence exercised by legal and illegal groups. To sum up, in a vertical definition of power,
violence is a relation of cause and effect with neatly defined victims, perpetrators and profiteers.
The definition of violence pursued by the union is closer to what Tyner (2016) proposes. For the
author violence is a social relation defined by material practices in modes of production. In that
regard, the geographical extension of the coal complex and the dynamics of extractivism, bring
together formations of violence that are often though as existing isolated from each other.
Is not a surprise, then, that the workers were particularly receptive when in October of 2017
FESCOL invited a German scholar and a renowned German anti-coal activist to talk about energy
transition in Valledupar and Bogotá. During the event, the German duo explained that energy
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transition was “an inevitable process” and that “Germany needs to consider not only what happens
in our country, but also what happens to the countries where coal is extracted. It needs to provide
help for the transition of labor too”. These words reverberated in the ears of
SINTRAMINERGETICA representatives, who have also been discussing what a world without
coal would look like. Although the event was short and it did not provide an agenda, the discussion
asserted that coal extraction was undergoing a global transformation that the union had to pay
attention to, and that among the practices of violence that they had experienced, they were facing
the disappearance of labor in coal.
In May of 2018, when I again visited the headquarters of the union at La Jagua, the leaders
kept pointing to the need for creating processes in which current and future workers could be
trained in different areas not related to coal, rather than continuing coal-related labor training. In
their view, a future of closed mines and energy transition is not seen necessarily as a change aimed
to improve the conditions of life in the region, but as a victory of the multiple forms of violence
that have effectively exploited the land to its depletion.
Life has been exhausted after decades of coal extraction and at the sight of the limits of
accumulation, the region seems to serve no purpose anymore for transnational coal companies. In
the view of the union, the present is the result of a massive re-organization of human and nonhuman life, which required the exercise of different forms of violence to obliterate difference and
guarantee accumulation at high speed rates. From that perspective, when coal ceases to be
profitable workers and their labor are not needed; the biophysical, ecological and natural
advantages of Cesár do not continue to be attractive; coal, as container of the energy of capitalism
loses its value In a way, the region has been used to the limits of its capacity, rendering irrelevant
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for transnational corporations and leaving as a result a sense of massive devastation and a bleak
future.
Meanwhile, SINTRAMINERGETICA workers are worried that their union is closer to
disappearance as a result of the many maneuvers that have diminished them in numbers.
Embracing the idea that there are multiple forms of violence that are produced by coal extractivist
practices, extends the union’s concern beyond labor and asks about the future after coal. But the
union has concluded that the project of reorganizing life for coal extraction has been largely
achieved, and in a future without coal, it is not clear to them what will happen to the region.

On the articulation of forms of violence
The members of the union understand coal extractive practices in a way in which
standardized analysis of the internal armed conflict and its critique coexist. On the one hand, they
do not dispute the established historical narration of the armed conflict, where landowners and
regional elites colluded with illegal right-wing groups to obliterate unions, peasants and indigenous
communities and secured coal extraction and revenues for themselves. On the other hand, they
have been pushing forward the idea that violence is manifold, and that it is produced by the
practices of coal extraction in relation to its infrastructures. According to the union leaders, in spite
of the capacity that the standardized historical explanation has to make sense of the present
organization of power in the region, it has also marginalized the multiplicity of violence, and has
created a situation in which the present is explained predominantly by the history of the armed
conflict while disregarding the multiplicity of violence.
For the union, war is extended beyond the realm of physical confrontation and the
normative limits of the internal armed conflict. The violence associated to the armed conflict is
not its own purpose, but one more mediator in a thread of forms of violence with the objective of
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obliteration and neutralization of political opposition. This form of war penetrates labor, humans’
relation with nature, institutional practices, legal procedures and bureaucratic activities. It extends
through the material transformations of the landscape designed explicitly to facilitate and make
more efficient coal extraction. Since for the union war is not confined to the armed conflict, the
extension of the realm of war -and violence- enters aspects of life that the standard notion of the
armed conflict fails to register as violence or subordinate to the violence of the armed conflict.
Hence, there is no escape for the union from the war created for its disappearance.
Authors such as Kochi consider that one of the dimensions of war is positing: “War
involves the effort to posit, put forward and realize a norm. This norm is contained within ethical,
political, economic or religious claim situated within the conditions of a social and material life”
(Kochi 2009: 15). This realization of the norm, the union understands, requires the obliteration of
the union as such, for the norm stands as a representation of an unsurmountable difference, and
the union is defined as the definitive obstacle for its realization.
The extended history of war in Colombia suggests that the relation between physical
violence and war is not enough for the obliteration of a group, for the disappearance of an obstacle.
The articulation of multiple modalities of violence becomes crucial for the achievement of positing
a norm. In other words, union leaders understand that political violence in relation to war requires
the latter to be linked to different modes of violence to achieve the objective of obliteration. Union
leaders flow between diverse definitions of violence, conflict and the processes that resulted in the
current organization of life in their region. They do not have a fixated definition of any of these
topics, and in fact they move seamlessly through them depending on the required scenarios.
A top-down definition of power coexists analytically with a notion of power as dispersed
and plural, although they serve -and point to- different intentions. The first notion helps to
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intervene in political conversations with human rights institutions, scholars and discourses. This
notion is to a large extent one-directional and univocal, but it helps to render visible regional elites´
connections with illegal paramilitary groups, illegal economies and its effect in the organization
of power. The second notion has helped activists to consider the effects of slow and routinized
violence, as well as to understand the uses of law, bureaucracies, machines and infrastructures as
forms of violence.
Foucault, questioning the Hobbesian idea of a space were power is legitimately
concentrated in a single central entity, argues for an analysis of the “peripheral bodies”, which
entails power as distributed among practices and institutions beyond the centralized idea of the
state, and certainly beyond the legal limitations that constitute the legitimate space for assertion of
power in the form of violence. The latter is important, as Foucault argues for an analysis that
inverts Clausewitz’s phrase “war is the continuation of politics by other means” into “politics is
the continuation of war by other means”. This inversion presents the realm of political struggle
explicitly as conflict and allows for an understanding of violence beyond war.
“No matter what philosophico-juridical theory may say, political power does not begin
where war ends,” Foucault declared. “Law is not pacification, for beneath the law, war continues
to rage in all mechanisms of power, even the most regular. War is the motor behind the institutions
of power” (2003: 50). Foucault questions the distinction of law as peace and war as disorder,
showing that the realm of war is produced as an exteriority that legitimizes law as peace and order.
In Hobbes this would be the Covenant, the pact that creates the Leviathan in which subjects
surrender their capacity for violence for its administration by a superior being. By creating this
distinction where there is a space presented as the absence of war and thus a site of law and peace,
the existence of conflict and violence outside war as disorder is denied. But as Foucault argues,
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war extends to what he calls the “institutions of power” in the form of political struggle, showing
a continuum of the exercise of violence and power beyond the formal limits of the definition of
war.
The Colombian war defined as an internal armed conflict defines the boundaries of
violence and its physicality, presenting war as an event that coexists with formal liberal
democracy. The notion of internal armed conflict helps to create a sphere where violence and war
exist alongside democracy and the rule of law as peace. Several authors have tried to conceptualize
this, often through the term “the Colombian Paradox” (Tuft 1997; Matanock and Garcia-Sanchez
2017). Those who use the term argue that in spite the longstanding armed conflict, high levels of
violence and lack of territorial control by the state, representative democracy remains healthy,
possible and sustains the legitimacy of the sovereign power of the state. The conflicts that exist
beyond the realm of war are also contentious events that could be resolved through democraticlegal procedures. Environmental destruction, stigmatization, poverty, certain forms of killing and
labor precarity are understood to be resolvable in the context of democracy and its legality.
The argument claims that once war is over, democracy can thrive and conquer the physical
and political places that were formerly sites of war. Thus, the notion of internal armed conflict
serves to create, within the limits of the Colombian state, the idea of two coexisting fields: one of
disorder and violence and another where legality rules sovereign. In the first one, illegal armies
roam and produce unruly violence. In the second, there is a sense of order and the presence of law
that can deal with specific conflicts. This distinction creates a fracture in the connection of forms
of violence: there is a form of violence that resides in the realm of armed conflict and that is the
main threat to liberal democracy and state formation. Other forms of violence largely reside in the
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field of democracy -even if they exist as illegality-, and it is argued that they can be resolved by
legal settings and political negotiations.
As mentioned before, there are two notions of power that are used by the union. One is a
political evocation of the historical trajectories for the organization of the region that are aimed at
exclusion, control and obliteration. This notion helps to render visible networks, actors and
practices that are often illegible because they remained in the obscurity of impunity, and it points
to the established networks of human rights institutions, activism, and discourses, that are mostly
interested in forms of violence that link the armed conflict to coal extraction for its legibility and
capacity of circulation. The second notion points to subtle, slow or legal forms of violence, as well
as to the material practices of coal extraction the slowly ruin human and nonhuman life.
SINTRAMINERGETICA uses both interchangeably as conceptual possibilities that capture
different arrangements of violence related to coal extraction. But they also try to bridge the fracture
that is produced by the notion of the armed conflict between the different forms of violence
produced by coal.
To do this, the union makes an argument in which the continuum of war into the realm of
politics and the relation between these two forms of power resembles Schmitt's notion of the
political. Schmitt considers that the political is defined by the creation of a dichotomy between
friend-enemy, of an exteriority that needs to be obliterated. Similarly, Schmitt asserts that the
political is constitutive of social relations, and it cannot be circumscribed to a single sphere of life.
This is generally understood as a critique of the notion of consensus and a rejection of conflict, but
also as the idea that politics cannot be circumscribed to some areas and absent in others. In this
way, Schmitt situates conflict beyond the formal realms of politics, suggesting that the process of
annihilation of the enemy is present in social relations, not exclusively in the realm of formal
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politics. Schmitt´s definition of politics resembles closely the widespread concern of social
movements and leftist political parties in Colombia that suggest that the intention of political
violence has historically been the complete obliteration of political opposition. It is telling, to say
the least, that the theoretical understanding of politics of a Nazi thinker seems appropriate to
describe the developments of recent Colombian history.
Mouffe famously follows this critique to argue that the notion of consensus in liberal
democracy denies conflict, and in that sense, refuses the political (Mouffe 2005, 2013). However,
unlike Schmitt, Mouffe disagrees with the consequences that the distinction enemy-friend creates,
insofar as in Schmitt the political is defined by the attempt to annihilate the other In her account,
democracies are rife with conflict, and it is that conflict which allows their political vibrancy.
Mouffe suggests an agonistic approach to this notion of the political, one that instead of defining
the other as an antagonist to be annihilated, re-introduces the notion of conflict in democracy
without leading to destruction of one group by another.
SINTRAMINERGETICA suggests that the infrastructure of coal extraction is created in
the realm of democracy as a weapon against the life of the union itself. It is certainly an intense
contradiction that the materiality that defines the territorio through which the union grounds their
political claims, is also understood as a weapon against themselves. Roads, trains, air monitors,
ports and machines are produced in the realm of democracy as the mediums that make possible
extractive practices (Barry 2013). They are the material claim of the manifestation of the practice
of democracy bolstered by coal extraction. They create legal regulations and administration that
are, in principle, part of the architecture of governance. At the same time they also generate the
violence that kill unions, people, and the ecosystems of the Caribbean region of Colombia. In this
way war and democracy go together, in a continuum of articulated violence aimed to obliteration
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of the union and to the organization of life for the purposes of accumulation of capital in coal
extraction.
As a consequence, legal maneuvers, such as those that divide corporations into many small
branches to impede unionization and distribute revenues among many different and unknown
hands, or those designed to uphold in the realm of the uncertain legal rulings related to
environmental disputes, work in tandem with the physical violence of the armed conflict and with
the threats received by unions and peasant organizations.
As Balibar (2015) argues, the state creates a series of antinomies to identify forms of
opposition that help to define the legitimate and illegitimate sites for the exercise of violence. To
assert the rule of peace, violence is imposed by the state, creating precise limits for its legitimate
exercise. This abstraction seems to be based on the idea that the state, the realm of legality and
democracy are fixed entities without shifting relations, histories and conflicts. One of those shifting
relations is related to the fact that violence operates at different degrees and realms. First, as the
legitimate exercise of violence by the state that in turn produces a space of peace and order; second,
as the exteriority of war, that in the case of Colombia coexists with democracy as peace; third, as
the necessary connection between these two realms, which tries to purify the realm of peace and
democracy through the assertion of illegal and legal forms of violence.
In counterinsurgency warfare it is not uncommon for the state to use terror, for it is terror
itself that balances asymmetries of war. Guerrilla tactics have camouflage, surprise and
spectacularism as central elements, and are usually confronted with forms of terror by the
antagonists to neutralize their advantages. State terror, in the case of Colombia, has been for a long
time a combination of paramilitary groups and practices like targeted killings, disappearances,
threats, torture or massacres. However, the shift that occurred in 2005, with the demobilization of
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paramilitary forces, also forced for a transformation of the techniques designed to neutralize
groups like the unions, which are considered and stigmatized as formally being in the realm of
democracy but acting with guerrillas to further war.
The use of legal tactics and the creation of regional infrastructures of securitization
supported by coal corporations work simultaneously as the assertion of the realm of peace and the
production of violence, as the materialization of democracy and the violence that produces war.
As a result, the infrastructures that are deemed as the materialization of democracy also generate
the fragility and precarity of workers and inhabitants of the region, the environmental hazards that
destroy agriculture and life. The realm of peace and legality is weaponized for annihilation, or at
least of the annihilation of the obstacles to the accumulation of capital. As Dora Lucy says:
My interest is not a nature-centered idea of ecocide. I am interested in people, and
sometimes these analyses seem to forget that people exist. What they want is to wipe out
certain lives in order to make others thrive. Indigenous communities disappear to make
way for capital; rivers disappear to make way for coal extraction; communities are
relocated, not for their safety, but for the safety of the business.106

In a move that broadens the definition of political violence, Kochi (2009) considers that
there is a conceptual trajectory centered around Hegel/Marx that assimilates class struggle to an
extension of war. Kochi argues that for Marx “underlying the concept of war is a conflict between
competing groups [...] In the sense that each of these groups presents a differing viewpoint over
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Yo no estoy interesada en una idea de ecocidio natura-céntrica. A mí me interesa la gente y a veces esos análisis
parecieran decir que la gente no existe. Pero lo que a ellos les interesa es acabar unas formas de vida para imponer
otras. Las comunidades indígenas desaparecen para abrir paso al capital. Los ríos desaparecen para la extracción de
carbón. Las comunidades son relocalizadas, no por la seguridad de la comunidad, sino por la seguridad del negocio”.
Bogotá, July 2018.
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how social, political and economic life is organized, there exists a conflict or war at the level of
concepts or ideas” (Kochi 2009: 198). Kochi continues by suggesting that in certain versions of
Marxism “the notion of class war militarizes the whole social and political life and even the realm
of ideas” (Kochi 2009: 199), while reminding the reader that Lenin inverts Clausewitz’s phrase as
well, and effectively assumes that political struggle is war, and therefore the assertion of violence
for political purposes extends beyond traditional scenarios of warfare.
Union leaders intentionally present a reality of conflicts that extends beyond the traditional
understandings of the Colombian armed conflict and the idea of physical political violence, to
articulate the idea that war and violence have moved beyond killing, massacring or disappearing
as privileged modalities of violence. In their view, violence has become a network of material and
legal practices where war has exceeded the standardized limits of its definition and has effectively
moved into other areas of life.
The extension of violence beyond war is possible because of the analysis that the union has
made, in which the material connections of coal extraction have been able to articulate multiple
geographies and modalities of violence throughout the landscape. Most forms of violence
produced by extractivism are usually not considered as such, for they are located in the realm of
legal conflicts and democracy, as the effects of development and modernization. But for
SINTRAMINERGETICA, the everyday practices of coal extraction are the extension of violence
and war into the realm of the legal. In that continuum of violence they are the enemy to be
destroyed, and the union is worried because they feel they are losing.
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Chapter 4
Death expanded: the value of death and the status of more-than-human
life
In this chapter I will concentrate on the value that the case acquires as the Bruno dispute
travels from La Guajira to Germany, England and Netherlands via Bogotá. I will analyze the ways
in which the actors arrange the Bruno case around specific notions of life -and death- in relation
to definitions of nature, and their political effects for the making of the Bruno case. For the
purposes of this chapter, I will concentrate on the relations established between Germany, the U.K
and Colombia. However, because the material connections of coal involve other sites, I will bring
them when necessary.
“Water is life” was the core message of most public interventions of indigenous
organizations and NGOs when they were invited to discuss and explain the conflict over Bruno.
After Samir Amin, the renowned Egyptian economist, spoke to the crowd at the G20 rally protests
in Hamburg in 2017, Jaqueline Epiayú -a Wayuú leader who was part of a group of Colombian
activists visiting Germany to discuss the future of a world without coal-, took the stage to explain
the connections between Colombia and Germany resulting from coal extraction and its circulation.
She began her speech with words in Wayunaiky, the Wayuú language, which pointed to the
intrinsic connection that her ethnic group had with water, and how the diversion of Bruno -and the
massive extraction of coal in Guajira- was driving her group to extinction. Epiayú drew an explicit
link between Wayuu communities, the cultural importance of water and the threat of “cultural and
physical extinction”107 that the diversion posed for their lives. At times, her words resembled

107

In 2009 the Colombian Constitutional Court released Auto 001 of 2009, which stated that there were 36
indigenous groups facing “cultural and physical risk”. The auto or finding became an important tool for indigenous
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contemporary discussions that stressed the relationality between humans and non-human as a
central feature of indigenous cosmologies. Her words echoed contemporary debates of climate
change in which the idea of the human life does not explicitly subordinate the non-human as a
resource for the life of the former.
Epiayú partially situated her speech in what anthropology defines nowadays as a relational
ontology, but also spoke to the legal discussions that have aimed to situate nature as a holder of
rights (Kaufmann and Martin 2018; Borras 2020; Kersten 2017). She talked about how spirits of
those who passed lived in creeks and rivers, allowing those alive to establish a dialogue with them;
she said that the possible diversion of the Bruno would made impossible the flows of those
interactions between worlds mediated by the creek, and therefore her ethnic group would be a step
closer to extinction. By locating the vital importance of water as both a biological necessity and a
cultural one — she mentioned the end of her culture —Epiayú made a move in which the lines
that differentiate the non-human and the human are blurred, suggesting a different way of being in
the world (Escobar 2008, Kohn 2013, Descola 2013).
But for the most part she drew an anthropocentric picture of the effects of climate change,
in which the main preoccupation was the risk of human disappearance as the effect of an
environmental crisis, and the concrete political and economic relations that Cerrejón had
established, aiming to divert Arroyo Bruno to expand the operations of one of the largest open-pit
mines in the world. In that picture, elements of that alterity and the relationality that produces
human and non-human life, were introduced to point out to a discussion about the loss of human
diversity to European audiences; and more importantly, to remind them that from her point of

organizations in the country, who adopted the language included in it. The phrase “cultural and physical risk”, as
one of the lawyers involved in its writing stated in a meeting, was a way to open the door in Colombia to the
question of indigenous genocide in a context in which the term was particularly contentious.
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view, nature remained a concept of dispute, as well as a resource necessary for the reproduction of
the human.
Her speech was effective because it pointed out many different fields at the same time: it
spoke of human rights and climate change; it reaffirmed contemporary discussions about the
possibilities of more than human life; and it connected extractivism to the global political ecology
in which coal played a major role. However, after being present in many debates over Bruno,
discussions about the best paths to follow in order to make the Bruno case relevant and effective,
and projections of transnational campaigns and solidarity exercises, I was also aware that the
category “life” and its relation to water was delivered in ambiguous ways. It was not easy to
understand exactly what forms of life Epiayú was making reference to, even if you knew the
context of intense draughts, cattle death and child malnutrition, for it seemed that she was leaving
open for interpretation the status of the forms of life she considered of central importance for the
dispute.
Hours before, at the beginning of the massive gathering, Manuel Arregocés was invited to
give a speech from the top of the car carried by the environmentalist group that invited them to the
anti-G20 event. Unlike Jacqueline, he pointed out not only the ways in which the diversion of the
Bruno risked the production and reproduction of life in the region, but also to the increasing threats
that activists were facing in Colombia since the peace accords were signed by FARC and the
Colombian government. Although leaders in Guajira were not as affected as in other regions,
Manuel though it was important to present a picture in which political violence was explicitly
related to water conflicts in Guajira. He aimed to link the convulsing scenarios of a political
transition, dreams of liberal democracy and economic development as a result of peace, living side
by side with the proliferation of death threats, killings and murder attempts. Similarly, Arregocés
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considered that this was important because neither the government nor those actors involved in the
peace process explicitly acknowledged forms of environmental violence in their negotiations,
somehow making it marginal to the long history of war in the country.
Both Samuel and Jaqueline had experienced anonymous calls, being followed, military
harassment and death threats. As dramatic as it sounds, these practices are quite common for
activists in Colombia, to the extent that sometimes they are not even considered problematic unless
an attempted murder or a murder occurs. These actions of violence are the result of their grassroots
activism which, as I explained in chapter one, are often stigmatized as disorderly, antinational and
even terrorist.
As I went back again to my notes and recordings of the Colombian activists’ visit to
Germany, I realized that there was something else about the ways in which both articulated the
political importance of the Bruno. On the one hand, Epiayú spoke moving in between a discourse
of alterity to defend a web of life with the human at the center, as well as a normative analysis of
the political economy of coal that marginalized communities, aiming to situate at the center of her
speech human life as constantly at risk. On the other, Arregocés spoke about corporate practices,
corrupt elites and political violence inflicted upon social and political movements opposed to
extractivist practices. Epiayú’s speech seemed more appealing to the audiences of the G20 protests,
while Arregocés’s, as important as it was, did not seem to have the same impact. Although their
lives and their activism were deeply intertwined, they seemed to be situating themselves in
different places, each one speaking not only about a specific face of coal extractivism and violence,
but to different audiences, debates, and futures. At some moments, it could even seem like they
were talking about two different realities.
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These two forms of presenting the Bruno struggles are not opposite to each other but are
not necessarily complementary. Not all the actors opposed to the Bruno diversion understand its
effects, the extension of the environmental violence or the purposes of the project in the same way.
At the center of the definition of what the Bruno is as a transnational political artifact, lies a
discussion about the pragmatic definition of the limits of the notion of life and the status of nature.
The plurality of forms of life that the case can speak about –not only human beings of Guajira, but
humanity at large and non-human life- means that, depending on the ways in which it is arranged,
a hierarchy is created to emphasize specific notions of life that subordinate, marginalize or exclude
others. By this I do not mean that the actors openly dismiss human or non-human lives to favor
others, but that in order for them to intervene in their intended scenarios, they do create political
hierarchies of the term life, with different reach, limits and inclusions that allow to further their
political objectives.
The work conducted between these organizations sometimes is connected and wellcoordinated, but most of the time it works through contingent projects and funding, as well as
sporadic invitations to conferences, rallies and different kinds of meetings or gatherings. For this
reason, is difficult to put together in a single picture the many forms that cases such as Bruno take
throughout the continent. Similarly, scholarly work is often expected to achieve the standards of
analytical coherence and closure, shedding light on the messiness of the world. But the objects of
study hardly stop breathing and transforming, challenging the available conceptual and
geographical frameworks of analysis.
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Chains of value, networks of knowledge.
The geographies through which events of violence related to coal extraction circulate as
cases are, with very few additions, the same geographies of the chains of value of coal extraction.
In turn, as obvious as it may seem, the sites of contention in which the effects of such extraction
are discussed are those in which Colombian coal is actively present: the mines, the ports, the energy
produced and consumed, the flows of capital in Guajira, Santa Marta, Bogotá, Berlin and London,
to name a few.
Commodity chains are the most evident material form that the networks of coal extraction
take. Defined as “sets of production segments characterized by commodity flows between nodes
within a chain, the organization of production between and within nodes, and the variant location
of nodes within a geographical space” (Smith et al. 2002: 44), it is at the nodes of this chain where
the Bruno debates are considered of most importance. As Cardoso has described, commodity
chains create multiple forms of environmental destruction, and thus their study allows us to
understand the “structural asymmetries in the distribution of burdens of pollution, the different
levels of sacrifice made to extract resources, or from the discrepancies in the access to natural
resources” (Cardoso 2018: 145).
The transnational connection of coal circulation produces linked but differentiated forms
of violence, resulting in different forms of death and dying at the nodes of coal circulation and
production. It is not surprising that it is at the sites where Colombian coal is present, that grassroots
anti-coal collectives, solidarity organizations, NGOs, scholars and a variety of governmental and
multilateral institutions are located as well, connecting seemingly distant experiences with their
practices, discourses and events. But because at each node the material relations of coal differ, the
cases are arranged to explicitly address the concerns of these sites. Hence, coal is different in
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Germany, The Netherlands, Bogotá and the UK, for the form it takes at each place highlights
particular qualities and relations while other conflicts, actors and institutions are rendered visible
or obscured. The commodity chain of coal circulation is not only a network that produces the value
of coal, but one that produces the value of life and death in relation to the forms of violence that
coal extraction produces.
In the European countries that have relations with coal from Colombia, anti-coal actors
have tried to find different ways to advocate against its use that could gather public support and
intervene in political discussions. Two main strategies have been used: one, related to the history
of war in Colombia and the role of coal in it, which I explored in the first chapter; the second one,
focused on climate change, CO2 emissions and energy transitions, namely, the increasing push
towards phasing out coal use. These two strategies sometimes are used together, helping one to
reinforce the other, but the practices of advocacy often produce different networks for their
circulation and appeal to different political interests.
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Figure 7: Source: OECD/IEA (2015) Medium Term Coal Market Report, IEA Publishing

.

Colombia in eyes of European activists has been linked to the idea of political violence and
genocide, and at the moment of my research, the defense of the peace process and the peace
accords. But as Ticktin (2011) has indicated, the public relevance of these concerns (that helped
many Colombians to find refuge and create solidarity networks), has diminished significantly, and
thus the violence of Colombian war is not deemed as important as it once were. European interests
have shifted towards environmental issues that put coal use at the center of the debate, CO2
emissions and climate change. Hence, European activists considered that the Bruno could provide
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a different kind of insight to their public, a form of interpellation directed to their everyday
practices:
We have the port in Rotterdam and we also have the heat in our houses. Is not like there is
something happening far away, but is actually in our homes. We can work with that to talk to
the people In Netherlands, and is easier than talking about the violence in Colombia, we do not
have to focus on that.108

These words show that environmental conflicts around coal had a possibility that speaking
about the armed conflict did not: they could intervene in debates in which the idea of a humanity
at risk could emerge vividly, through the link that is established between the diversion of the Bruno
in Guajira and coal consumption in Europe. Unlike the Colombian armed conflict, considered a
tragedy far away, coal extraction is experienced directly in Europe, not only in the sense of the
moral responsibility felt from being consumers, but from the role played in the active destruction
of the world through coal extraction and use. Hence, the material relations established in the chain
of value render specific political possibilities tangible by arranging the Bruno case to speak to local
concerns about climate change.
It is important to consider that it has not been possible to get a definitive estimate of the amount
of coal that moves from the different mines in Colombia to each European country. In spite of the
many different attempts by European NGOs to guarantee accountability and transparency about
these numbers, the different corporations involved in the processes of extraction and circulation
have not disclosed the numbers of how much of the total exported is sold to which countries or
companies, making it difficult to trace the exact distribution of coal exported by company in
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Conversation with an NGO representative from PAX Netherlands, Hamburg 2017.
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importing countries. However, NGOs like SOMO have found ways to trace the movement. In
their report about the coal commodity chain, they explain that:
A lack of transparency on the part of the electricity companies makes it impossible to fully
determine the origin of coal used in the Netherlands to a greater degree of specificity than
the country level. Nevertheless, based partly on results of a request through the Dutch
Freedom of Information Act (WOB), SOMO was also able to identify some of the specific
mines that supply coal to the Netherlands. For example, at least 3.2 million tonnes of coal
from the Cerrejón mine in Colombia arrived at the Port of Amsterdam in 2010. This
represents approximately 24% of all the coal that arrived at the Port of Amsterdam in 2010.
SOMO also discovered that coal from the Drummond mine in Colombia was used in the
Netherlands in 2009-2011, imported almost exclusively through the Port of Rotterdam
(Wilde-Ramsing 2012-2013: 7).

Accountability efforts in Europe have enabled at different moments lines of
communication between environmental activists and coal corporations, allowing access to general
information about coal shipment and transportation. Another strategy used is to follow the ships
from the ports in Colombia to the ports in Europe. Although this does not give a definitive picture,
it helps activists to discriminate the distribution of coal in Europe by corporation, as well as provide
a sense of the amount exported from Colombia. Hence, if a ship departs from a Drummond port
and arrives in a port in Europe, at the very least anti-coal activists would be able to draw a line of
responsibility that might turn into different forms of political lobbying in the country.109 This
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In 2103, SOMO published a report specifically focusing in Italy. In that report, they were able to trace several
shipments in this way. It helped to organize specific forms of lobby that resulted, in 2016, with Italy deciding not to
buy coal from Colombia.
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information allows activists to ground their claims in something that seems tangible and that
creates a concrete relation between anti-coal groups in Colombia and Europe.
The lack of transparency in the coal chain is a global problem and not limited to Colombian
coal, as I will explain later. European and Colombian NGOs have a general and sometimes
intuitive sense of the circulation of coal. Whether it would be by following the shipments, because
the Colombian government provides gross numbers of exports or because corporations partially
disclose at a given moment their operations. Although they do not know exactly the amounts that
move to Europe, they do know that the headquarters of BhP-Billiton are in London; that Glencore´s
headquarters are in Switzerland; that Vattenfall, the Swedish corporation, buys coal from
Drummond and the Cerrejón conglomerate; that the port of Rotterdam receives coal from
Colombia and that the Netherlands has been one of its most important consumers. At these places,
there are solidarity groups with Colombia and anti-coal activists that are interested in Colombian
environmental conflicts, and that get a sense of how concrete this link is through the circulation of
cases and specific data.

Evidence as a political arrangement
Evidence of the links of coal extraction, circulation and consumption between Colombia
and Europe is especially important. It allows concrete connections and a shared standard in the
network (Grewal 2008), rather than exclusively moral claims about the Global North’s
responsibility on climate change and the looting of an abstract Global South. However, as shown
in chapter two, evidence is fragile, difficult to capture and permanently contested. For Grewal, the
shared standard -the codes, discourses, languages and stories about cases and objectives- allows
the network to be possible by creating a common ground for the coordination of activities, and the
making of specific claims by its nodes (Grewal 2008: 21). Therefore, the circulation of evidence,
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reports, documentaries, testimonies and other forms of data that are considered valid across the
network, help to maintain its transnational links, not only because the flow of information keeps
the network alive, but also because the network itself validates what otherwise is fragile and
contested data.
As Ballestero (2012; 2015) argues, the artifacts produced in environmental conflicts help
actors to position themselves in relation to the conflict at hand, as well as creating the transnational
connections and allies in order to pursue and achieve their desired objectives, While Ballestero is
mostly focused on the production and circulation of numbers as forms of data that make possible
alliances and actors to analyze of the political landscape in which the cases circulate -allowing to
know, for example, which actors could be allies by the way they use numbers-, the instability of
the Bruno requires the production of a coherent arrangement of data, and a solid network of
institutions, social movements and grassroots organizations that give legitimacy to the particular
arrangement for the presentation of the case.
Making a case means that the arrangement of the data defines the allies, its venues of
circulation, the elements highlighted and the possibilities of political intervention. But alliances
are contingent on the uses of the data, namely, on the connections that are established through
what the data says for different actors. Ballestero (2014) claims that numbers convey particular
meanings and contain a poetic quality that is translated by the actors, allowing them to ground
political and moral arguments based on what numbers say. Therefore, the multiple forms that the
Bruno case could take -from presenting the death of indigenous people to a question of the survival
of humanity as a whole- depend on contingent articulations of a myriad of interests, evidence and
material relations, in which certain qualities of the case emerge and others are obscured.
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But this quality, that allows a case to intervene at different sites, creates as well a paradox:
on the one hand, the strength of the case depends on the validation and authority of the evidence
by NGOs, grassroots activists and scholars; on the other, the case remains as a fragile artifact, at
least in the sense that the particular arrangements to make it possible at concrete locations could
dissipate or transform when discussions are settled or changed, cutting the ties that created the
importance of the case and the form it takes to a given moment and place.
The making of data such as the transnational circulation of coal or the numbers about water
use of Cerrejón requires tremendous labor and resources. It also needs the validation of other actors
and its effective use for political purposes. As explained in chapter two, Julio Fierro´s studies and
estimates are usually the data that activists in Colombia use to argue about the drastic differences
between Cerrejón´s water use and the generalized absence of water in Guajira. The Bruno case
relies extensively on the poetic idea that these numbers provide, as well as on the assertion of a
material responsibility at the nodes of the chain of value: On the one hand 24 million liters of water
used each day in a mine located in a semi-arid landscape (Fierro and Llorente 2014: 6), with
droughts that are massively killing children, cattle, plants and other forms of life; on the other, the
idea that these conflicts occur because European countries require a sustained supply of Colombian
coal to maintain their living standards.
When a case like the Bruno circulates out of Guajira to Bogotá and Europe, it does so by
moving through the material networks connected in the chain of value, and the solidarity networks
with Colombia and anti-coal activism. Although scholars who have studied environmental
movements have questioned the ways in which these movements have bound themselves to
restrictive notions of nature and therefore limited their own struggles and political objectives
(Gottlieb 2001; Di Chiro 2008), it could be argued that this is also true for those working in the
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field of human rights110.

Environmental activists from Colombia working on coal-related

conflicts, said to me that there were NGOs whose work was explicitly on human rights and political
violence related to the armed conflict, and that even if their cases were connected to such
experiences, they would rather concentrate on explicitly environmental aspects. Lawyers working
on environmental issues would reaffirm this position, and their decision was informed by the fact
the human rights field is saturated with NGOs, government institutions, aid agencies and scholars,
while the environmental field is not.
The standards that make possible the coordination of the actors of the network are
established by combining the material processes of coal extraction, the local political and
economic discussions they produce and the status that the actors give to nature at the moment in
which they interact with the case. It is through the ways in which actors elaborate the notion of
nature –its place in relation to violence and war, its political possibilities, its ontological qualitiesthat they establish the strongest connections and are able to conduct joint political projects. In the
case of Bruno, the data provided by NGOs and grassroots activists made it possible for activists in
Europe to intervene in discussions around their countries´ responsibility in climate change and the
policies for the reduction of CO2 emissions.
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Peasant, indigenous and Afro-Colombian organizations have publicly defined their own political projects around
a critique of the connections between nature as an object of appropriation and war. As has been established by several
authors, the shift towards an “environmentalization” of political struggles could be seen throughout Latin America
(Ascelrad 2010; Quimbayo 2018). In that transformation, organizations that previously were galvanized around the
defense of human rights that included the defense of the environment, increasingly became known as environmental
activists, and transformed their discourses and practices in the direction of environmental protection. In that
connection, conceptual elaborations that relocate the ontological status of nature and argue for that particular modes
of existence are grounded in territories. This argument has become particularly important as a political tactic, and it
has helped traditional networks of human rights to be involved with environmental activism.
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The hierarchies of death: armed conflict in Colombia, climate change in Europe
Living every day with the slow violence of coal extraction turns it into a mundane
experience that forces inhabitants to accommodate to its existence. Small towns and indigenous
reservations have grown used to the routine violence of explosions, coal dust and water scarcity as
much as to the presence of corporate negotiators, economic settlements and government disregard.
Legal cases rest at notarías and government institutions and are only shaken back to life when
scholars visit to take samples and conduct interviews, or when a lawyer travels to check any
unforeseen developments. The cases emerge at certain events, disrupting meetings with
antagonistic actors, visits of foreigners or extraordinary situations, making, in a particular setting,
extraordinary what has become mundane in the everyday –even if these events are increasingly
part of the routines of the actors.
Therefore, what otherwise has sank deeply into the ordinary -blending the everyday and
slow violence to the point of making the latter mundane and normalized, disrupts the quotidian
when the actors that help the circulation of the event of violence as a case interact with it. As
suggested in the previous chapter, this normalization that withers away the presence of conflict is
problematic for NGO activists in Bogotá, who struggled with the tensions emerging from their role
in the network of circulation of the case. It was common for them to consider that if they withdrew
from the region the existing disputes would fade away. Hence, even if they did not have projects
in the area, they kept trying to find ways to maintain a certain involvement and connection with
the persons and disputes in Guajira. But this effort led them to make comparisons between the
state of grassroots organizations in Guajira and other places where they were involved. In their
opinion, their presence in Guajira was a double-edged sword that kept environmental conflicts´
relevant while impeding grassroots organizing in the long run.
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In a Colombia that entered a phase of expected political transition out of half a century of
war, the interests of most political organizations, social movements, government institutions and
international actors were aligned with the possibilities of a future without war. In their scale of
priorities, the Bruno -and its considerations around environmental conflicts- was not on the top of
the list. President Juan Manuel Santos believed that extractivism would be able to finance the peace
accords. At least this was his idea in 2012, when the peace111 process started. His government
opened many fronts of exploration for mining projects throughout the country and considered the
expansion of the operation of already existing projects, such as those established in the Caribbean,
around coal. Santos repeatedly claimed that in the peace process the “modelo económico was not
negotiable,” by which he meant, among other things, that any debate around extractivism was off
the negotiating table.112 The results of this decision were particularly strong for environmental
conflicts, even more so for conflicts that took place in sites that were not particularly important for
the peace negotiations, such as Guajira.
In the geopolitical imagination of Colombian social movements, Guajira takes the form of
a peripheral region disconnected from “the center”, which is a term often used to describe places
like Bogotá, where most political and economic institutions are, and where most national debates
take place. Margarita Serje (2005) argues that the making of Colombia as a nation involved the
creation of a dichotomy between the center as civilized, modern and ordered, which was
challenged by its reverse: “no man´s” lands where savages, chaos and lawlessness thrive. Social
movements usually use the term “las regiones”, to speak about the geographies that Serje
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This plan changed to an extent when in 2014 the commodity prices declined. As mentioned in previous chapters,
Santos coined the the term “mining locomotive” as a way to articulate his idea of fully involving the country in the
global extractivist economy taking advantage of the commodities boom that had served other countries in the region.
112
The proliferation of mining projects transformed into the proliferation of conflicts, feeding illegal groups and
eventually redefining the conditions of violence in the country. However, between 2015 and 2017, these conflicts
were still considered as having less importance than the overall idea of a political transition resulting from peace
negotiations.
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describes as the reverse of the nation. The accepted assumption is that conflicts that occur in the
regions can only acquire importance when they are effectively discussed in the center.
The Bruno case circulates from Guajira to Europe via Bogotá. Although foreign visitors go
directly to Guajira to witness the effects of coal extraction, for the most part they are connected to
that department, its actors and organizations through NGOs located in the capital of Colombia.
The prevalence of Bogotá as the site where legal and political discussions are held, where NGOs
and aid agencies operate, reproduces the concerns of the actors involved. Since cases such as the
Bruno depend on legal rulings produced in Bogotá, as well as the networks of support that have as
an important node the capital city, those actors who have the resources to move back and forth
between Guajira and Bogotá not only have better access to the debates held around the case, but
also more control over the forms that the case takes.
As the case moves away from Guajira, those directly involved in the everyday conflicts of
water and coal, increasingly lose control over the qualities of the case that are highlighted, the
form that the case take and even the effects that it produces. Colombian NGOs and organizations
from Guajira are aware of this, and they try to find ways to have the case circulate with the people
that it affects. This is not an easy endeavor, for it requires resources that these activists usually do
not have. Nevertheless, the NGOs I worked with tried to invite activists from Guajira to events in
Bogotá in which the Bruno case would or could be discussed; similarly, they organized rallies,
meetings and public performances in Bogotá that complemented the making of legal actions.

Forces of attraction
In one occasion, CCAJAR prepared a legal action (tutela) against the diversion of the
Bruno, supported by 35,000 signatures collected via www.change.org. The event was filmed by
the office of communications of CCAJAR, and they set it up to make it look as if Arregoces were
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walking from Guajira, followed by dozens of Wayuus in order to deliver the box with signatures
to the Supreme Court. On a different occasion and almost ten months later, a rally was organized
with the idea of bringing the Bruno to Bogotá. On this occasion, several Guajira leaders traveled
to the capital city with water from the Bruno in a clay jar. As they walked in downtown Bogotá to
the Constitutional Court, they invited people to drink from the Bruno, presenting an idea of the
purity of water and its importance for life in the region.
These public actions were combined with other events, like conference presentations,
interviews or visits to universities, NGOs and social movements’ headquarters. They had three
main objectives with regard the presence of people from Guajira: First, to guarantee that the
circulation of the case would be explicitly related with the lives of the people experiencing it;
second, to build capacities of leadership as a way to transfer the responsibilities from the NGOs
experts to the grassroots activists; three, and as explained in the previous chapter, to move away
from the realm of legality as the privileged site of political action, and therefore to guarantee that
leaders and grassroots organizations could control the terms in which the case becomes in the
public sphere.
However, it was clear for all the actors involved that at a national level, emerging conflicts
around gold in other parts of the country were significantly more relevant than the Bruno, because
of their location, ties to illegal activities and armed groups. For those interested in extractivism,
gold extraction practices were clearly feeding illegal armed groups, and creating conflicts with
small scale artisanal mining. The relation between gold extraction and war seemed to be more
urgent, transparent and relevant than coal extraction, which was mostly legal, regulated and not
currently related to the armed conflict.
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Thus, the Bruno in Bogotá seemed marginal compared to other economic practices that
could be tied to the conflict/post-conflict axis. The global commodities boom meant a spike in the
price of minerals, including gold and coal (Svampa 2012a; 2012b, Gudynas 2009; Baud, de Castro,
Hogenboom 2016). But unlike coal, gold is highly unregulated in its practice of extraction in
Colombia. This allowed multinational corporations, artisanal forms of peasant mining and illegal
armed groups to coexist and compete for gold extraction. Illegal armies turned to extractivism to
finance their own projects, making the regulation of gold mining one of the key state priorities
with regard extractivism.
Many contemporary conversations have argued for a different understanding of the
ontological status of the environment, in order to create alternative ways of human and non-human
existence in the world. In Colombia, the Constitutional Court had ruled in favor of considering
the Atrato River a subject of rights,113 which is a decision influenced by these debates. But their
effect is marginal, and the central discussion about peace had expulsed the environment, retreating
to a conceptualization that reproduced long-term ideas of nature as a radically different field from
human society.
The result was that even if social movements, aid agencies, NGOs or government
representatives believed that this dichotomy between nature and society was not helpful to deal
with the effects of war and the environment, the overwhelming relevance of armed-conflict related
violence kept pushing environmental violence to the margins of political concerns, creating a set
of institutional, political and epistemic practices that kept these offices subordinated to those
focused on human rights in relation to armed conflict.
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The Constitutional Court, in its T-622 ruling of 2016, recognized the Atrato River as a subject of rights.
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Without losing sight of the importance that armed conflict had in Colombia, some
European aid agencies – from Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands-, as well as grassroots
collectives in those countries and the UK had been increasingly interested in supporting projects
that were explicitly related to coal extraction and the role of Colombia in the global market of that
mineral.
The different organizations had interests that depended on the particular debates that their
countries were having and the corporations that exported coal to their countries. For more than two
decades, these countries had been major importers of Colombian coal, or had a different roles in
the chain of value of coal. During my fieldwork there were four NGOs from Germany with
different levels of involvement operating in Colombia: FESCOL, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Rosa
Luxemburg and AGN; one from the Netherlands, PAX-Netherlands; and one from Sweden,
Forum-Syd.114 There were also multiple NGOs based in these European countries that were
involved with Colombia and coal related issues, but that did not have enough resources -or the
need- to travel to Colombia.115
The debates in Europe around climate change had increased significantly in the last decade.
More importantly, these debates had led to the recognition of the importance of a process to
transition out of coal use. Germany, UK and Netherlands are at the forefront of this process. It is
not surprising that they discuss the economic and political effects that such transition would have,
paying attention to the different nodes of the chain of value.
Interestingly, the closing of coal mines in Europe boosts coal imports, as is the case with
Germany. This problem speaks directly to what have been defined as environmental load
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There were other NGOs and aid agencies, but these were actively involved in the discussions related to this
research. I will expand on each organization later in the chapter.
115
I will discuss their role and implications later in this chapter.
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displacement: the process through which the required input to sustain economic growth in core
economy countries is transferred to periphery producers, creating profound forms of unequal
exchange and deepening environmental effects. Hornborg describe two different analysis of global
development: the first, which he calls cornucopia, has at its core the assumption that economic
growth at the core of capitalism benefits the peripheries. In turn, the argument of environmental
displacement presupposes that the transferring of the load to peripheries will help their economies.
The second states that the economic growth at the core has detrimental effects at the peripheries
(Hornborg 2009: 245). He articulates a critique of the conceptual apparatus around climate change,
focusing on those that refuse to engage with the global unequal practices of exchange that favors
the continuous and undisputed reproduction of capitalist accumulation at the core. Instead, he
argues, this position denounces the ecological crisis focusing on aspects such as consumption and
transportation, advocating for clean energy but never addressing the problem of unequal exchange
and its effects (Hornborg 2009: 246).

The sense of a changing climate
In Germany, after a long history of debates around the diversification of its energy matrix,
the country decided to embark on a big national plan to shift to renewable energy sources.
Although the history of this transition could be traced back to the late 1960´s (Renn and Marshall
2016), it is around 15 years ago that Germany seems to fully commit to such a project, often
defined with the term “Energiewende”. Germany increasingly positioned itself as one of the
leading countries of the energy transition to renewable energy, conducting a process that involved
slowly reducing coal imports, closing German mines, rejecting nuclear energy and expanding the
use of renewable energies. The process, which was highly promoted worldwide –and therefore
includes YouTube videos, brochures, reports, and other forms of public propaganda- involves the
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promise of a sustainable energy transition that would not hamper levels of production and
accumulation of wealth, and therefore would not jeopardize the living standards of Germans, nor
capitalism as a whole.116
The decision for a transition was particularly praised during the 21st Conference of the
Parties (COP 21) meeting in Paris, when the debate was centered around the imperative of
combating anthropogenic climate change, and the search for a global agreement in that regard.
Likewise, in the 2017 COP 23 meeting, 46 countries became part of the Powering Past Coal
Alliance, in which countries committed to create strategies to phase out coal use. Beyond the
many faces of that discussion117, the idea that a global economic power like Germany was making
the effort towards such a transition important. The plan, as the New York Times reminds us,
“helped earn [Chancellor] Ms. Angela Merkel international admiration and the moniker of “the
climate Chancellor” (NYT, Oct 10, 2018). However, and in spite the global applause for this
decision, the “Energiewende” faced tremendous challenges, leading not only to a myriad of
questions in Germany around how effective, sustainable and possible the transition plan actually
was, but also to a scrutiny of the uses of coal in the country.
According to Renn and Marshall, since 2010 domestic coal and lignite production has
remained static, while nuclear energy decreased, and renewables spiked (Renn and Marshall, 2016:
225). But domestic prices of electricity increased, while job concerns for those that were part of
the labor transition became an increasing unresolved question. Longstanding concerns about
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Among the many studies explaining this transition process as smooth and lacking conflicts or dangers, is the
report presented by Agora-Energiewende “Understanding Energiewende” in 2015, a think tank based in Berlin
dedicated to the promotion of this policy. In this study, the authors aim to explain as clear as possible for a noninitiated reader the overall project, and through it they try to show the public that the transition does not mean a risk
for the standards of living of the country.
117
The COP 21 agreement required that countries define their contribution to combat climate change by establishing
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) as a form to address the differentiated responsibilities and capacities of
national economies. However, NDC are still very debated by several countries, as the compromises seem still to be
unable to address global forms of inequality (Bretschger 2016; Hohne et al. 2017; Northrop et al. 2016)
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energy security, as well as concepts such as energy poverty and the speed of technological changes
to materialize the transition without risking energy requirements became central issues of debate
in Germany (Fischer et al. 2016). Moreover, the public international image of a country committed
to CO2 reductions was jeopardized as media outlets in different parts of the world started to pay
attention to the fact that the progressive closure of coal mines in Germany did not mean the end of
coal use.
Energiewende is a contested process, with many challenges at hand and no clear and
definitive short-term solution. Moreover, beyond the expectations in Germany of a smooth
transition with little impact, European activists increasingly started to consider that energy
transitions required to understand the impact, not only in the consumer side of coal, but throughout
the value chain.118 The energy transition brings the question of the country´s stability in the
process, and as it has been reported by news throughout the world, it requires the use of coal either
as a reserve or as part of the transition itself. In light of this discussion, German NGOs and aid
agencies committed themselves to a political intervention that could further the objectives of
ceasing coal use, guaranteeing an energy transition and committing to the CO2 reductions.
Colombian NGOs who had struggled with acquiring funding and attention for their
projects, found allies in FESCOL, Rose Luxemburg Foundation, Heinrich Böll Foundation,
MISERIOR and AGH. These organizations all have differing political positions. The first three
are think tanks from different political parties in Germany, and their work mixes financing NGOs
and grassroots groups while producing policy papers, conferences and reports on the issues of their
interest. The second group consists of foundations that receive funding from many different
sources of civil society. MISERIOR has funded many anti-extractivist projects throughout Latin-
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Interview with and NGO representative, Berlin August 2017.
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America, even bolstering transnational collaborations between lawyers in the hemisphere, while
AGH funded several NGOs part of this research and provided personnel who would support the
work conducted by them.
Their support, which existed before and beyond the Bruno case, proved of great importance
for the circulation of the case. The activists I worked with were very careful with the relations that
they would establish with each organization, having internal meetings and analysis of their
practices, networks and intentions. Hence, they would accept very specific alliances, or accept
certain invitations but not others, mostly as a result of the analysis of the political interests of these
international organizations. However, in a context in which coal-related debates were not taken
into consideration in Colombia, and given the interests of these German NGOs, they recognized
that establishing a stable relation was necessary.
But Germany was not the only place of interest. In the UK, a grassroots collective known
as London Mining Network (LMN) had established an important relation with Colombian
organizations. Probably because this organization is considered to be largely grassroots,
Colombian activists were less suspicious of its activities and interests. LMN has been interested in
Colombia for a long time, and it has access to the annual BHP-Billiton shareholder´s meeting
celebrated every year in October in London. For this meeting, LMN usually organizes a weeklong visit of Colombian activists, in which one of the mandatory stops is the shareholders’ meeting.
Like Germany, the UK has entered a project of energy transition that involves closing local
mines, CO2 emissions reduction and eventually ending coal use. Although its process has not been
as promoted as Germany´s, it has also faced similar concerns, with coal unions fiercely opposing
the coal-transition plans, raising the question of who will bear the costs of energy transition, as
well as concerns about energy poverty and overall energy stability. However, the presence of BhP-
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Billiton in London gives the work of organizations like LMN the sense of a possibility of
interaction that others would not have.

Caring for Life: Climate change, coal politics and political futures
European organizations move between a sense of solidarity, political sympathy and
pragmatic interests, which make their relations with Colombian organizations turbulent at times.
When Samuel Arregocés and Jaqueline Epiayú were invited to Germany in the summer of 2017,
Catalina Caro – the person in charge of the office on extractivism at CENSAT- was also invited
with them to a visit that would end in the anti-G20 demonstrations in Hamburg. Assembling a
group to visit Europe or the U.S. often follows a similar procedure: one or two people from the
comunidades,119 who can provide a testimony of a given experience, and an expert from the world
of NGOs or academia, who would present a thorough and structured analysis, situating testimonies
in formal analysis of economics, environmental conflicts, politics and history.
Colombian activists are used to these kinds of arrangements, and consider that this strategy
has undesired political effects. Although it is an effective way of presenting the different aspects
of coal-related conflicts, by defining the position of the actors in this way a distinction between
the experts and the communities is created. The latter are situated as testimonio, presenting their
experience unfiltered from analysis, with their narratives validated by the idea that their experience
is pure and presented as the closest thing to a pristine and undisputable portrayal of a particular
situation. The former filters the testimony, translate the experiences in histories of dispossession,
institutional policies, economic disputes and legal transformations to favor corporations. While the
representatives of the comunidades speak from a knowledge validated by their position of
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difference, by the undisputable sacredness of their experience and identity (Sommers 1999), the
expert projects the authority of scientific knowledge, presenting a rationally organized argument,
backed by maps, numbers and citations to bring a certain kind of authority to the presentation.
Testimonio as a genre is a highly debated subject in Latin America, and is not my intention
to intervene in that discussion (cf. Beverley 2004). It suffices to say that it has been an effective
tool for the circulation of experiences of violence in contexts of fierce political repression and, as
such, it has become a common technique used by human rights organizations to achieve their
objectives. The combination of the testimonio as experience with the structural analysis of the
expert aimed to create a complete picture of the conflict. While the strategy proves effective, it
fixes the positions of the persons invited to the narrow expectations of European audiences. Under
this organization of the group that traveled, the participants also arrange their presentations,
collaborating in the general objective of presenting the situation of Guajira and emphasizing
concrete conflicts.
Hence, Arregoces, Caro and Epiayu prepared their interventions aiming to build on each
other´s narratives. They tried to appeal to the particular audiences that they speak to and the sites
in which they talk. During their tour in Germany, the group visited coal unions, towns historically
tied to coal, NGOs, and environmental activists for a period of two weeks. As Caro said to me,
they did not significantly change the presentation, mostly maintaining an order in which Caro
would provide a power point presentation that explained Cerrejón´s activities in Colombia, its
environmental effects and the relation between coal extraction in Colombia and its consumption
in Europe, while Epiayú and Aregocés focused on the lives of communities and the ways in which
environmental violence put them at risk.
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As time passed by, they said, they became used to the repetition of the performance, as
well as recurrence of the same audience questions, which mostly revolved around Germany´s
responsibility and possibilities of international solidarity. Probably because of this repetition of
presentations, conversations and questions, the group sometimes felt uncomfortable. The roles in
which they were situated increasingly felt asphyxiating, and the performance rendered evident that
the positions of authority of the communidades-as-testimonio and the expert´s structural analysis
created a double movement: first, a sense of objectification of the experience, for the group
occasionally felt itself as a representation of the ways in which Europeans imagined the Global
South; second, they considered that the political interests of Colombian organizations were being
increasingly downplayed, in order to put forward an argument that used the Colombian experience
to speak about a different but related issue.
Hornborng´s critique of the generalized refusal to engage with the effects of unequal
exchange speaks to this, albeit in more subtle ways. The concern over climate change as a process
caused by “humanity” creates an abstraction that dilutes responsibility in an abstract notion of the
human. This problem has been also addressed by multiple scholars, who have shed light on how
the industrial revolution and the global expansion of capitalism played a major role in the current
ecological crisis. Malm (2016) has shown how the shift from steam to coal as main energy input
on machines had a nefarious effect on CO2 emissions, with effects that cannot be erased even as
European countries decide to phase out of coal in the present. Others, engaging with the
contemporary debates on the Anthropocene, have coined the alternative Capitalocene, in an
attempt to resituate the terms of the discussion into concrete material histories (Moore 2017).
As the Bruno case becomes an example of a human experience within climate change, it
loses its geo-historical force and become one more event in the myriad of ecologic violence for
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the purposes of having an effect in what Hornborg defines as a core economy. Although there is
no denial that German activists recognize and value the historical specificities of Guajira, the fact
that they seek to intervene in a German debate about consumption and responsibility creates a
sense of dislocation where the interests of Colombian activists are not always acknowledged.
In Ticktin´s study of refugees struggles in Europe, she notes a transition from a political
understanding of the refugee to a humanitarian definition, that strips history and politics from the
bodies and turns them into bare humans that need to be saved (Ticktin 2011). The dehistorization
and depolitization creates an abstraction of humanity, not very different from that occurring when
the Bruno is summoned as a concern of human existence, dislocating its relevance, historicity and
the particularities of environmental violence in Colombia to interpolate European moral
sensibilities.
Caro told me that they unexpectedly learned that coal extraction also had nefarious effects
for workers and towns throughout its existence in Germany. This discovery was surprising to them,
and as they visited towns and talked to persons with different health problems resulting from their
proximity to coal use, at moments they found a certain kind of transnational connection that went
beyond the sensation of being scrutinized by European audiences. Nonetheless, the repetition of
events, speeches and stories, slowly unearthed an uneasy consideration that was difficult to
address, or that was not discussed by the visiting group. There was a sensation of being used by
European groups, who in all their solidarity, care and thoughtfulness about European-Latin
American relations, seemed to be constantly failing to understand the political interests of the
group of Colombians visiting Germany.
For the Colombian activists visiting Germany there seemed to be moments when the
political discussions furthered by the supporting NGOs would stop short, for certain debates were
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not as important for European audiences. Colombian activists presented their arguments around
three elements: first, the increasing impossibility of producing and reproducing life; second, the
political economy of extractivist practices and the position of subordination of Colombian
economies and lives, which impeded the full development of communities in their territorios.
Third, the need for a radical transformation of the modelo económico, as the only real possibility
to change the conditions that reproduce extractivism and the need for cheap energy in the form of
coal. These points are the result of ongoing debates in anti-extractivist networks in Colombia, and
it could be argued that they constitute the political stance of those involved in anti-extractivist
movements in the country.
The argument is not new, and it is informed by Latin American scholars and social
movements who have developed similar critiques in extractivist countries like Ecuador, Bolivia,
Chile or Brazil (Albuja y Davalos 2013; Gudynas 2011; Vanhulst 2015). It is important to notice
that the term modelo económico is ambiguous in itself. As described before, it is used by different
actors to point out to many different things. During the peace negotiations, Santos mentioned that
the modelo económico was not part of the discussion because there was a widespread fear —
bolstered by the right — that they would result in some sort of communist agenda that would turn
Colombia into Venezuela.120 But at the same time, it made clear that Colombia´s extractivist
policies were out of the debate. The term is also used by social movements, and it usually refers
to economic policies enacted by a government and the idea that these policies make a structured
economic project. Sometimes, the term is also used to refer to capitalism as a mode of production
and to neoliberalism as a particular moment of capitalism.
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Although this is not part of the research, it is worth to point out that the actual term was “castrochavismo”.

197

In the context of its presentation in Europe, modelo económico is equated to extractivism
as a model of re-primarization of Latin American economies that, among other things, situate them
as providers of raw materials, reproduce dependency and neutralize their proper economic
development. By asserting that extractivism was a concrete economic practice with transnational
responsibilities of governments, corporations and consumers, Colombian activists aimed to render
visible a global political economy of coal that creates a condition of structural subordination of
exporting countries and the shared responsibility of the precarious conditions of people in places
Colombia.
The introduction of the modelo económico has three objectives: first, it suggests that the
conditions of precarity of people in Guajira are historically grounded in decades of extraction of
coal that have destroyed the environment in irreversible ways. These effects cannot be resolved by
unilateral decisions of importing countries and the argument follows, an energy transition in
Germany will not guarantee that the environmental violence and its effects would be transformed
as well in Colombia. In that regard, the modelo económico debate aims to argue that importing
countries that are currently considering phasing out of coal, must take Colombia in consideration
when laying out their energy transition plans. Second, it highlights territory-based political projects
that could be considered alternatives to existing economic practices, largely aligned with what
Latin American scholars have articulated in terms of post-development possibilities that exist as
material alternatives to contemporary capitalism. Finally, it points to the transnational
responsibility of global activism in undermining economic practices that are reproduced as the
result of the global chain of value.
Arregocés and Epiayú describe a pre-coal past as defined by common access to water and
inter-ethnic market relations that sustained communities throughout Guajira, presenting the
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creation of the mine as a major disruption of otherwise stable relations between human groups and
with the environment. This idealization of the past is a common tactic of social movements that
allows them to present with clarity specific critiques of the contemporary. The idyllic past before
Cerrejón, in the form of a testimonio from the communities is the desired future that cannot be, as
coal extraction has guaranteed that life in the areas where it operates cannot be possible in the same
way again.
In this story, Epiayu spoke about the historical and cultural importance that water has for
Wayuus, emphasizing not only that it is central for their subsistence, but also for their cultural
reproduction121, for “it is the place where our ancestors live”. This argument was carried at every
single instance were the Bruno was discussed, both in Colombia and Europe, and was reinforced
by the experts of ICAHN122 invited to provide a concepto for the Colombian Constitutional Court
to rule on the matter. In that way, Epiayú would portray a difference that was very difficult to
contest, for it referred to a form of alterity that is defined by the relation of an ethnic group to water
and that is presented as escaping European sensibilities. Certainly, the idea that extractivism was
a direct threat to the “material and immaterial” realms of Wayuús was tremendously powerful, and
even if Epiayú delivered her story with little context, the image was powerful enough to create a
space of indisputability of her claims, a sense that her word produced a field that could not be
contested, only witnessed from the outside.
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As mentioned before, the idea of cultural reproduction has a very specific meaning within legal-political disputes
of indigenous people in Colombia. In 2009, the Constitutional Court ruled that there were 38 indigenous groups at
risk of “cultural and physical extinction”, and that it was imperative for the Colombian state to find ways to protect
them. Among the reasons for this risk were the multiple modalities of violence resulting from war, as well as the
proliferation of massive extractivist projects close to indigenous reservations. The legal validation of a longstanding
political demand by indigenous communities, made of this argument significantly potent and of widespread use.
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Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia (National Institute of Anthropology and History), a small
institution in charge of preserving material and immaterial culture of the country. As it has an official recognition, it
is often called on by other state institutions to provide analysis of conflicts related to indigenous communities.
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Although this sacralization came from the way in Epiayú produced a sense of difference
and radical alterity, playing with the expectations of media, bystanders and the crowd. During one
of the many rallies at the Anti-G20 demonstrations, Epiayú wore traditional Wayuú clothing, being
the only indigenous person in an ocean of white bodies dancing to electronic music as a form of
resistance. She was being filmed for one of the many news outlets that followed the Colombian
activists, and her sense of pride shone brightly in the way she carried herself through the march.
But even if the recognition of the importance of Wayuus was one of her goals, she positioned
herself as one of the people whose possibilities of existing were under threat by coal extraction.
As she would later tell me after a few beers, “I know that in this visit I play a part, and that the
Bruno diversion affects not only Wayuús, but life in la Guajira. But Cerrejón is massive, and is
killing everything. So I use my culture, because that is the place where I can talk about. But I learnt
that this is not a problem only of Wayuus, but of the economic model.”123
In different ways, the nostalgia for an idyllic past -as an expectation of a future that will
not be-, and the public performance of an ethnic identity are effective techniques through which
Arregocés and Epiayú articulate a critique of the modelo económico stemming from, in their own
words, the territorios. Furthermore, the critique of the modelo economico is the continuation of
the struggle that these activists have in Colombia to claim the political importance of extractivism
and the status of nature. While Epiayú and Arregocés unfold their critique through the assertion of
a territory-based alternative, Caro speaks not only about energy transition, but a political economy
that articulates two regions of the world through the circulation of a commodity.
The modelo económico is a way to speak about the political and economic processes that
coal requires in order to be conducted, and as a term it captures the different threats to life in
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Informal conversation with Jacqueline Epiayú, Hamburg. August 2017
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Guajira and larger political projects of emancipation that are still present in the political agendas
of these movements. However, even if activists from Germany agree that this is a fundamental
issue, their interaction with a case like the Bruno is defined by very pragmatic considerations,
specifically by the ways that they can use the information that the case provides in order to
intervene in parliamentary discussions in their country.
There is a difference between small NGOs based in Berlin and Hamburg, which might
conduct short trips to Colombia, or that are connected to those in Colombia, and bigger aid
agencies and think tanks that fund projects and hemispheric initiatives around extractivism .124 As
the member of one small NGO told me in Berlin, there is a division of labor in which those with
access to the cases would gather the information that is later used by these smaller NGOs to lobby,
as well as put public pressure on the parliament and corporations in Germany.
Having experienced the importance of the support of German organizations in Colombia,
it was surprising for me when, during my visit to Berlin, one member of a small NGO told me that
he really did not know much about Colombia, that their relation with the country was particularly
random and that it was largely defined by the problem of transparency. From his point of view,
Colombia offered clear data about environmental violence -and political violence- that was
important for their claim around the need for phasing out of coal as a global responsibility of
Germany.
The reason was simple: Russia, China, Turkey and even Poland as coal economies were
significantly more obscure with their policies, and it is next to impossible to access information
about their practices in relation to coal extraction and circulation. On the contrary, Colombia´s
coal extraction is documented, even if the data is contested, refuted, and unstable. From this point
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of view, the idea that Colombian cases work as the standard that make possible the transnational
coordination of the actors makes more sense. But their relevance is defined by timely urgencies
geo-historically located and concerns over transparency, accountability and evidence.
This position, which according to the European activists comes from the utmost respect
towards Colombian self-determination -and in a larger sense the question of not reproducing
colonialist tropes-, presupposes that, along the transnational value chain, political responsibilities
of intervention have to be localized in specific nodes. Therefore, for German NGOs their
responsibility with Colombian struggles is to intervene in the German parliament, to influence the
German public, and position the problem of the global effects of coal use in Germany, by using
the cases that are available to them. In this way, they can be more effective in their attempt to stop
using coal, which ultimately might impact both Colombia and European countries. The turbulent
context of Colombian politics is not relevant for their purposes. The complications deriving from
the armed conflict are not relevant, the peace process and the questions of post-conflict are
secondary, for these can even harm the overall strategy.
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Conclusion
Multiple death, multiple fractures.
A future without coal. A future of life in the devastation of coal extraction. A future imagined as
uncertainty, sometimes through apocalyptic landscapes, with that beige colour of dry clay mixed
with black dust, with the soil cracked and the trees dried. A future of carcasses in the road, of
cattle and humans dying of dehydration. A future of once upon a time workers, trained in the coal
industry now roaming towns, hoping for new endeavours to be part of. Workers walking over the
bones of other workers, murdered for this imagined present of impossibility. A future of restored
ecosystems, of pristine nature reborn after the exhaustion of coal. Of workers re-trained in new
industries after forty years of extractivism, thriving in the new energy economy. Of redistribution
of wealth and sustainability. A future of an untainted earth, blooming back again. A future of
modern roads, with top technology embedded in the lives of towns and public places, with big
investments materialized in the regions, redefining them forever.

The future of coal is a blurred photograph in which the spectator can infer certain patterns,
ideas and colors. She can even guess the subjects and a sense of the place where the photograph
was taken. But the picture is never completed, never fully realized, and a sense of frustration and
possibility defines it. It is a future suspended, with no clear direction and only strokes of light
signaling the options. In Europe and the U.S -and more and more in Colombia- the future is
increasingly imagined without coal. As mentioned in previous chapters, this means a massive
transformation at a global scale, an energy transition that requires efforts that have not yet been
reached.
The policy decisions about energy transitions in Europe have impacted Colombia.
Companies and social movements alike are discussing what that would mean, even if it is not one
of their top priorities. But the numbers around coal are unclear, sometimes claiming a reduction of
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coal exports and labor, sometimes discussing how these changes have opened new markets in
countries such as Turkey, Russia, India and China125.
Coal holds in itself the forces of life and death. For more than two centuries coal was the
promise of material change, of a process of civilization that required the energy it contained to be
unleashed into the world (Leslie 2006, Huber 2013). The Colombian governments and
transnational corporations promote coal extraction in that light, and the promise reverberated in
the lives of towns and villages across the mining complex in the Caribbean. The mineral is also
the holder of death, both in the apocalyptic concerns of CO2 emissions as the limits of existence
that have become pervasive all around the world, and in its material presence throughout sites such
as the Colombian Caribbean region.
The ways in which death emanates from coal are at the center of the question for the future.
In Colombia, the practices that organized the value of death by situating at the center a notion of
violence related to the armed conflict have created the sense that the urgency of environmental
destruction is secondary. But environmental activists have been increasingly trying to rethink the
relation between modes of violence, death and the possibilities of life (Savino 2016Pineda and
Moncada 2018; Riofrancos 2017). Similarly, the question of how to consider war in relation to the
environment, and the formations of violence and coal are becoming part of the agendas of NGOs,
social movements, activists and scholars alike (Rahder 2015; Hetherington 2013). However, their
attempts are constantly challenged by the practices and institutions that reproduce explicitly
dichotomies between nature and humanity. What follows is an attempt to present how these
developments are taking place, by presenting a number of events in which different actors gathered
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According to the National Mining Agency, in 2016 Colombia exported 90 million tons of coal. This number was
reduced in 2018, with around 82 million. However, since according to the agency 80% of the GDP in mining comes
from coal, there is no clear intention of reduction, but rather of expansion. Since this intention conflicts with the
global claim of an energy transition, the numbers and intentions change at different venues of discussion.
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around to consider the role of coal, not as a separate realm from other aspects of violence, but as
at the core of the unravelling of the making of the country through violence. My argument is that
in spite of the global concerns and claims about the urgency to stop the use of coal, or the analysis
made by scholars about alternative ontologies of nature and radical discourses of extractivism, the
future of coal is anything but sealed. Beyond the constant blockages at global conferences such as
the G20, the different COPs, or the countries´ arguments about how a transition out of coal would
undermine development and growth the actors that are involved in anti-coal activism face
considerable obstacles in articulating political projects that address environmental violence with
violence resulting from war in a way that substantially transforms political interests, sites of action
and the making of viable cases for legal and political purposes (Ciplet and Roberts 2019; Vanhala
and Hestbaek 2016; Antto, Mulugetta and Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2011).

The present of duress
In this research I made the decision of avoiding speculative theory or the more current
theoretical work that has questioned the divide between nature and society. In fact, what I present
are the ways in which in spite of all the novelty and relevance of that academic and artistic
production, this divide is maintained and reproduced within the transnational networks of anti-coal
and human rights activism; not only by corporations or states, but by activists, social movements
and NGOs that are aware of the limitations of the divide. Even in countries such as Bolivia and
Ecuador, pioneers in the creation of legal frameworks aimed to shift the ontological status of
nature, the divide has not only persisted, but has served economic-political projects resulting in
many conflicts.
My focus in the study of these two cases deals with the space of uncertainty that the cases
inhabit, not because lack of knowledge of contemporary debates around the status of the

205

environment, but because the historical formation of the discourses, practices and institutions in
which the cases circulate. In this investigation, I have showed the ways in which the attempts to
assemble cases to circulate within these networks, are constantly faced with the political, economic
and geographically situated concerns that limit or neutralize the possibilities of a disruptive
intervention that could redefine the terms in which the fields of coal and human rights activism
operate.
But in the same way that I decided not to choose the cases before starting my fieldwork, I
do not want to create a conclusion that has the sense of an end. These cases gravitate in their own
space of impossibility, the inhabit uncertainty because they cannot fully fit established frameworks
of legality or NGOs neatly defined agendas. They continue to create conflicts, disputes and legal
resolutions in Europe and Colombia, in unending waves that do not end with this research
The Bruno dispute began while Cerrejón was building the new riverbed of Bruno, and
could not continue its construction because the legal action initiated by the the NGOs and
communities. However, in 2019 after a long rain period, the Bruno creek rose beyond its original
path, and jumped into the one built by Cerrejón. The Constitutional Court had ruled against the
diversion, but several bureaucratic obstacles delayed the notification of the decision to Cerrejón.
According to members of CENSAT and CCAJAR, it seemed that the conglomerate was buying
time, hoping for this result. But the fact that the Bruno made the decision by itself did not stop the
conflict. While writing these lines, more rulings and counter rulings continue to appear, with
Cerrejón showing the benefits of the diversion while the NGOs and indigenous communities keep
campaigning to force the Bruno to return to its original path.
In the same year, the legal transitional system (JEP) decided to accept the inclusion of one of the
perpetrators of the murder of Valdemoré and Orcasitas in their legal system. However, they did
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not accept the case of the union leaders. While the intellectual perpetrator of the murder was
accepted for his recognized ties to paramilitarism in Cesár, the murder of the union leaders is still
considered to exist in a grey area. Coal companies, as being third parties, are not demanded to be
part of the transitional justice and the murder of the union leaders is not fully defined as part of the
armed conflict, and thus it is still under consideration.
Thus, this conclusion is a composite of images of uncertainty. In what follows I will present
three situations in which corporations, social movements and NGOs have tried to make sense of
the uncertain future of coal, trying to re-calibrate their own political projects vis-à-vis coal
transition and war and post-conflict scenarios. I describe uncertainty as the state in which these
actors are currently living and creating. I refrain myself from suggesting that alternative
epistemologies to analyze environmental violence and war are already in place, and instead I
explain how the limits of the institutional and political frameworks to capture violence in war and
environmental degradation clash with the attempts of these actors to create new possibilities of
thinking coal, war and violence.

Corporate flows of violence
Coal companies -but in a broader sense the extractivist sector- move between this sense of
despair and promise while accusing the Colombian government of being unfair to them. They have
coined the term legal insecurity to capture how the government made a promise to support and
encourage foreign investment, but that later was paralyzed because of the work done by grassroots
organizations, politicians, scholars, NGOs and several institutions. Even the Contraloría General
de la Nación published an extensive four-volume report on the dangers of mining in Colombia
(Garay et al. 2013). Companies would sign a contract with the state to explore the possibilities of
mineral extraction, or even for a definitive concession, which would later be stalled. From the
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point of view of these companies, the process of extraction - which requires a phase of exploration
before setting up mining infrastructure- requires large investments to which the Colombian
government cannot guarantee a return.
For the government and the corporations, the reason for this legal insecurity is the
proliferation of grassroots organizations throughout the country that have fiercely stood their
ground against extractivism. These movements have mostly articulated around gold extraction
projects, using a legal actions like consulta popular126 and tutela, to vote against the national and
local governments’ decisions to allow exploration and extraction. Although the Constitutional
Court put an end to the use of this mechanism in 2018127, the idea that grassroots organizations
had been able to stop massive investments throughout the country was a major reason for concern
in the corporate world, and thus different companies tried to sue the government for not holding
up their end of the contract128.
Meanwhile, Cerrejón is supposed to end its operations in 2034. On their website it is
possible to read the plan to close the mine, which in their own account is already in place129. It has
to plan ahead, for recovering the land from decades of extraction of millions of tons of coal requires
an intensive process of reforestation and rebuilding of the ecology. This ongoing process is one of
the things that Cerrejón seems to be most proud of, constantly presenting to the public how, in
spite of having the largest open-pit coal mine in the continent, they carefully rebuild every inch of
the environment touched by the extractivist industry. In fact, one of the claims made by Cerrejón
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Popular Consultation was created by the 1991 constitution. It allows civil society to vote on matters of public
relevance, and became the most important mechanism throughout the country to make decisions with regards
extractivist projects. The first one was conducted in Tolima in 2013, and since then it has become increasingly
popular. By 2018 there were 54 planned popular consultations, all of them related to energy-related projects.
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“Fallo contra Consultas da seguridad a Minería y Petróleo: Gobierno” Newspaper El tiempo, October 23 2018.
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In 2017, Toby Mining, a Corporation from Canada, sued the Colombian government after a peasant filed a tutela
that ruled against the exploration inside a natural park. Galway Gold, Eco OR and Red Eagle, all Canadian, sued the
Colombian government in 2018 for the same reasons.
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Cerrejón. “Cierre de mina”. September 2020.
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when presenting the diversion plans of the Bruno Creek, was that the new route mirrored the shape
of the original, and in the making of this shape they were guaranteeing that the ecosystems that
depended on the creek would remain unthreatened. Certainly, Cerrejón does not miss the
opportunity to present their efforts for reconstruction and best practices. From the tours they
conduct to visit the mine to public events and meetings at their headquarters, Cerrejón tries to
make sure that those who interact with them know that they are restoring the devastated landscape.
Drummond had been flirting with the idea of selling its assets in Colombia130. As
mentioned repeatedly, Drummond has maintained a policy of closed doors that makes activists
and scholars highly suspicious of their activities and decisions. But as the company keeps getting
fined by the Colombian state for different kinds of malpractice — from delaying union
negotiations, clandestine coal dumping into the Caribbean sea to the accusations of financing
paramilitary groups — their business returns are increasingly negative. This attitude of flirting
with leaving the country is seen by the union as an attempt to strengthen Drummond’s position in
relation to the government, and not necessarily an attempt to actually leave the country. In fact,
after claiming for a year that they were considering leaving, by the end of 2019 they changed their
opinion and decided to stay.131
On the other hand, multiple organizations, such as CENSAT and Tierra Digna, have been
trying to figure out ways to introduce the question of energy transitions in the country. During the
presidential election of 2018, leftist candidate Gustavo Petro used the issue of coal and
extractivism to carve out a path of innovative politics that aimed to move away from the history
of violence and extractivism that has had so much weight in the last fifty years of Colombian
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“Porqué se Cayó el que Iba a ser el Negocio Más Grande del año? Drummond desistió vender su Operación en
Colombia” Newspaper El Tiempo, November 2018.
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politics. He was not very successful, and his take on energy transitions was widely questioned in
public. However, this intervention seemed like a shift in the national debate, or an open window
for a shift. For Colombian activists and NGOS the conversations with German and British activists
only made more obvious the urgency of this discussion. This debate seemed particularly relevant
because, as I have shown, coal extractivism and its long-term violent manifestations seemed to be
not relevant compared to other extractivist practices and their relation with armed violence.
Probably because of this, for Catalina Caro of CENSAT Vattenfall´s132 decision to visit
Colombia was a victory. According to her, the coalition formed by CENSAT-CINEP-CCAJAR
had been trying to find new alternatives for political intervention, and convincing Vattenfall to
conduct a visit to Colombia was a significant move in this direction. As I was told by several
people, environmental organizations along the networks of anti-coal activism in Europe and
Colombia had for a while been considering tactics such as divestment and direct intervention in
corporate decision-making in order to further their goals. The idea might feel surprising at first,
given that trusting a coal corporation to have any kind of impact on coal practices seems at odds
with most of the discussions I had heard until that point.
However, as I learned later, a Swedish coalition of civil society organizations known as
Forum Syd was putting pressure on the Swedish government, to consider the effects of Vattenfall’s
involvement in the value chain of Colombian coal. The stories of death, murder and violence
resonated with intensity in the Swedish public sphere and, under the framework of best practices,
it seemed plausible for the organizations in Sweden and Colombia to open up a conversation on
coal extraction and its future.
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Vattenfall is a multinational energy corporation from Sweden, owned by the Swedish state. According to their
website, their market is mostly in Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the U.K.
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Vattenfall’s involvement in the chain of value is one of distribution. Essentially, the
company buys Colombian coal and uses it at their different thermoelectric plants in Europe.
Therefore, the company played a substantial role in maintaining the energy needs of Europe, and
in that connection the idea of inviting it to conduct a field visit in Colombia seemed an appropriate
move in the desired direction.
Vattenfall hired a person to conduct a visit that would result in a report. Alejandra, a
Spanish lawyer and part of Vattenfall, met with government and corporate representatives, visited
communities, mines, unions and NGOs to get a sense of coal conflicts in the country. When she
travelled to the Caribbean, the Swedish aid agency provided support for the many NGOs involved
in coal-related issues. The result was that during her trip, in the visits to affected communities and
at most meetings there were more NGO representatives, activists and scholars than inhabitants
affected by coal extraction. But those who were present were fierce. Alejandra was very careful of
not showing any sign of sympathy, trying to gather information without hinting at any particular
position, listening closely and being skeptical of any kind of evidence that was presented to her.
As Vattenfall´s concerns were not with one mine or one corporation, she visited Guajira, Cesar
and Magdalena, doing an analysis of the links between the different mining operations. In this
way, she was doing something that most NGOs have considered but not accomplished, namely,
thinking of coal extraction as a regional complex of material conflicts, rather than fragmented
experiences turned into cases by NGOS, lawyers and anti-coal activists.
During one meeting at a hotel in Riohacha, Alejandra met with representatives from CENSAT,
Tierra Digna and CINEP, who had previously been preparing what was going to be said to her. By
this time it seemed obvious to her that there was, at the very least, a level of negligence in the
operations. The group of NGOs concentrated on the closing plan of Cerrejón’s mine, which in
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their opinion was sketchy at best, but for the most part it was not even presented as thorough and
planned. In their opinion, the plan was more like a suggestion for a future to come, and was being
brought every once in a while to ratify its existence, but was never pursued.
The question of a devastated landscape without possible renovation became a common
concern for Alejandra, as she mentioned during their conversation. Vattenfall’s role in the coal
chain was one of buying Colombian coal. Hence, the company understands that Drummond, the
Cerrejón conglomerate, Prodeco and Glencore are suppliers. In the report, the company states that
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights allow Vattenfall to situate not in the
“cause” case, namely, a direct generator of violence, but most likely in the position of contributing
or linked to cases of human rights violations (Vattenfall 2017: 7). This position of distance is not
one of lack of responsibility in the eyes of Vattenfall, but one in which its responsibility is tied to
the operations of coal extraction as a whole, namely, the value chain of coal, rather than what
occurs around one mine.
The fact that Vattenfall holds this position of buyer means that they do not have their feet
on the ground, but they do not differentiate coal extraction by departments, government
administration, businesses, indigenous communities, peasants and town inhabitants as isolated
cases.

Although the report is organized by departments and forms of violence such as

environment, unionization and displacement, it is aimed to present an overview of coal extraction
as an interconnected flow of operations in the Caribbean. Vattenfall´s responsibility as an energy
supplier and coal buyer cannot differentiate among the coal extraction operations, and thus
highlights the interconnection between modes of violence and the value of coal as a commodity.
Its position is also one respected by the companies in Colombia, and its voice is valued for its role
in the market of extractive industries. But Vattenfall´s decision of addressing the violence of coal
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as a material continuum reverberated in the ways in which NGOs conducted their work. The visit
encouraged NGOs and activists to consider their cases not as isolated experiences, but as the
articulated results of a plurality of practices of coal extraction that reverberated into each other.
Rather than the isolation and particularism of specific cases, the visit of Vattenfall generated a
recognition of connection and repetition. Air pollution at the indigenous reservations in Guajira,
the ports in Magdalena and villages in Cesar; death threats from unknown groups against unions,
indigenous communities and village leaders; water grabbing at different points; noise, violence
and wastelands throughout the mining complex.

Grassroots attempts of de-fragmentation
Coalitions of social movements like Congreso de los Pueblos, Marcha Patriótica and
Dignidades Agrarias considered that after the unexpected support of peasant strikes and indigenous
protests in previous years, it was a proper moment to explicitly bring to the public their critiques
of economic policies in the country. Among the many results of these protests, the coalitions and
the government agreed on the creation of the mesa minero-energética, a negotiation forum
between the government and social movements to discuss energy policies and extractivism.
Talking to leaders of the different grassroots organizations involved in the mesa in 2016,
there was a generalized sensation that the suspension of war during peace negotiations was opening
political scenarios that did not seem possible years before. For decades these organizations were
accused of being politically aligned –and commanded- by guerrillas, which made them targets of
the Colombian army, paramilitary groups and even competing guerrillas. But for a moment these
accusations seemed to decrease, and grassroots movements felt that a new political field was
slowly opening.
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As a result of the escalation of war and the stigmatization of social movements as belonging
to guerrillas, human rights discourses, practices and institutions became a site for retreat, a secure
possibility of denunciation within internationally accepted legal and moral frameworks (Gil 2016,
Van Isschot 2015). Thus, Colombian social movements became experts of human rights,
international legislation and lobbying in these transnational networks (Cotton and Royle 2014; Gill
2009; Tate 2009). For the period during the negotiations in which combat and military actions
were suspended, deaths of civilians dropped significantly,133 and social movements believed that
political “positions,” that used to be the motive for an attack, could now exist in the public sphere.
Among these were the mining and energy policies implemented by the government. The
term Minero-energetico implied not only mining extractivist industries, but also massive
environmental transformations towards energy production: dams, management of water, oil and
gas, as well as the uses of alternative sources of energy besides fossil fuels. Hence, the negotiation
table encompassed a plurality of projects, which meant not only various actors but also a diversity
of conflicts.
The different coalitions belonging to this negotiation table organized regional meetings in
which local movements tried to come together to build a coherent proposal to be brought back to
the negotiations in Bogotá. The meeting for the Caribbean region took place in Valledupar, capital
of Cesár, and was organized by unions with the support of Congreso de los Pueblos. The Comité
Clasista de Trabajadores Ignacio Torres Giraldo was in charge of the meeting that took place in
October 2016. Their intention was to bring together different leftist unions and grassroots
movements to analyze the development of coal in the region and create a plan of action that, while
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El Espectador, using data from the Centro de Recursos para Análisis de Conflictos, reported in 2018 that “while
in 2002 there were reported 2799 deaths between guerrillas, civilians and military, in 2017 there were none”. “La
Reducción de Muertes en el Conflicto Tras el Acuerdo con las FARC” El Espectador, June 23rd 2018.
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having at its center the concerns and interests of unionized workers. It was able to engage in a
process of articulación, namely, the creation of a common agenda between peasants, indigenous
communities and unions. The term articulación is regularly used by activists in Colombia, and it
is usually presented as part of the aspirations of social movements to pursue an idea that resembles
what Mouffe and Laclau consider a project of hegemony as the articulation of subject positions
(Laclau and Mouffe 2014).
The term articulación is a more nuanced approach to the term unidad, as it signals the
intention of joining efforts around specific concerns, rather than the pursuit of a homogenous
organization. The line of distinction between these two concepts might not seem immediately
clear, but it could be defined, precisely, in the effort of authors such as Mouffe and Laclau. In
their famous work aimed to re-elaborate the concept of hegemony, the authors discuss the
development of debates of political organization since the late nineteenth century, stressing the
role of political subjectivity and, in an important manner, the revolutionary subject.
Laclau and Mouffe´s project aimed to redefine the field of radical politics by questioning
what they considered to be the “[...] epistemological prerogative based upon the ontologically
privileged position of a “universal class”” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 3) in a moment where
critiques of certain prevalent notions of Marxism, political subjectivity and social movements´
organizing were common.
The call for unidad was explicitly connected to the emergent concerns about energy
policies and extractivism, in a way that aimed to find what they called “caminos de unidad”,
namely, the articulation of political positions of those affected by mining operations. Nevertheless,
it also pointed to two concerns: on the one hand, the idea that the corporations, along with local
and national elites, were already united in a transnational bloc with the purpose of continuous
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accumulation; on the other, the difficulties for making sense of the coal experience in the
Caribbean as shared throughout the coal complex that connects Guajira, Cesár and Magdalena.
The cases that I studied in this research are a clear example of the diversity of conflicts produced
by coal, not only because they are all connected to different moments of the coal chain of value,
but also because in spite of the many scenarios where the actors involved are together, it has not
yet been possible to find a way to articulate a political project that effectively encompasses the
material, affective and vital relations that these actors experience in relation to the extraction of
coal.
The October 2016 gathering brought activists from different backgrounds and places of the
Caribbean: peasants, indigenous communities, coal workers, and fishermen, and activists from
political parties, lawyers and NGOs. According to one of the organizers from the Comité Clasista,
We are a clasista organization. But we do not think that class should be all that movements
must be about. In fact, our aim is to challenge those unions that think like that, or that think
that class can only exist in the union or the workers of the mine. We need to find a different
notion of class, which articulates workers of different types and communities, because we
need to be clasistas in relation to capital, not as a formality for a union.134
The words of the organizer present a particular take of the event. As mentioned in previous
chapters, in Colombia there has been a growing criticism against the effects of multiculturalism,
specifically directed to the ways in which it has fragmented political subjectivities and thus created
differentiated and competing demands. The 1991 constitution explicitly defines Colombia as a
multicultural and pluri-ethnic country, which in spite of the many benefits it provided for
historically marginalized groups, produced fragmented political scenarios. As in other parts of the
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Interview with a member of Comité Clasista, Bogotá September 2016.
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world, in Colombia social movements are also thinking through the limitations generated by
multiculturalism.
The event was created as follows: first, it was organized by a group with a class-based and
union-driven political stance. Second, it had two main political objectives: on the one hand, it was
an opportunity for the organizers to organize a meeting with the different unions of the area. On
the other hand, it attempted to find modes of articulación between unions and indigenous, AfroColombian and rural movements.
Those three final groups were defined as communities, creating a distinction before the
event started. Whereas unions and political parties seemed to be part of one group, “communities”
belonged to a different one. This differentiation reproduced a longstanding fracture that assumed
in certain organizations a higher understanding of politics, conscience or revolutionary capacity.
Coming from a highly conservative approach of leftist traditions, this distinction presupposes that
communities had a more simplistic understanding of the coal political economy and its
transnational process of value making.
The organizers were aware of such tension, for in their experiences they had to deal with
situations in which unions and peasants argued extensively over the value attributed to specific
topics over others. This awareness led to the idea that creating a scenario where debates could
move from fragmentary demands to an interconnected assessment of the political-economy of
extractivism would lead to the creation of a common agenda to supersede isolated objectives.
In the two-day meeting, the first day was dedicated to a conversation between different
groups affected by coal, informed by what was deemed as structural analysis provided by scholars,
renowned activists and politicians. The discussion revolved around three concerns: unity, peace
negotiations and the multiple forms of violence produced by coal. The first topic was an abstract
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expectation voiced in negative terms, as a substantial problem of the different initiatives that was
constantly undermining the achieving of concrete goals. Meanwhile, peace negotiations were
approached not in relation to the present of coal extraction, but as an undeniable force that
organized politics in Colombia. Peace negotiations were discussed as the impossibility of escaping
their pervasiveness and effects, for they were a central concern at a national level, rather than
focusing concrete effects in coal policies. As mentioned before, the form that this discussion took
place during this meeting was the result of the marginalization of environmental discussion from
the peace negotiation. Finally, each participant would explain their particular relation to coal:
indigenous people fighting Cerrejón´s water grabbing projects and whitewashing strategies;
fishermen demanding that someone pay attention to the effects of the ports on their work; village
leaders discussing the effects of trains, pollution and relocation and peasants denouncing how coal
was making impossible for them to grow food.
The proliferation of concerns stated by communities was often followed by a fierce critique
towards unions and politicians from the leftist parties:
I do have to say to the union comrades that putting in your list of demands our demands to
say that you are with us, but after you received what´s negotiated you forget about our
things is very wrong. Like that it is not possible to build unity or anything. Because the
comrades use their position for negotiation to take advantage of both sides.135

This was a regular concern during the first day of the gathering. Actors belonging to what
was defined as communities criticized what they considered to be a form of abuse by unions: unity

“Y yo si le tengo que decir a los sindicalistas que eso de poner en un pliego de peticiones nuestras demandas
para decir que están con nosotros y luego de recibir lo negociado se olvidan de lo nuestro está muy mal. Así no es
posible construir unidad ni nada. Porque los compañeros usan su posición para negociar para aprovecharse por los
dos lados”. Intervention of a peasant leader from South Cesar, Valledupar 2016.
135
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was being used as a bargaining tool with the sole purpose of gaining enough support for the
negotiating table, but there were no concrete achievements, according to these leaders, because
unions did not care about those issues. As was mentioned to me several times, communities
believed that the unions’ only goal was to guarantee that their workers keep their jobs, and
therefore the concerns of the communities were not actually a significant part of union´s
negotiations.
Definitions of nature situate actors in different fields of action. Hence, the narrative of
political parties and unions analyze coal extraction as a political economy that fueled war during
the 1990’s and the first decade of this century. But its relevance is usually framed in terms of
nature as a collection of inert elements in dispute for human control (Ghosh 2018).
The debates occurring in this gathering resemble many of the traditional critiques in the
field of social movement studies since the late sixties (Hannigan 1985, Archila 2003, Buechler
1995). The distinction between old and new social movements –that stressed repertoires of action
and differences in demands- is not very different from the idea that unions and political parties still
are at the forefront of political transformation, while other groups –in this case defined as
communities- need to be subordinated to higher forms of politics developed by unions and parties.
This tension was precisely what the organizers were trying to confront and avoid while
they were putting together the methodology of the event. In order for the two-day gathering to be
possible –and as representatives of a larger coalition with a strong presence of peasant and
indigenous organizations- they held, as usual, a number of previous meetings in which they
analyzed the situation of the region. This analysis led to the recognition of several tensions between
indigenous communities, peasant organizations, NGOs and unions. Hence, they knew that these
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conflicts would emerge during the meeting, and it was necessary to find ways to address them, not
necessarily to neutralize them, but to find “caminos de unidad”.
However, the two-day meeting only had substantial presence from the communities during
the first day, which made the efforts of unidad difficult to achieve. As often happened during
meetings I attended during my fieldwork, after the presentations from scholars about the political
economy of coal, legal analysis and the implementation of the peace accords, the floor would be
opened to interventions that turned into reiterations of the problems that communities were
experiencing, the need for unidad to face corporate politics and their alliance with regional elites
and the government.
There was a sensation of talking in a context where not a lot of people were listening. This
is not unusual during these events. Participants sometimes feel that other people talk too much,
repeat topics or only participate in order to show their importance as leaders. Likewise, as an
activist told me,
At the end what matters is what is recorded in the minutes. That is why las organizaciones
are always fighting for the minutes. You have a lot of people talking and the methodology
is about recording them, but most of the time it is confusing or the organizers think they
know what will be said. So things are recorded, but then the organizers discuss and define
the priorities and release a statement, which is what seems to matter.

Activists such as this have been present in these kinds of events for a long time, and they
are able to recognize patterns of political practice about how these events are set up. They grow
tired of what they recognize to be tactics conducted by certain organizations in order to make their
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point move to the top of the priorities while being legitimized by an idea of consensus created in
the public statement.
Unity is manufactured in the minute. The persons in charge of recording the interventions
and organizing them in a written document have the challenge of negotiating between the conflicts
that emerge in the room. They are not encouraged by the main organizers of the event to highlight
dissent, instead they are pushed to present the political as a flat surface in which every actor is
already articulated in a common project against a homogenous antagonist. Riles identified the
presence of these political patterns in her study of the making of collective documents at UN
sponsored gatherings, indicating not only their repetition across geographies, but a certain form of
layering in which documents “mirrored the others in form and function” (Riles 2001: 79). In her
view, more than originality, what these documents require is closer to familiarity and patience for
the task (Riles 2001: 80).
In her work, the documents analyzed have a set of pre-established conventions that remain
stable and are filled with specifics by the attendants of meetings. This is not, in principle, what
happens at the gatherings of social movements, for there are not always standardized version of
documents. But there are still conventions that are learnt from repetition, unwritten rules of what
minutes should contain in order to portray inclusion, unity and a strong political stance.
The discussion of what kind of language must be used is certainly relevant here too. In
Riles´ study, the proposed language is discussed within a proper procedure previously established,
that takes the form of inclusion within brackets and constitute a temporal suspension, a neverending possibility of development within the brackets, never fully resolved (Riles 2001: 100).
Proposed language set the terms of a discussion, and the negotiation that takes places is aimed to
bridge gaps between the language within the brackets (Riles 2001: 86). This is a form of writing a
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collective document that seems to speak to ideas of liberal consensus, and certainly differs from
what social movements in Colombia aim when they think of unity.
The political intention of the organizers is to show a cohesive bloc rather than a set of
disaggregated identities. Unity for them equals programmatic strength when confronting
corporations and state institutions. For this reason, terms like territorio, buen vivir, modelo
económico and peace work as coordinates through which the document is organized. They help to
guarantee the inclusion of the different groups, for they are hardly contentious terms and bring
public legibility to the final statement to other groups, both in Colombia and at a transnational
level.
The making of a common project requires a level of agreement, and since the interventions
moved between critiques of other organizations, the state and the call for unity, the form of unity
that takes shape in these situations revolves around general statements about such subjects but
subordinated to what is considered to be the higher form of political action and diagnosis of the
problem. One intervention, made by a member of a very important coal industry union might help
to understand the discussion:
I agree with the comrades (referring to the previous intervention by the communities). As
unions we can’t work only with ourselves, we need to pay attention to the territories. Unity
is important. Our work...we need to organize the peasant grassroots with the doctrine of
the working class, because the working class knows the stuff and knows what the vanguard
is. Is our task to go there, where peasants and indigenous people are and organize with the
working class doctrine? Or have we forgotten about historical materialism, comrades?”
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It is important to notice that the union leader was summarizing an ongoing debate and
trying to bring together workers and communities in a common project. However, unity in his
analysis was defined by a hierarchical framework in which what constitutes the political was
distributed by degrees of relevance and consciousness. In this sense, the different conflicts in
relation to coal would be located along the framework of priorities according to how political they
were, and this organization would make possible course of action.
This statement summarizes the concerns of everyday practices and attempts to create a
common project among different actors affected by coal operations in the region. Gatherings are
important places where multiple experiences are confronted against each other, struggling to
emerge as the main political compass for political action backed by other organizations, activists
and institutions. They are made of multiple ritualistic procedures, starting by their preparation, the
struggles to get access to decision-making scenarios and recording the results. Each step of a
meeting entails specific confrontations and forms of dissent that unfold the political terrain in
which the actors interact. Participants are fully aware of every step. They know and organize their
interventions; create tactics to wear down other participants and diminish the strength of their
claims; they calmly wait for the correct moment to talk, signal others to activate their talking or
move around the room to negotiate what will be said.
The development of these gatherings renders vivid the struggles that the different groups
are facing. As I suggested in previous chapters, the events of death are arranged in specific ways
for their presentation, and it is the organization that activates their existence. Hence, as indigenous
communities describe the massive environmental degradation, they are producing an object of
negotiation that interacts with the objects created by peasants and their problems with crops or
labor conditions as presented by unions.
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Coal unions´ interventions in a meeting such as the one described have a certain kind of
lasting resonance, for they are often better funded, have concrete scenarios of negotiation with
corporations and are not seen as objects of charity –as is often the case with peasant and indigenous
communities-. They usually have a stronger position throughout the gathering, and they can situate
their concerns at a higher status compared to communities.
The experiences presented in the meeting must show the degree to which they have a
relevant political dimension, and their general capacity to further structural political goals. This
definition of what constitutes “the political” becomes a question of the concrete understanding of
the role that the ideas of nature and death have for the political project of unity. Union leaders
prioritize an anthropocentric notion of rights and life. Their main concern is related to the concrete
conditions by which humans affected by coal are living. In that regard wages, education,
employment, violence by armed actors and health are their main concerns. The latter, which might
connect human life to environmental conditions, is often articulated as the ways in which
environmental degradation makes the life of humans possible. In that regard, there is an overall
recognition that non-human life exists and is important, but is certainly subordinated to human life
as the top political priority.
Communities also care about human life. But they usually situate this concern in relation
to the life of their experienced environment and the general effects that the overall degradation of
life has to the actual possibilities of human existence. This is often defined in terms of the la
defensa del territorio (defense of the territory), creating a connection between identity and the
reproduction of life that is rooted in a particular geography. Certainly, peasants, indigenous
communities, fishermen and Afro-Colombian groups for the most part put their labor to transform
the environment at a small scale, and therefore they become affected in a different way by the
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effects of coal extraction. To a certain degree, this means that their notion of the relevance of life
is extended to more-than-human beings, and in turn the idea of nature and death differ.
The debate becomes a discussion about the status of death. Through the prism of environment and
territorio, human death is inextricably tied to the well-being of the environment.

The status of

death informs the political organization of agendas, the networks in which cases circulate and the
relevance of specific experiences of death and dying.
Human precarity is often tied to the armed conflict. The argument is that there are structural
conditions that are the roots of Colombia’s longstanding war. By tackling directly the causes of
war it is possible to guarantee a transition to a democracy. In light of this, the historic demands of
workers, peasants and indigenous and Afro-Colombian movements, have largely revolved around
these material human needs. The idea that environmental violence needs to be considered as a
problem that threatens the possibility of reproduction of life –not only human life, but also nonhuman life- is often regarded as a secondary problem. This move requires an understanding of
nature-as-land defined as an economic object and a prize of war , as well as considering indigenous
and peasant understandings of nature as defined by ontological difference, in the sense that such
ideas of nature are specific to indigenous groups, peasant and Afro-Colombian communities and
cannot be expanded to other realms of debate.
The privileged site of contentious politics therefore is that of the human. Nature is a
homogenous concept that seems to remain untouched by politics and that nevertheless every actor
agrees needs to be protected. Furthermore, since there are no discussions about the status of the
environment in the peace accords, for many actors it is futile to discuss it. The idea of life, its
relation to war and the questions about a transition out of war, do not take into consideration the
environment beyond its proper use to guarantee a certain kind of life for human beings. Thus, when
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more-than-human life is brought into the discussion, it is often dismissed as not related to the
specific conversations of war, the structural causes of the armed conflict or the negotiations about
a political transition.

Travelling with NGOs
We were a group of five people travelling: the lawyer from the NGO, two people from a
Swedish NGO doing acompañamiento, a PhD student doing an internship and myself. Weeks
before this trip, I agreed to do an evaluation to consider possible directions that the NGO could
take in order for its work to have a clear strategy in the Caribbean. The NGO had been working
for around four years in both Magdalena and Cesar with two different communities, but had been
unable to find something that might tie together the different trajectories of these two groups. This
has been, to a greater or lesser degree, a concern of coalitions, NGOs and activists working in the
region.
The effects of coal -as we have seen throughout this work- proliferate throughout the region,
emerging in concrete ways in relation to the specific techno-political arrangements at each site.
NGOs struggle to capture these effects and make them concrete objects for political action.
But in these processes, cases become particularly isolated from each other: whether because NGOs
do not have resources to create strategies to generate dialogue; because it is a case that according
to the assessment of those in charge does not need to be linked to another one; or because the
networks for its circulation are different from other cases, the development of the cases often draw
the lines of their own limits and possibilities.
While Juana -the PhD student- was working on a project to build a visual platform of the
effects of coal in a village fighting for its relocation, I was looking at agreements between the
Colombian government and the national army in the area, health measurements at different points
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of the mining corridor and the company’s relation to neighborhoods in Magdalena and Cesar. My
conversations with Juana revolved, at first, around the notion of nature. According to her, because
I was constantly using the word nature in meetings and panel conferences, I was risking an active
reproduction of the dichotomy human/nature, which reproduced a notion of the environment that
actively pushed the humans away. She did not only mean human action, but specifically armed
conflict and its political violence. After much consideration, I answered that this was not the result
of my personal understanding of environmental conflicts, but the effect of discursive and material
practices by the actors I have been studying. In other words, I was trying to explain that NGOs,
human rights activists and communities were constantly reinforcing the great divide between
nature and society, even when they were questioning its making and were critical of the effects
that this divide had in their everyday practices.
That environmental conflicts are inherently political and are relevant for Colombia´s war
seemed to be an obvious statement for everyone working in the field of human rights, as well as
for environmentalists in war-related areas. The idea that the notion of nature was an outdated
concept that reified the environment, freezing it in time and making homogenous is, generally
speaking, known by grassroots and NGO activists. Nonetheless, the practices that assemble cases
usually reinforce the lines of distinction between fields and networks of circulation, specifically
between environmental struggles and war-related conflicts.
As we were travelling around Cesár and Magdalena with the lawyer in charge of the cases
in the area for this NGO, Juana and I discussed the relevance of the idea of nature, specifically in
relation to the possibilities of generating a project able to link different experiences around coal in
the region. Boquerón had been negotiating with the government and the corporation their
relocation, due to their proximity to the mine and the high levels of pollution. When we travelled
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to the area, Boquerón was in a vicious internal struggle between leaders, new and old inhabitants.
Leaders were being questioned for their incapacity to achieve a deal –some persons suggested that
they only went to the meetings for the lunch-, while older inhabitants argued that the new ones
only arrived because they knew their assets would be bought as a result of the relocation.
Meanwhile, recent news claimed that the latest scientific studies of air quality said that it was no
longer necessary to relocate the town.
A few kilometers further south, another famous case had a different course, in Hatillo. This
place was significantly closer to a mine, and unlike Boquerón, it seemed to have a stronger case
for relocation. At different meetings and conferences in Bogotá, lawyers from Boquerón and
Hatillo repeatedly claimed that they represented “the most harmed community at risk of
relocation”, which immediately triggered a response from the other representative. The lawyers
certainly did not intend to undermine each other's cases, but to render visible the fact that there
was another village going through a very similar situation. However, the result was a constant
comparison between the two cases, as aid agencies or researchers would bring the name of the
forgotten village at any given moment, which seemed to dismiss the other. This led, in one
particular meeting with international NGOs and experts from the Netherlands and Germany, to
one of the lawyers saying: “we should not be trying to compete about which community is the
most affected by coal and coal dust. We should be trying to find a strategy to address the problems
that these two communities are facing and find a way to move forward an agenda around that”.
This was not exclusively a problem of two competing lawyers and NGOs. Aid agencies
saw the differences between these two cases, not only because Boquerón´s relocation was on the
process of being suspended, but because Hatillo had a closer relation to the immediacy of postconflict and the killing of activists after the peace accords. As we were travelling around the area,
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we saw the complications that Tierra Digna had to assemble the different experiences it was
working on, due in part to the variety of problems that the communities were facing, but also
because their cases were being constantly sidelined for their lack of connection to the
implementation of the peace accords. In our last stop in Valledupar before returning to Bogotá,
MAP-OEA asked for a meeting with Tierra Digna in order to “find ways of articulation” of the
different initiatives they both had. After TD explained their initiatives with regard health and
relocation of Boquerón, the MAP-OEA representative explained that their work was being
directed, almost entirely, to strengthen the implementation of the peace accords, putting an special
emphasis on the Zonas Veredales136 and peace-related efforts.
It was at this point when silence sank heavily on the table. As we were staring into each other's
eyes, the main interlocutors –the TD lawyer and the OEA representative- seemed to be looking for
ways to overcome what seemed to be an impasse. The OEA representative said:
-So, you see, I do not know exactly how to articulate our work with yours.
●

Well, Boquerón has a history of violence as well.

-Yeah...In Hatillo they have killed people recently, and they are receiving threats, has anything
like that happened recently in Boquerón?
●

Well...what do you mean...There have been reports of people in motorcycles moving
around and scaring people away...

-Yeah, but something that we can say is related to BACRIM or paramilitaries?
●

Well...no. Not like that. There have been some situations of people driving around in
motorcycles, harassing leaders. But no death threats or killings. Not like Hatillo.

136

These were the special zones where demobilized FARC members were concentrated. In the peace accords, these
zones would become targets of investment and support to help ex-combatants to return to civil society,
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-Yeah...If there were actual threats we could had been able to intervene and maybe help with
the other stuff, but the mandate is very clear. Everything has to be focused on the
implementation.
This exchange was a major turn for the conversation. It was obvious that there were no further
possibilities to pursue, for the MAPP-OEA mandate clearly defined the limits for intervention and
funding. The mutual recognition of the general importance of coal extraction in the region did not
translate into concrete actions or projects to address the relation between coal and war. Although
the doors were not completely closed for future collaborations or side projects, it became clear that
MAPP-OEA understood extractivism in a different light compared to TD´s analysis of the region.
We left the meeting in direction to the airport trying to wrap our minds around how the meeting
unfolded and what it said for our personal interests, as well as for the objectives of TD. MAPPOEA did not deny the importance of Boquerón, neither considered the experience of coal
extraction through an understanding of nature as inert or secondary. But it was not its mandate, for
it could not engage in a process that questioned legal practices of coal extraction, regulated by the
state and with no explicit relation to the armed conflict or political violence. The normative notion
of nature, its explicit rejection of the multiplicity of violence as an interconnected flow that
threatened life, had apparently won.

Dark futures.
As the present unravels, the normative concepts of violence keep being challenged. The
peace accords and FARC demobilization have created a reconfiguration of illegal armies,
corporate activities and the analysis that the actors of this dissertation are making about the future
of the country. Pundits and think tanks argue that FARC has left a void in areas that they used to
control, and now are up for grabs, with other guerrillas, new paramilitary groups, drug lords and
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FARC dissident groups fighting over them. The sense of hope that shined with the peace
negotiations began to shatter after October of 2016, when a referendum aimed to ratify the peace
accords had an appalling result that rejected them.
The term social leader became regularly used to describe the escalation of targeted murders
against activists in small towns or villages that spiked after the referendum. The killings could not
be tied to a concrete political project, a group or reason. The persons murdered had very different
backgrounds and political struggles: from village leaders in rural areas, to union members, activism
in neighborhoods, local nodes of parties, or environmental grassroots organizing. The term social
leader was used to group the plurality of political positions of the persons murdered in a loose
way that tried to point to a shared -albeit loose- identity.
The murders are the result of a variety of situations, mostly related to the targets opposing
or questioning the presence of illegal armies, extractivist projects, and coercion to force peasants
to grow coca as well as their participation in political organizations from the left. As presented in
previous chapters, the actors involved in human rights´ discussions started to denounce these
killings, but to this day they have a hard time establishing a set of patterns that can reunite the
more than 600 killings since 2016 in a coherent form137. This is a major issue, for the claim of
human rights activists is that it is possible to claim the existence of a systematic practice of killing
akin to previous moments in the history of Colombian violence.
President Santos and his minister of interior repeatedly denied that the overwhelming
number of killings had a systematic pattern of connection. Duque´s government repeated the same
argument right at the beginning of its term, adding that the problem was the result of Santos´ poor
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“702 líderes sociales y 135 excombatientes habrían sido asesinados desde firma del Acuerdo” El Espectador,
May 23, 2019. It is important to notice that the numbers differ between NGOS, aid agencies and government
institutions.

231

security policies. The governments and their representatives argued that the persons murdered have
no clear connection between them, that there is no proof of a plan to kill, that the motives are
varied, responding mostly to ordinary criminality, and that the perpetrators are too loose and
sometimes impossible to define.
In this discussion, the search for sistematicidad is at the center of the debates. The terms
point out not only to the idea that violence is systemic, but also to proving that it is exercised as a
pattern and a plan. As several lawyers told me, defining these murders as systematic, constitute a
practice that might be a direct violation of the Rome Statute, specifically the Chapeu of chapter 7.
As explained by Robinson, during the Rome conference it was recognized that not all crimes could
be considered against humanity, and a debate developed how to define the threshold of what
constitutes it, in which the distinction between “widespread and systematic” and “widespread or
systematic” took most of the floor (Robinson 1999: 47). According to Robinson, the solution to
this debate entailed the articulation of three elements: course of conduct, a level of scale and
policy/planning (1999: 50).
The debate about systematic killings in Colombia is crucial to show the interrelation of
these three elements. An important example of this attempt is the report ¿Cuáles son los Patrones?
Asesinatos de líderes Sociales en el Post-Acuerdo, published in 2018 and conducted by 11
Colombian organizations and the Somos Defensores program138. In it the organizations aim to
define the shared identity of a social leader, as well as try to describe patterns that explain their
killings and point to systematicity. The report took into consideration 144 murders, explaining that
this number is only partial and the numbers are significantly higher (Somos defensores 2018: 5).
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Somos defensores. “¿Quienes somos?”. September 2020. According to their website, Somos Defensores is a
coalition of four NGOs formed in 1999. Since 2006, three of this NGOs coordinate the project with funding of
different aid agencies.
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Their definition of social leader is “ a person respected by its community because she conducts,
coordinates, or supports processes or activities with a collective quality that positively affects the
life of the community, improves and dignifies their life condition and builds its social fabric 139”
(Somos Defensores, 2018: 9). In this definition, there is a clear attempt to bring together the
plurality of political actors that get murdered into a shared identity, but also to draw connections
between the causes for their killings. In addition, the report tries to indicate the authors of the
assassinations. According to their data, FARC dissidents committed 19 of the murders,
unidentified armed groups 35 and paramilitary groups 44. However, the number of unidentified
authors is 118 (Somos Defensores 2018: 30).
The relation between the definition of social leader, the obscurity that shrouds the
perpetrators and the motives of the murders speak of a transformation that started with
paramilitarism demobilization in 2006, exposing the limits of the narrowing definitions of violence
and death. As suggested in the first chapter, the proliferation of armed groups that started in 2006
created a significant challenge in the redefinition of the question of war and violence, with the
term armed conflict organizing the legal, political and material definitions of death. The Centro
Nacional de Memoria Histórica (CNMH) gathered different databases of human rights violations
tied to the armed conflict to produce a comprehensive statistical analysis of the violence produced
in the context of war.140 But as the term armed conflict fades away in the midst of transitional
politics, so does the conceptual frameworks that were often used to describe forms of violence.

“Un líder o lideresa social es una persona que cuenta con reconocimiento de su comunidad por conducir,
coordinar o apoyar procesos o actividades de carácter colectivo que afectan positivamente la vida de su comunidad,
mejoran y dignifican sus condiciones de vida o construyen tejido social”.
140
The database could be found here
http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/basesDatos.html. Nevertheless, the team
in charge of its making was aware of the conceptual and analytical complications that it entailed, and therefore they
attempt an explanation of the process, which can be found here
http://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/en/noticias/noticias-cmh/asi-se-construyo-la-base-de-datos-mas-importantesobre-el-conflicto
139
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Unlike other forms of extractivism, coal extraction is considered a relatively stable and
legal activity. Its material present is defined by the massive infrastructure required to create its
value through exports, as well as the administration of the mines and revenues. But this presence
is the sign of its own unraveling of violence, the radical transformation of the landscape and the
redefinition of political positions in the region through the use of violence, whether it would be
paramilitary or the national army. Today, the landscape of coal extraction buries the traces of life
before, and with it, the practices of violence that were required to make this present possible.
The government and regional elites see coal extraction as a successful industry, one that
has brought development and that could be regulated because it exists in the realm of legality.
Sometimes it is even compared to the varieties of gold extraction in the opposite parts of the
country, where illegal and artisanal mining coexist with transnational corporations’ projects of
large mining projects, usually conducted by transnational corporations. They present coal
extraction as a successful story that gravitates in and out of the history of the armed conflict. In
such context, transnational corporations have no responsibility to appear in front of the transitional
justice apparatus.
Meanwhile, extractivist practices that fuel the emergent modes of violence overflow the
legal and conceptual definition of war and violence. The term social leader encompasses political
activists deeply committed against the different modalities of mining for a variety of reasons: from
the massive destruction of the environment, to the attempt of multinational corporations to
monopolize extractivism, activists have been threatened and killed for their public opposition to
extractivism. The position of these leaders increasingly blurs the standardized conceptual limits of
modes of violence, making a strong effort to articulate a notion of the environment that is
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intrinsically linked to human life, as the condition of possibility for the reproduction of life rather
than through a definition of nature as subordinated to the human.
Since the exclusion of environmental violence from the peace accords, environmentalists,
indigenous and grassroots organizations facing extractivist industries have presented their
concerns to the Truth Commission and JEP about the possible effects of such exclusion. They have
submitted reports aimed to show the link between the environment and the armed conflict, and
have held multiple gatherings discussing how to make possible interventions in the transitional
apparatus in order to re-introduce the environment as an agent and a victim. In these attempts, coal
is not usually discussed. Although there are not definitive reasons for this marginalization, coal
extraction is generally seen as belonging to a different moment in the links between armed conflict
and environment.
Such moment is related to AUC paramilitarism rather than the more recent peace-accords
with FARC. Somehow, the materiality of coal is the proof of a process already fixed in the
mountains of waste, the holes in the earth, the roads and the trains. A victory materialized in the
coal complex of the Caribbean. Its existence is now undisputable, as much as its legality. The
modalities of death that have spread from coal in the region remain sidelined, while discussions
of gold extraction and the use of mercury, pollution of rivers and destruction of shores are
increasingly present in relation to the new illegal armies, as if they belonged to a different reality.
But union leaders and grassroots organizations in the Caribbean denounce death threats and murder
attempts made by obscure armed groups, in ways that are similar to those occurring in other parts
of the country.
The fracture is largely the result of how the practices, institutions and discourses of human
rights and extractivism organize the cases related to forms of violence. The effects go so far that
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even as restrictive notions of violence are questioned by activists, political organizations, NGOs
and grassroots movements, the actors are forced to return to them rather than being able to assert
different understandings of the relation between war, violence and the environment. In this way,
attempts to redefine nature become reduced to particularist approaches of radical alterity that
cannot be used beyond the realm of identitarian claims for defense of territorio. Meanwhile, the
interconnected flows of violence that assemble the material organization of power are fragmented
in specific cases with normative definitions of violence.
The transitional process is also presented as a promise. Quite often, it is the promise of
liberal democracy, of the fulfillment of modernist dreams of a rational organization of society,
with strong markets connected to the global economy. However, in Colombia the possibilities of
transition have occurred in stages -first the paramilitary process and ten years later with FARC,
leaving, at least one active guerrilla, the ELN-, always uncompleted, signaling a new mode of war
rather than its end. Currently, the peace process is an uncertain terrain, with the transitional
institutions struggling to gain legitimacy while being undermined by the government, increasingly
losing the confidence of victims and with a national army that seems to remain at war.141 The
murders, threats and acts of repression executed by the military and illegal groups are proof of this.
The defense of the peace accords and its transitional apparatuses seem to be at odds with
reconsidering emerging forms of war that escape the notion of armed conflict and its legal-political
consequences. This has to do with the fact that the extreme right rejects the term armed conflict,
arguing that the Colombian state has faced a “terrorist threat”. This position by the right has the
141

An important faction of the military -retired and active- argue that they should not be prosecuted under the same
laws as the guerrillas in a transitional scenario. Duque´s government and party have tried to pass laws to create
special scenarios for prosecution of the military, albeit ineffectively. Likewise, at the end of 2019 and the start of
2020, several media outlets reported wire-taps conducted by the military intelligence to left wing politicians and
activists. Finally, the murder -and subsequent cover up by the government- of Dimar Torres, a FARC ex-combatant
showed to the public that the military was not overly interested in the protection of former guerrillas nor respecting
the peace accords.
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objective of obliterating the political character of war, its history and effects, even dismissing the
existence of victims of state violence. For many actors supporting the accords, suggesting that war
has moved from the definitions of armed conflict to a new mode that is not currently legible is a
direct threat to the accords, transitional justice and reparations that risks a widespread recognition
of the right´s terminology.
The term social leader is a fragile concept that pinpoints to the plurality of violence and the
impossibility of the different actors to coherently make sense of the current state of affairs. At the
moment, it seems to be closer to an open denial of rethinking death in Colombia under the
expectation of a peace that has not yet arrived. It tends to obscure and homogenize the plurality of
violence, the struggle of activists and organizations under sometimes idealized notions of activism
that are framed within the defense of liberal democracy rather than the radical critique that activists
articulate as a flow of interconnected forms of violence that produce a particular social order.At
the same time, what lies underneath the term is the impossibility of making sense of the plurality
of death, the overflowing of normative notions of violence, victims and motives. Considering
forms of violence, its geographies and materialities as fragmented and self-contained experiences
is creating significant limitations in the ways in which violence and environmental destruction are
addressed. We need alternative notions of war, death and violence that could explicitly articulate
the modalities of violence.
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